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JPRS-SEA-85-103

1 July 1985

Southeast Asia Report

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 4, April 1985

19991018 026

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SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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No. 4, April 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Communist Party published in Hanoi.

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TEN YEARS OF TENACIOUS STRUGGLE, TEN YEARS OF GLORIOUS VICTORIES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 1-7

[Editorial]

[Text] Ten years ago, our entire country was living the heroic hours of the great victory of the spring of 1975. Seizing an unparalleled, historic opportunity, our Party Central Committee, headed by the esteemed Le Duan, elaborated the strategy for winning victory over the U.S. imperialists in our final test of strength with them. In the spirit of determination to fight and win and with fighting skills born of our forefathers' tradition of fighting the enemy to defend the country and the party's many years of experience in struggle, our armed forces and people, in 55 days and nights of attacks and uprisings, the pinnacle of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, crushed the more than 1 million man lackey army of the United States, thereby carrying out Uncle Ho's teaching to "drive off the Americans, bring down the puppets." Our armed forces and people won victory rapidly, systematically and thoroughly. The enemy had no time to react, not even the aggressor and expansionist powers had time to carry out their dirty strategic calculations. That resounding victory led to the complete liberation of the South, the completion of the people's national, democratic revolution in the South and the eventual reunification of the country. With the country reunified and the nation completely independent, the position and forces of the Vietnamese revolution increased many times and our nation stood on the threshold of a new era.

The significance of the great victory won in the spring of 1975 goes far beyond the borders of our country. At the victory celebration held on 15 May 1975 in the capital Hanoi, Le Duan said: "The victory of Vietnam...is not only the victory of national independence and socialism in Vietnam, but is also a victory of enormous international significance and clearly marks the start of a new age: it has overturned the global strategy of the U.S. imperialists. It has proven that the three revolutionary currents of our times are on the offensive, are gradually forcing imperialism to retreat, are bringing imperialism down one piece at a time."

It is not surprising to hear people talk about the "post-Vietnam period." It has been a period in which the balance of power in the world has changed, in which imperialism, headed by the U.S. imperialists, has been weakened in every

respect and has become increasingly mired in a general crisis. Meanwhile, the position of world socialism has been strengthened and the offensive position of the three revolutionary currents is stronger and more solid than ever before. It has been a period in which oppressed peoples, inspired by the example of Vietnam, have arisen in determined struggle to win their independence and freedom and nearly 100 million people on the various continents have embarked on the course of socialism. It has been a period in which an entire generation has grown up within the international communist and worker movement through the struggle to support Vietnam in its resistance against the United States for national salvation. Even in the United States, revolutionary and progressive forces also acknowledge that useful lessons have been learned from our people's war of resistance.

Today, the Reagan administration is often heard to proclaim: the Vietnam syndrome is over, the United States has regained its strength and prestige! However, such is not the case. The nightmare that was the Vietnam war still haunts U.S. ruling circles. The Vietnam syndrome still acutely afflicts American society. The lesson of Vietnam still deters the imperialists and reactionaries from taking adventurous and reckless actions. The "marvelous" strength of the U.S. imperialists is not inviolable. It was crushed in a country whose economic and military capabilities are many times less than those of the United States, a country whose name was once not even known by many people in the world--the country of Vietnam.

As we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the South, we feel very deep pride in our nation, our party, feel the deepest gratitude to those heroes who gave their lives in every year of the war to bring us to the great victory that was ours and will forever remember the service performed by the esteemed Uncle Ho who, together with the illustrious party, devoted his efforts to preparing for the victory of our armed forces and people and brought glory to our country. This occasion is also an opportunity for us to look back on the past 10 years in order to see ourselves more clearly and march steadily forward.

During the past 10 years, our people have carried out more than a few undertakings. It can be said that the past 10 years have been a period of glorious victories in our country's history. We have recorded comprehensive achievements in both socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland, in both politics and socio-economic matters, in both domestic and foreign affairs. Surmounting towering difficulties, we have developed for the Vietnamese revolution a new and more solid strategic posture and created new, large capabilities.

We quickly reunified the country in terms of state administration and then adopted numerous policies designed to stimulate the process of reunification in every respect. We gradually brought the entire nation into a life of harmony. Today, our nation's sense of unity is strongly evident in the socialist transformation and procurement movements in the South, the nationwide movement to support the frontline along the northern border, the implementation of uniform nationwide policies... This unity has created for

our country's revolution an enormous strength and allows us to bring the combined forces of the entire country to the causes of building and defending the fatherland.

The proletarian dictatorship system has been established throughout the country and proven its strength. This is the most important guarantee that the socialist revolution will develop. Through the strength of the proletarian dictatorship we have defeated the "post-war plan" of the U.S. imperialists, discovered and thwarted every plan of the imperialists and the expansionists and hegemonists to commit espionage and foment rebellion and firmly maintained political security. At the same time, we have effectively dealt with many pressing socio-economic problems. As a result, during the past 10 years, the socialist revolution has progressed relatively smoothly throughout the country and the laboring masses, especially farmers, have voluntarily and consciously adopted socialism.

Before the wounds of the 20 year war against the United States had time to heal, we had to deal with a new reactionary power, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. Our new enemy is very aggressive, cruel and cunning. They launched a two-pronged war of aggression in a vain attempt to annex our country. For the past several years, they have been waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against our country. In particular, they initiated a new tactic last year, a war of encroachment and occupation against our country. However, we have defeated each of their plans. We have begun to defeat the expansionist and hegemonist strategy of China, have stopped their encroachment and occupation activities, defended the fatherland's frontier and maintained the independence and sovereignty of the country. This is a victory of very large historic significance. Facts have proven that our people possess all the spirit and forces they need to win victory over our new enemy and that we know how to win victory over them.

Closely associated with this victory is the great victory won by the militant alliance among Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This alliance has become increasingly solid and cannot be undermined. The three socialist countries in Indochina have established a solid, strong and unified strategic posture. At the same time, the comprehensive cooperation between our country and the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries is developing more strongly with each day that passes. These are extremely important safeguards of the independence and security of our country and the other countries on the Indochina peninsula, of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and provide favorable conditions for the cause of socialist construction in our country.

During the past 10 years, we have recorded important achievements on the socio-economic front. To begin with, we carried out the enormous task of virtually abolishing private ownership of the means of production throughout the country and virtually abolishing every form of oppression and exploitation. Our society is leaving the era of the inevitable and entering the era of freedom. What was once only the dream, the ambition of countless generations of our forefathers has now become reality: the working people are the true masters of the country.

Under the nearly two 5-year plans that we have completed, we have gradually overcome the serious consequences of the war, overcome continuous natural disasters, restored and reorganized production along socialist lines, reversed the serious economic decline of 1979 and 1980, gradually set the economy on an improving course, achieved stability in one area at a time and created the conditions for development in the years ahead.

We have been and are carrying out socialist transformation in the South and perfecting the socialist production relations in the North. In the South, the state has nationalized the economic bases of 290 compradore bourgeoisie, traitors and persons who fled the country; carried out the transformation of private, capitalist industry, primarily through joint public-private enterprises; abolished capitalist commerce and developed state-operated and cooperative commerce. In the South, we have redistributed 265,400 hectares of cropland to more than 440,000 farmers. At the same time, the socialist transformation of agriculture in the South is being strongly promoted. Today, cooperatives and production collectives account for 65 percent of farm households and 59.6 percent of farmland. There is the prospect that this cooperativization will be virtually completed in 1985. The entire country now has 15,629 cooperatives with more than 5.3 million member households, 335 state farms and nearly 2,900 state-operated industrial enterprises and joint public-private businesses with 695,000 workers. A state monopoly exists in foreign trade, banking, posts-telecommunications and virtually all of the transportation and capital construction sectors. As a result, the socialist economy now produces more than 56 percent of national income and 63 percent of the gross social product.

We have built a number of the material-technical bases of socialism and begun to build a new economic structure throughout the country. During the first several years of the past decade, we restored virtually all industrial plants, main roads, seaports and warehouses and put some 500,000 hectares of fallow land into production. Since then, many new projects have been constructed, such as thermoelectric and hydroelectric power plants, transformer stations and high voltage power lines, machine works, cement plants, engine works, building materials plants, chemical plants, mines and so forth, representative of which are the Pha Lai Thermoelectric power project, the Hoa Binh Hydroelectric power project, the Bim Son Cement Plant, the Hoang Thach Cement Plant, the Vung Tau petroleum-natural gas project, the Cam Pha Machine Works, etc. Special attention has been given to the construction of consumer goods factories and grain and food product processing plants. Within the communications-transportation sector, we have constructed more than 238 kilometers of rail line, nearly 3,500 kilometers of highways and dozens of kilometers of bridges, of which the Thang Long Bridge is a typical example, enlarged ports and equipped the economy with many additional means of transportation. The state has invested in agriculture and forestry about one-fifth of the capital it invests each year, constructed a number of large water conservancy projects, such as the Ke Go and Dau Tieng projects and cleared nearly 1 million hectares of land. These do not include the projects that have been constructed to support the commerce, service, public health and education sectors and support scientific research.

We have been redistributing and making good use of our country's abundant labor. Employment within the national economy has risen from 18.4 million persons in 1976 to 23.1 million in 1984. Some 92.4 percent of social labor is working within the material production sector. The technically skilled labor force has grown quickly, from 145,000 persons with a college or post-graduate education in 1976 to 265,500 in 1981. During the same period, the number of technical workers increased from 1,053,500 to 1,859,200.

In recent years, we have begun to build the economic-technical sectors, restructure and reorganize production and reassign management responsibilities and functions, all on the basis of socio-economic returns. At the same time, we have gradually established a new management system with the aim of eliminating bureaucracy and subsidization and tapping the initiative and creativity of the basic production units. Special attention has been given to building the district level. Our country's economic structure has begun to change. The socialist segment of the economy is playing the dominant role. Both the central economy and the local economy have developed. Local industry's share of the value of industrial output has risen from 56.4 percent (1976) to 63 percent (1984). Every economic area of the country has begun to develop its separate strengths.

Our country's socio-economic situation is stabilizing and moving toward new stages of development. During the 2 years 1983 and 1984, average annual national income grew at the rate of 52 percent compared to 1975. Grain output has risen from 11.5 million tons in 1975 to 17.9 million ton in 1984. Despite rapid population growth, grain output per capita has increased from 240 kilogram in 1975 to roughly 310 kilograms in 1984. Between 1976 and 1984, we planted nearly 900,000 hectares of forests and harvested more than 13 million cubic meters of timber. The ocean fish catch reached 560,000 tons in 1984. The level of industrial production in 1984 was 1.9 times higher than in 1976. Within circulation and distribution, much progress has been made. Whereas we only procured about 2 million tons of grain per year during the period from 1976 to 1980, grain procurements now exceed 3 million tons per year. Our foreign trade has developed. In 1984, exports were 4.9 times higher than in 1975. The state has made efforts to stabilize and improve the standard of living of the people and guarantee the supply of the nine essential goods under ration standards to cadres, manual workers, civil servants, troops and public security personnel. Nearly 7 million square meters of housing of all types have been constructed. More tile homes are being built in the countryside with each passing day. Significant development has occurred in the fields of education and public health. The cultural-ideological poisons left behind by neo-colonialism are being eliminated. With each day that passes, the new socialist culture and the new socialist man are becoming more evident.

Only by understanding the specific historical circumstances of our country over the past 10 years--the consequences of the war, the sabotage by China and the U.S. imperialists, national defense needs, the backward state and small-scale production of the economy, rapid population growth and continuous natural disasters--is it possible to realize the significance of the enormous achievements that have been recorded by our people, possible to understand why our people's standard of living is, generally speaking, still low even though

production has developed. The achievements mentioned above are the results of steadfast and tenacious struggle by all our people, of the correct leadership provided by the party. Although we still face countless difficulties and despite the fact that shortcomings and weaknesses exist, such as those for which our party has criticized itself, it must be stated that the situation of our country's revolution during the past 10 years has been good, that the Vietnamese revolution is continuously developing along the socialist path. Every pessimistic and wavering approach of only seeing the difficulties and negative things that exist, not the victories that have been won, and every metaphysical approach based on subjective assessments, not objective reality, of only seeing the victories that have been recorded in one area but not those that have been won in other areas is wrong.

Compared to the many years spanned by history, 10 years are but a brief moment in time. The road before us is long and hard. The socio-economic situation is still not truly stable. Major imbalances exist within our country's economy. Agricultural production is not stable, especially when major natural disasters occur. The development of industrial production is not uniform and productivity, quality and efficiency are low. National income is outstripped by social consumption. Many complex developments are still occurring within the field of circulation and distribution. The people, especially cadres, manual workers, armed forces and public security personnel, are still encountering many difficulties in their everyday lives and their standard of living is unstable. The negative phenomena within the economy and society have yet to be effectively thwarted.

Having been engaged in this struggle for only 10 years, we have yet to emerge from the initial stage of the period of transition. A country with a population of 60 million that only produces several tens of thousands of tons of steel and several million tons of coal, produces no petroleum or gas and only produces about 300 kilograms of grain per capita obviously cannot immediately achieve large-scale, socialist production. As V.I. Lenin once said, the more economically backward a country is, the more difficulties it will encounter as it advances toward socialism. On the other hand, we must also deal with the encirclement and sabotage of the imperialists, with the wide-ranging war of sabotage and the war of encroachment and occupation of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. This struggle is closely tied to the struggle between capitalism and socialism within our country. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th Party Congress pointed out: "We are building socialism against the background of complex developments in the international situation and in the face of serious difficulties at home in the sharp struggle taking place between the two paths."

Only by struggling to be self-reliant, enduring hardships, stepping up production, living on what we produce and giving our attention to the formation of capital for socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland can we quickly overcome our difficulties, emerge from the initial stage of the period of transition and lay the foundation for making our country, in the words of Uncle Ho, grander and more beautiful.

On the economic front, the tasks we face now are to endeavor to achieve the four socio-economic goals and the primary norms set by the 5th Congress of

the Party, stabilized the economy and developed it in exact accordance with the line and policies of the party. The 7th Plenum of the Party Central Committee pointed out that we must continue to view agricultural production as the front of foremost importance, with primary emphasis upon grain and food production, and more strongly develop the production of domestic consumer goods and export goods while strengthening the key heavy industrial installations that support agriculture and the consumer goods industry. Stabilizing and improving the standard of living of the people, most importantly the standard of living of cadres, manual workers, troops and public security personnel, must be considered our first goal; at the same time, efforts must be made to increase the formation of capital so that we can continue to build the material and technical bases of socialism. Determined steps must be taken to virtually complete the socialist transformation of agriculture in Nam Bo and the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce throughout the country. Determined steps must also be taken to solidify and strengthen the socialist economy. We must establish closer coordination between the economy and national defense system and insure that the requirements involved in strengthening our national defense and security are met. We must continue to improve the economic management system and shift everything involved in management from bureaucratic management and subsidization to economic accountability and socialist business principles. We must successfully establish state control over the market throughout the country in 1985 and introduce well coordinated, sound solutions to the pressing problems being encountered with money, wages and the financial and monetary systems. We must make real improvements to planning, improvements which insure that plans are realistic and sound, take positive steps to develop the four different sources of materials and supplies and work hard to achieve a higher rate of economic development and higher economic efficiency. In conjunction with developing the economy, we must endeavor to record many more achievements on the cultural-social, educational, public health and scientific-technical fronts.

The moving forces behind the implementation of the state plan for 1985 are the self-reliance, the revolutionary movements and the spirit of collective ownership of the working people.

While implementing the 1985 state plan, we must review the implementation of the 1981-1985 Five Year Plan, make preparations for the 1986-1990 Five Year Plan and thoroughly research both the theoretical and practical aspects of the initial stage of the period of transition and our socio-economic strategy during the initial stage.

On the national defense front, we must not relax our vigilance against the schemes and acts of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists for one moment. This is a long and hard struggle, a struggle in which we can harbor no illusions. The Chinese reactionaries still dream of annexing our country, of expanding down into Southeast Asia and becoming the rulers of the world. Their lackeys have been badly beaten along the border between Cambodia and Thailand and they, themselves, are being dealt painful blows in their war of encroachment and occupation along our country's northern border. However, in the voice of a big country hegemonist, they continue to talk about "teaching Vietnam a second lesson." Our people are determined to strengthen their

national defense forces, fulfill their military obligation and build the northern border, determined to firmly defend the independence and freedom of the nation and fulfill their international obligation.

The key to winning even larger victories is to make our party solid, strong and pure. Through the course of its long fight, our party has become one of the most revolutionary and staunch parties of the international communist movement. The vast majority of the party's members have maintained their revolutionary qualities, stood firm in the face of historic turning points, in the face of enormous difficulties and are taking the lead and setting good examples on all fronts. Besides this vast majority, however, are some cadres and party members who have shown themselves to be undependable, even become immoral or deviant. Therefore, teaching the glorious tradition of the party, teaching revolutionary qualities to cadres and party members is a pressing task. Living, fighting, working and learning for the fatherland, for the people, for the sake of the ideals of communism, these must be the constant thoughts of every cadre and party member.

With confidence in victory, with determination to be self-reliant, let our entire party, our entire army and all our people strengthen their unity, struggle with all their might and advance the cause of building socialism and defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland to increasingly large victories.

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 8-13

[Text] Editorial Note: the correct, flexible and timely guidance provided by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee headed by General Secretary Le Duan was the factor of foremost importance in the victory of our armed forces and people in the general offensive of the spring of 1975. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the victory of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the liberation of the South and the reunification of the fatherland, we have printed below a number of cable messages sent by General Secretary Le Duan to the leaders on the battlefields in the South during the general uprising in the spring of 1975 for our readers to study.

To: Nam Cong and Hai Manh

27 March 1975

Dear comrades,

During a meeting on 25 March 1975, the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee adopted a plan to attack and liberate Da Nang and decided to establish the Da Nang Front Command. You have already been informed of this in a message from Van. The purpose of this message is only to emphasize a few points.

The brilliant victories won in Buon Me Thuot and the Central Highlands have presented us with an opportunity to liberate Da Nang. We must concentrate our forces and attack from two directions, from Thua Thien-Hue southward and from Nam Ngai northward, quickly wipe out all enemy forces in Da Nang and not allow them to flee and regroup to defend Saigon.

At this juncture, time is a force. We must display great ingenuity in our actions, take the enemy completely by surprise and give them no time to react. You must immediately use the forces of the military region and the province to directly attack Da Nang. Take special measures to move your troops as quickly as possible, promptly control and occupy the airports and encircle and divide the enemy in order to wipe them out.

You must quickly mobilize the armed masses to stage uprisings, crush the control forces on the basic level, occupy public offices, warehouses and factories, set up revolutionary governments and agitate among enemy soldiers to lay down their weapons and surrender, thereby routing the units of the puppet army.

The main force military corps in the North have adopted plans for moving their forces as quickly as possible in order to promptly coordinate with the southern flank. You must take action immediately. Do not delay.

The Political Bureau commends the armed forces and people of Zone 5 on the resounding victories they have won and awaits news of a large victory on the Da Nang front.

Ba (1)

To: Bay Cuong

1630 hours, 29 March 1975

The situation is developing quickly. The revolution in the South is entering a stage of development by leaps and bounds.

Our large and repeated victories have inflicted very heavy defeats upon the enemy and taken them completely by surprise. The puppet regime is in imminent danger of rapid military and political collapse.

I am in complete agreement with you that now is a time for very prompt, determined and bold actions. In actuality, the campaign to liberate Saigon can be considered to have already begun.

While working to quickly implement the strategy we have adopted, I want to emphasize one crucial step that must be taken immediately, that is, boldly strengthening our forces so that we can strategically divide the enemy and encircle Saigon from the west, in the areas of My Tho and Tan An.

I wish you good health and large victory.

Ba

To: Bay Cuong Sau and Tuan

1100 hours, 31 March 1975

The situation is developing rapidly. Urgent actions are required. Therefore, as soon as possible, Tuan should meet with Bay Cuong at the Central Department to discuss plans for attacking and occupying Saigon. Sau will also go down to attend that meeting. Bay Cuong and Tu Nguyen are not to go back up to the Central Highlands again.

Ba

To: Bay Cuong, Sau and Tuan

1400 hours, 1 April 1975

At a meeting on 31 March 1975, the Political Bureau heard a report by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on the developing situation of our general offensive during the past 3 weeks, especially in recent days.

The Political Bureau was unanimous in its assessment of the situation:

1. Our strategic general offensive actually began following our victory in Region 9 and the liberation of Phuoc Dong Province in eastern Nam Bo with the attack on and occupation of the Central Highlands and the winning of extremely large victories in a very short amount of time.

We have wiped out or routed more than 35 percent of the enemy's troops; killed or put out of combat two enemy corps; destroyed about 40 percent of their modern technical branches; captured or destroyed more than 40 percent of their material and rear service bases; and liberated 12 provinces, thereby bringing the total population within the liberated zone to nearly 8 million.

In particular, during the battle for Da Nang, we succeeded in coordinating military attacks with uprisings by the masses as a result of several new factors that emerged: the people, feeling deep hatred and resentment toward the enemy, were merely waiting for an opportunity to arise and the vast majority of the enemy's officers and troops completely lost their will to fight. The armed forces and people of the Da Nang front recorded an outstanding feat of arms: only 30 hours after they opened fire, with forces smaller than those of the enemy and through a timely attack and uprising, they occupied the largest military base complex of the puppet army in central Vietnam.

Through the victories mentioned above, our armed forces have undergone extraordinary growth: our troops have suffered few casualties and their moral and fighting skills have been markedly improved; our losses in terms of weapons and ammunition have not been significant and we have taken a very large quantity of weapons and ammunition from the enemy. Our main force troops have grown in number many times and they are mobile on all battlefields.

It is the assessment of the Political Bureau that, from the standpoint of strategy, from the standpoint of military and political forces, ours is a position of overwhelming strength in this situation and that the enemy is in imminent danger of collapse and annihilation. The United States has shown itself to be completely powerless and cannot extricate the puppets from their situation, even if it provides them with additional aid. Not only has the revolutionary war in the South entered a stage of development by leaps and bounds, but the opportunity for launching a general offensive and uprising in Saigon-Gia Dinh has also ripened. The final, strategic battle of our armed forces and people begins now.

2. Our country's revolution is developing as much in 1 day as it would normally take 20 years to achieve. Therefore, the Political Bureau has decided that we must seize this strategic opportunity, be determined to carry out a general offensive and uprising and bring the war of liberation to a victorious conclusion as quickly as possible. Ideally, we should begin and conclude this general offensive and uprising in April of this year, no later. Our actions must be bold, unexpected and taken with the speed of lightning. We must attack immediately, while the enemy is in disarray and weakened. Even larger forces must be concentrated on the main targets on each front and at each point in time.

We must utilize the strength of all three strategic elements, combine attacks and uprisings, combine attacks from the outside with attacks from within. Overwhelming forces must be concentrated on each front and for each battle so that we can systematically annihilate and quickly route the forces of the enemy and use the new opportunities and advantages that arise to launch repeated attacks and increase the size of our victory.

As has been decided, we must now act more rapidly, must quickly strengthen the forces to the west of Saigon, strategically isolate and encircle Saigon from that direction, completely cut Route 4 and build pressure on Saigon.

At the same time, we must rapidly concentrate forces to the east and southeast, attack and occupy important targets and encircle and completely isolate Saigon from the direction of Long Khanh and Ba Ria-Vung Tau.

We must prepare main force units that are very well equipped with weaponry and technical equipment to attack and occupy the most important targets within the center of Saigon as soon as the opportunity arises.

In the Mekong Delta, we must urge our military and political forces to take bold and urgent action, expand the scope of attacks and uprisings, destroy the apparatus of the subsectors and district seats, destroy large portions of the enemy's control network and rapidly expand the liberated zone within key areas.

3. To promptly implement the strategic guidelines presented above, it is necessary to immediately adopt a bold plan of action employing the forces that are currently on the eastern battlefield. The Military Commission of the Party Central Committee has decided to quickly send down the 3rd Military Corps along with weapons and technical equipment from the Central Highlands; at the same time, it has ordered the Reserve Corps into the region. However, to save time, we should not wait until the forces there have been fully strengthened. We should also avoid sending in forces that are unnecessary and affecting the campaign plan.

4. While the Central Department and the Regional Military Commission will continue to perform the same duties, the Political Bureau has decided to establish the Saigon Front Command and Party Committee to unify and highly concentrate the leadership and guidance of this key battlefield. When Sau and Tuan arrive, you are to discuss and immediately implement this decision.

5. Here in the North, the Political Bureau will bring together the various forces that provide guidance and has issued to the entire army, to all battlefields, sectors and levels the instructions necessary to insure total victory in this historic, decisive battle.

Determined To Win
Ba

To: Tuan, Sau, Bay Cuong and Tu Nguyen

1100 hours, 9 April 1975

This morning, I received message 21KT dated 8 April 1975 from Tuan.

Having discussed the matter with Van and the members of the High Command, I find that you need several more days to prepare while awaiting the arrival of the majority of the forces of the 3rd and 1st Corps (infantry, weapons and technical equipment) before beginning the offensive.

Between now and the start of this major offensive and under the command of Sau Nam, you must intensify the operations on the western and southwestern fronts, cut Route 4 and force the enemy to disperse their forces to deal with us, thereby adding to their disorder and confusion and making it difficult for them to discern what our campaign plan is. At the same time, order special operations units to infiltrate the inner city. The other fronts must also conduct appropriate activities to lay the groundwork for coordinating with this major offensive.

Once this offensive is launched, you must make sure that we launch truly strong, continuous and repeated attacks until final victory is won. While attacking the outskirts of the city, you must seize every opportunity that presents itself to deeply penetrate to the center of Saigon from many different directions utilizing the forces that have been prepared. Coordinate attacks from the outside with attacks from within and create the conditions for uprisings by our fellow countrymen. Do not divide these attacks into two stages. This is the basic plan and the one that best assures us of victory. In the present situation, it is a plan that embodies lightning-like speed, boldness and surprise. I also agree that we must prepare for the possibility of the war lasting for awhile longer.

Ba

To: Tam Thanh, Bay Cuong and Tuan

1750 hours, 14 April 1975

At a meeting on 14 April 1975, the Political Bureau heard a report from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee concerning the situation on the Saigon front and the guidelines and policies presented in your message. Your guidelines and policies have the complete endorsement of the Political Bureau. It is hoped that you will use the time available to make very good preparations so that a truly large victory can be won. The Political Bureau

agrees that the campaign to liberate Saigon should be called the "Ho Chi Minh campaign."

I wish you good health.

Ba

To: Tuan, Sau, Bay and Tan

1530 hours, 22 April 1975

During a meeting on the morning of 22 April, the Political Bureau heard a report from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on the front situation and our present combat plan. The Political Bureau is in unanimous agreement concerning the following assessment and decisions:

Recently, following repeated defeats, the enemy lost Phan Rang and was forced to withdraw from Xuan Loc. They not only discovered our large forces near the seacoast in the east, but also discovered our large forces along Highway 4 and to the southwest of Saigon and some of the large forces we have to the north of Saigon. In danger of being encircled and wiped out, they quickly adjusted the deployment of their forces. The new deployment does not indicate that they intend to pull back and defend Saigon, but that they intend to keep the Route 4 corridor from Saigon to Can Tho open. Last night, under pressure from the United States and his senior officers, Nguyen Van Thieu resigned. To delay our attack on Saigon, the United States and the puppets installed a new government and proposed to us a ceasefire and eventual political solution in a vain attempt to save them from total defeat.

All of these situations are causing much disorder within the puppet army and government. A new stage of development can be reached in the struggle of the masses.

The opportunity for launching the general military and political offensive on Saigon is at hand. We must launch new attacks every day. Taking action at this point in time is the surest guarantee of total victory. There is nothing to be gained either militarily or politically from waiting any longer.

Immediately order your fronts to take prompt action; at the same time, instruct the Saigon-Gai Dinh Zone Party Committee to make preparations to mobilize the masses to stage uprisings in coordination with the attacks by our army. Coordinate the various fronts as well as the timing of attacks and uprisings in the course of your operations.

If we seize this major opportunity, total victory will surely be ours.

I wish you good health.

Ba

To: Sau, Bay, Tuan and Tu, with a duplicate message sent to Tan

1000 hours, 29 April 1975

During a meeting of the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, news was received that Duong Van Minh has ordered a ceasefire. The Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee have issued the following instructions:

1. You are to order our forces to continue to attack Saigon as planned: be as aggressive as possible in battle, liberate and occupy the entire city, disarm the enemy's army, dissolve all levels of the enemy's government and crush all resistance.
2. Publicly announce that Saigon-Gia Dinh has been placed under the authority of the Military Management Commission chaired by Tran Van Tra.
3. Additional messages will follow, reply immediately upon receipt.

Ba

To: Sau, Bay, Tuan and Tu

30 April 1975

Convey the following message of praise from the Political Bureau to all cadres, soldiers, party members and Youth Union members.

Ba

Message of praise from the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee

To: all cadres and soldiers who participated in the Ho Chi Minh campaign and our beloved fellow countrymen of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee wholeheartedly praises the armed forces and people of Saigon-Gia Dinh, praises all cadres and soldiers, all party members and Youth Union members of the units of the main force troops, local troops, special forces and militia and self-defense forces for having fought with extreme bravery, recorded brilliant feats of arms, annihilated and routed large enemy forces, forced the unconditional surrender of the Saigon puppet government, liberated the city of Saigon-Gia Dinh and brought the historic campaign that bore the name of the great Uncle Ho to total victory.

May all of you display a high spirit of determination to win and, together with your fellow countrymen, continue the attacks and uprisings and completely liberate the fatherland's beloved South.

Hanoi, 30 April 1975

On behalf of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee
Le Duan

Footnote

1. Translator's note: The name Ba, as used here by Le Duan, was used for 2 years by Ho Chi Minh while aboard the French merchant ship Latouche Treville.

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CSO: 4210/9

THE MAJOR DOCUMENTS ON THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR NATIONAL SALVATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 14-20

[Article by the Marx-Lenin Institute of the Party Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam]

[Text] The book entitled "The Major Documents on the Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation" consists of a number of important articles by President Ho Chi Minh, which are printed in the first portion of the book, followed by resolutions regarding the resistance against the United States for national salvation adopted at the plenums of the Party Central Committee and conferences of the Political Bureau held between 1954 and 1975. The final portion of the book consists of excerpts from the resolution of the party's 4th National Congress of Delegates held in 1976 and a section discussing the significance and reasons behind our people's victory in the resistance against the United States for national salvation.

This is the first time that the resolutions of the Party Central Committee and Political Bureau regarding the resistance against the United States for national salvation have been published in book form. It is a collection of valuable materials. It helps the reader not only to follow the evolution of the war through its various stages of development, but also see how clear-sighted and skillful the Party Central Committee, headed by President Ho Chi Minh, and the Political Bureau were in their thinking, policies and guidance that led our nation's sacred war of resistance against the United States to one victory after another and ultimately to glorious total victory in the spring of 1975. This important book assists us in the study of many political and military matters regarding the resistance against the United States for national salvation. In our introduction of this book, we deal only with a number of matters of most general significance.

War is a test of physical strength and a test of intellect. To fight the enemy, we must know them well from many different perspectives: their strategy, the potentials and capabilities they can mobilize, their international circumstances and their strengths and weaknesses in war. Even more important is the need for us to know each and every capability that we ourselves possess and the international circumstances surrounding our fight.

These are the foundations upon which the political and military lines of a war of resistance are defined.

"The Major Documents on the Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation" shows that several days before the 1954 Geneva Accords on ending the war and restoring peace in Indochina were signed, the Central Committee of our party pointed out: "The U.S. imperialists are a major obstacle impeding the restoration of peace in Indochina. They are working hard to promote the establishment of the Southeast Asian aggressor bloc, working hard to make Indochina a springboard from which to expand their wars of aggression. They are intentionally maintaining international tensions in order to profit from arms sales, making urgent preparations for war and threatening world peace. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists are the chief enemy of the peace-loving people of the world and are now being the chief and immediate enemy of the people of Indochina."

In the years that followed, the U.S. imperialists intervened ever more deeply in South Vietnam. They pushed the French colonialists into a subordinate position and then kicked the French out completely and installed a lackey government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. They urgently sent weapons and U.S. military personnel into the South and made every effort to assist Diem in building the puppet army, undermining the Geneva Accords and intensifying the acts of terror and suppression to destroy our basic organizations and the kidnapping and murdering of revolutionary cadres and masses. Ngo Dinh Diem, the loyal running dog of the United States also made a public appeal to "fill in the Ben Hai River" in order to "march northward."

Thus, together with the establishment of the Southeast Asian aggressor bloc, the activities of the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam revealed their evil intention to turn South Vietnam into a colony and military base of the United States in preparation for a new war of aggression with the aims of attacking and occupying all of North Vietnam and the entire Indochina peninsula, crushing the national liberation movement and preventing the spread of socialism--which they called the "Red wave"--in Southeast Asia.

In its analysis of the above situations, the 15th Plenum (January, 1959) of the 2nd Party Central Committee pointed out: "The U.S. imperialists and the lackey clique have not only invaded and taken occupation of the South and impeded the development of the South's society, but are also making urgent preparations for war in a vain attempt to occupy all of our country and defeat the whole of our people's revolutionary cause. Therefore, the Americans and Diem are not only the enemies of the people of the South who are being ruled by them, but also the enemies of the entire nation of Vietnam, of the people of the liberated North." President Ho Chi Minh also said: "The imperialists have caused our people much suffering in the past and, today, the Americans and Diem are partitioning our country and trampling upon the South. Until we drive the U.S. imperialists from the South, until we liberate the South from the barbarous rule of the Americans and Diem, our people can know no peace of mind"(address opening the 3rd Congress).

To carry out the plan mentioned above, the basic tactic or policy adopted by the U.S. imperialists was not to employ the old, blatant form of enslavement

used by the French colonialists, but to conceal their colonialism in something new. Instead of setting up an administrative apparatus as the French colonialists did, they used the lackey government, which represented the most reactionary powers in the South and masqueraded as an "independent nation," as the tool for implementing the U.S. policy of enslavement and making preparations for war. In other words, the policy of aggression and expansion of the U.S. imperialists in the South was a policy of neo-colonialist style aggression and expansion, the very same policy that had been the distinctive, fundamental feature of the global counter-revolutionary strategy of the U.S. imperialists since World War II((the resolution of the 21st Plenum (1973) of the Party Central Committee)).

The military strategy that accompanied the policy of neo-colonialist aggression was the "flexible response" strategy, a strategy that encompassed three different types of war: world war, a limited war and a special war. Among these, it was the special war that was best suited to U.S. neo-colonialism at that time.

The tactic or policy of neo-colonialist intervention and aggression was very dangerous because it employed cunning and deception in competing with the revolution for the support of the people. However, it was also the product of the weak and defensive position of imperialism; therefore, it embodied many contradictions and, from an objective standpoint, gave us legal ways to intensify the struggle, especially the political struggle.

Evaluating the capabilities, especially the strengths, of the U.S. imperialists in that historic conflict was a complex matter, one that President Ho Chi Minh and our Party Central Committee always gave their attention to fully analyzing and clarifying. As the ringleader of the imperialists, the United States possessed enormous economic and military might. It had also been the most bellicose of the imperialist powers since World War II and had ambitions of becoming the ruler of the world and establishing the "American era" throughout the world.

Our party did not underestimate the strength of the U.S. imperialists. It constantly exposed the bellicose and obstinate character of the U.S. imperialists in their plan of aggression against our country and emphasized the need to wage a long and arduous struggle, a struggle that we would certainly win once we adopted a correct line and methods and tapped the tremendous potential strengths of our people.

It was our assertion that the strength of the U.S. imperialists was limited by the fact that they were waging an unjust war of aggression at a time when, on the international scene, the various tides of revolution had taken the strategic offensive and imperialism was in a period of general crisis. And, it was the United States that had suffered the most defeats since World War II, such as the defeats in China, Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, etc. Even when the United States was sending hundreds of thousands of troops to invade the South and using its air power--including strategic air power--to attack the North, our Party Central Committee remained convinced: it is against the background of the failure of their special war that the United States is sending troops into the South and using its air power to attack the North. Because their

troops are attacked as soon as they arrive, the Americans have become more confused, have assumed more of a defensive posture and are in danger of becoming bogged down. The U.S. imperialists are becoming increasingly isolated in the world and even at home. "While the United States has been mired in Vietnam, its allies have grown and become strong economic competitors of the United States." The longer the war lasts, the more the difficulties of the United States will mount. President Ho Chi Minh said: "We see their strengths, their new weaponry and their great wealth but we know their shortcomings, shortcomings which are large and fundamental. Now, the whole world is against them. The American people, the youths and intellectuals of America are opposed to them, strongly opposed. Some youths have set themselves afire to protest the policy of aggression of the U.S. government. Things are happening today that never happened before."

On the battlefield, strength is not tested by weapons alone, the political struggle and moral strength are always important. In combat, there are different factors also, such as organization, command, methods of fighting, etc. In simple, easily understood words, President Ho Chi Minh pointed out: "The American soldier sent to the South by the United States is provided with bread, meat, tobacco, chewing gum, everything. It costs 15 times as much to send one American soldier into combat as it does one puppet soldier. The American soldier is quickly transported by helicopters of the 1st Airborne Division but when he lands, he has no mobility. The American soldier is large and carries all sorts of gear, which slows him down even more. Our liberation soldier, although small, is very quick. In hand-to-hand combat, the American soldier is not much of a match." This was a scientific assessment.

The second issue, the most important issue, was that of defining the line to be followed in the resistance against the United States for national salvation.

Following the signing of the Geneva Accords, Le Duan, by order of the Party Central Committee, drafted the "Thesis on the Revolution in the South" and subsequently prepared the resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee.

The 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, which was held in January, 1959, and the party's 3rd National Congress of Delegates held in September, 1960 defined the line of the Vietnamese revolution as consisting of two strategic tasks that had to be performed simultaneously: building socialism in the North and continuing the people's national, democratic revolution in the South. It was a line that brandished the two banners of national independence and socialism, was an independent, autonomous, correct and creative line that made it possible for us to mobilize every force of the nation and combine the revolutionary forces of our nation with the revolutionary forces of the times in order to win victory over the U.S. imperialist aggressors.

The resolution of the party asserted: building socialism in the North is consistent with the objective laws of development of that portion of society that has been liberated and is a revolutionary requirement faced by the entire country because to build the North is to build the "revolutionary bulwark of

the entire country," to "build a solid base for the struggle to liberate the South and reunify the country."

Continuing the people's national, democratic revolution in the South was also consistent with the objective laws of development of that portion of society that was still under the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and consistent with the requirement faced by the entire country of protecting the North and creating favorable conditions for it to build socialism.

The line of brandishing the banners of national independence and socialism was an independent, autonomous, correct and creative line.

The party's line reflected the most pressing requirements and fervent aspirations of our people at that time.

In the South, the constant growth of our revolutionary forces enabled our armed forces and people to defeat the four different war strategies of four U.S. administrations and, through the general offensive in the spring of 1975, the highpoint of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, bring the resistance against the United States for national salvation to total victory.

In the North, the results achieved in socialist construction during the war, although only initial results, enabled our armed forces and people to win brilliant victory over the enemy's war of destruction strategy while supporting the cause of liberating the South more effectively with each passing day.

The coordination in combat among the armed forces and people of the entire country led to the victory of our nation of Vietnam in both zones of the country. Our victory was also the result of adopting a correct foreign policy, the policy of closely tying the revolution to liberate South Vietnam to the tides of revolution in the world, to the struggle for the goals of our times: peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. Our party won very large moral and material support from the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, from all revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, support which helped to build the invincible might of our people in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation.

The common strategy pursued by our party throughout the resistance against the United States for national salvation was an offensive strategy.

When the Americans and Diem showed themselves to be fascists by abolishing all democratic freedoms, trampled upon the legal foundations of the Geneva Accords and began murdering revolutionary cadres and civilians everywhere, our party, seeing that the position of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet government was one of weakness, promptly shifted from preserving our forces to taking the offensive and coordinating the political struggle with the armed struggle.

The offensive strategy of the revolution was a comprehensive offensive strategy, was the strategy of taking the offensive militarily, politically and diplomatically in both the South and the North. This strategy was implemented not only when the enemy was "de-escalating" the war, but even when they were

"escalating" the war. When the enemy sent forces to directly invade South Vietnam in the limited war and unleashed attacks against the North in the war of destruction, our party's policy continued to be one of continuing to maintain and strengthen our offensive posture in order to give the enemy the beating they deserved. The first battles we fought, the battles at Nui Thanh and Van Tuong, confirmed that we were able to defeat the U.S. forces. In the North, our armed forces and people dealt the American Air Force appropriate blows even with infantry rifles.

The offensive strategy that was implemented by us under the guideline "gradually pushing the enemy back, toppling the enemy's system piece by piece and eventually bringing it down completely" was the offensive strategy of combining the art of knowing how to force the enemy to de-escalate and winning victory over them gradually.

The revolutionary method employed by our party in the resistance against the United States for national salvation was basically defined at the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee. It was the method of employing the combined violent force of the revolution through two main forces, political forces and military forces, and two main forms of struggle, military struggle and political struggle.

The entire course of development of the war of resistance and the conclusion of the general offensive in the spring of 1975 eloquently proved just how correct our revolutionary method and our method of conducting the war were and how large their impact was.

Employing the combined strength of the revolution and combining many different forces and many different forms of struggle within many different fields and many different areas in order to achieve the goals of the revolution during each period and advance the revolutionary war to final victory, these were the special characteristics of Vietnam's method of waging revolutionary war, waging people's war.

The policy of waging the struggle on two fronts, the military and the political, through a three-pronged offensive (military operations, political activities and enemy proselyting), which we called the "two feet and three prongs," was the embodiment of our revolutionary method, our method of waging war. The revolution in the South gave birth to countless very effective and flexible ways to build and organize forces and wage the struggle.

Practically all of the resolutions and directives of our Party Central Committee in this book discuss the issue of our revolutionary method and the method by which the war of liberation was waged. From the standpoint of the forms it assumed, the revolution to liberate the South developed in very flexible and diverse ways: the coordinated uprisings in 1959 and 1960, the movement to defeat the strategic hamlet program, the long-haired army, the general offensive and uprisings during the Mau Than Tet, etc.

Taking the offensive diplomatically was also part of the offensive.

The 13th Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee, held in January, 1967, decided that it was necessary to attack the enemy diplomatically and asserted that while victory on the battlefield was the prerequisite to diplomatic victory, the purpose of the diplomatic struggle was not to merely reflect the struggle on the battlefield, but to "develop upon our strengths, our victorious position, our offensive posture" and denounce the crimes of the enemy, expose their lies and clearly present our just cause and inevitably victorious position to world opinion.

Our party's policy toward the peace-loving and progressive people in the United States was to make them understand that the bellicose U.S. imperialists were their enemy, too, and that the U.S. government, through its war adventures in Vietnam, had gone against their interests and tarnished the reputation of the United States. President Ho Chi Minh, in an interview in MINORITY OPINION, a review published by a number of progressive American personalities and intellectuals, pointed out: "The Vietnamese never confuse the justice-loving people of the United States with the U.S. administrations that have committed so many crimes against our people over the past 10 years. They are the ones who are subverting the independence and freedom of our nation as well as the ones who have betrayed the American Declaration of Independence, which states the truth 'all men are created equal' and defines as man's inviolable rights 'the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'" He stated: "The American people, who are also victims of the U.S. imperialists," must struggle against the bellicose U.S. militarists and demand that the filthy war of the United States in South Vietnam be ended.

Our policy of taking the offensive diplomatically put the U.S. imperialists in a state of confusion and at a loss to deal with the movements underway in the world and even within the United States to protest their war of aggression.

This collection of documents also accentuates one of the factors determining the victory won in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, namely, the effective strategic planning provided by our Party Central Committee, headed by President Ho Chi Minh and the Political Bureau. As clearly stated in the resolution of the 9th Plenum of the Party Central Committee held in December, 1963, the thinking behind this strategic planning provided by the party was: activism, initiative, mobility, flexibility and the close coordination of all aspects. As seen in the documents presented, the guidelines on which this planning was based can be summarized as follows:

--Simultaneously waging a political struggle and a military struggle, coordinating the two and considering both to be basic forms of struggle of decisive significance, with armed struggle playing more of a decisive role as the war neared its end.

--Waging a protracted struggle, winning victory gradually and eventually winning total victory but always taking the initiative in creating opportunities and seizing opportunities to win a decisive victory in a relatively short amount of time.

--Practicing self-reliance while making every effort to win the assistance of friends in the world.

Applying this thinking and these guidelines, President Ho Chi Minh and our Party Central Committee set forth very correct policies for each stage of development of the revolution and the war against the United States for national salvation. For example, immediately after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, our party adopted the policy of preserving the real forces of the revolution in the South primarily through legal and illegal political struggle among the masses with the support of propaganda forces and armed self-defense forces.

When the Americans and Diem showed themselves to be fascists, our party shifted its efforts to an offensive strategy and mobilized the masses in local uprisings, which eventually led to the coordinated uprisings of 1959 and 1960.

When the United States was waging the special war, it was the policy of our party to defeat the strategic hamlet program, win the right of ownership for the masses in the countryside, rapidly develop our military forces and intensify the armed struggle with the aim of killing many main force puppet troops and defeating the enemy's new tactics while intensifying the political struggle in the cities to bring down the various U.S. lackey administrations.

When the United States was waging the limited war in the South and the war of destruction against the North, we resolutely maintained our offensive strategy by fighting the Americans and killing puppet troops in the South. And, after defeating the two dry season strategic counter-offensives launched by the United States, our policy became that of staging a general offensive and general uprising to win decisive victory. In the North, our armed forces and people also resolutely retaliated against the enemy's air force, dealing them painful blows and protecting socialist construction in the North while continuing to strengthen and reinforce the great frontline in the South.

Following the general offensive and uprisings in 1968 by our armed forces and people, the United States was forced to "de-Americanize" in order to "Vietnamize" the war and end the bombings and attacks against the North. Our party adopted the policy of developing our offensive strategy in a comprehensive, continuous and strong manner. A new offensive front, the diplomatic front, was opened to explain our just cause, show our good will, win wider sympathy and support among Americans and the people of the world and force the United States to fight while negotiating with us from a defensive position.

When the Paris Agreement was signed, the U.S. lackey puppets were strengthened by their bosses with the intention of encroaching upon and occupying our liberated areas. The policy adopted by our party then was to resolutely counter-attack and attack them, maintain the liberated areas and move further into the disputed areas while intensifying the political struggle in the cities in preparation for an opportunity to deliver the decisive blow (see: the resolution of the 21st Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee).

In late 1974 and early 1975, after we had dealt the puppet army many painful blows and liberated many more areas, the Political Bureau, seeing a major strategic opportunity was approaching, adopted a plan to liberate the South during the 2 years 1975 and 1976 but then promptly upgraded it to a plan to

liberate the South in 1975. The result was that the various elements of our forces, under the guideline of lightning-like speed, boldness and surprise, dealt the enemy thundering blows and our people's sacred resistance against the United States for national salvation won complete victory.

Although 10 years have passed, the great victory of the resistance against the United States for national salvation and the wealth of experience gained in it have been made even clearer to us with time.

Rereading the documents of the party and Uncle Ho on the resistance against the United States for national salvation, everyone will feel even greater pride and gain deeper insight into the magnitude of intellect of our party and nation. The revolutionary intellect and will of our party and nation must become a powerful motivating factor of our people in the cause of building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland.

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CSO: 4210/9

FROM DIEN BIEN PHU TO THE HISTORIC HO CHI MINH CAMPAIGN

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 21-28

[Article by Senior Colonel Hoang Van Thai]

[Text] Ten years have passed since the spring of 1975, when the 20 year war of resistance against the United States for national salvation ended in total victory with the general offensive and uprising staged by our armed forces and people, the pinnacle of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. That great victory is deeply ingrained in the memory of each Vietnamese and viewed as one of the most beautiful pages in the nation's 4,000 year history of building and defending the country.

That remarkable feat of arms was the combined result of a host of factors. The skilled, effective and timely strategic guidance provided by our party in the revolution and the revolutionary war in the South and during the war of resistance against the United States throughout the country was not only one of the primary factors in our victory but also one of the most distinctive aspects of the strategic genius of our nation of Vietnam in fighting the enemy and saving the country.

The more than 20 years that elapsed between the Dien Bien Phu campaign in May, 1954, and the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign in April, 1975, marked a process of continuous development by Vietnam's revolution and revolutionary war; at the same time, our party's art in guiding the strategy of the people's war also took long strides forward in its development.

In the resistance against France, the correct strategic planning provided by the party and President Ho Chi Minh was of decisive importance in defeating the various strategic plans of the enemy, from the plan to strike quickly and win victory quickly (1945-1947), the plan to encircle border areas and expand the scope of occupation in Tonkin (1948-1950) and the plan to regain the strategic initiative (1951-1952) to the Navarre Plan (1953-1955), the final unsuccessful strategic plan of the French colonialists in Indochina.

As we know, during the winter and spring of 1953 and 1954, despite having suffered continuous defeats, the enemy still drew up and implemented a highly ambitious strategic plan for the 3 years from 1953 to 1955 in a vain attempt to maintain their strategic defensive posture in the North, conduct a

strategic offensive in the South and strengthen their main force, mobile units in order to take the strategic offensive on the Tonkin battlefield during the 1954-1955 dry season, win a decisive military victory and build pressure for a political solution that best served their interests.

In order to defeat this strategic plan of the enemy and create the conditions for winning a decisive victory, our party accurately analyzed the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy. This analysis provided our party with a clear picture of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses and showed that it was possible for us to limit the enemy's strengths, take advantage of their weaknesses and force them to make strategic mistakes. The strategic planning provided by our party during this period was marked by outstanding successes. We opened many offensive fronts, using primarily local forces, and forced the main force units of the enemy to decentralize their forces to deal with us on all of these fronts, decentralize their forces so much that they no longer had a large, mobile main force at their disposal. And, when they sent their remaining mobile, main force units into the valley of Dien Bien Phu, we promptly and correctly selected it as the site of the decisive, strategic battle, a battle that would be fought on a battlefield much more favorable to us, and sent into that area a mobile main force superior to the enemy's force, victoriously fought the largest battle in the history of the war against France, won a large military and political victory, completely changed the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy and brought about a fundamental turning point in the war, one that led to the victorious conclusion of the resistance against France.

The brilliant victories of the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign marked a pinnacle in the art of the party and President Ho Chi Minh of guiding the strategy of the 9 year people's war against France, the first full-scale people's war fought by our nation under the leadership of its Marxist-Leninist party. Those victories provided us with many valuable lessons and much valuable experience in strategic planning, lessons and experience that we were able to apply and further develop upon in the war of resistance against the United States, the historic conflict between our nation of Vietnam and the U.S. imperialists, the ringleader of imperialism, the biggest enemy of progressive mankind.

During the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the planning of strategy by the party and President Ho Chi Minh, as proven by developments, clearly reflected greater experience and ingenuity. Our party's skill in strategic planning was brilliantly exhibited in the final strategic battle of the 30 year war of liberation, in the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975, the pinnacle of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign.

One of the notable successes of our party in strategic planning was its correct evaluation of the comparison of forces between the enemy and ourselves and its adoption of timely and accurate strategic decisions, especially at times that were in the nature of turning points in the revolution and the revolutionary war in the South. The following several periods can be cited as

typical examples: the period of greatest difficulty (1958-1959), the period when the enemy escalated the war to its highest level (1966-1968) and the period most favorable to the revolution and revolutionary war (1973-1975).

The years 1958 and 1959 were the period during which the difficulties of the revolution in the South were the most serious. It was a period during which the U.S. imperialists, the bellicose ringleader of imperialism, using the Ngo Dinh Diem regime as an instrument of extremely brutal enslavement, ruthlessly murdered revolutionaries, resistance fighters and patriots and openly terrorized the people. It can be said that it was a period during which the entire South relived the days of the Middle Ages. The enemy's "denounce the communists, kill the communists" policy brought screams of hatred from the people everywhere. Bloodshed and executions were occurring everywhere and had a serious impact upon the spiritual and material lives of our fellow countrymen in the South. The enemy thought that their strength was unbeatable, that the revolutionary movement in the South would wither and collapse.

Our party maintained that the enemy was not as strong as they thought they were and was always firmly confident that the compatriots of the South would never accept a colonialist regime, be it old-style colonialism or neo-colonialism. The enemy's forces were large but they lacked a widespread, solid socio-political base. Their military was strong but they were very weak politically and were weakest in the countryside. A regime that enforced its rule by means of bloody slaughter was not a strong regime. During that time when they had to resort to dragging their guillotines from one end of the South to the other to murder persons and intimidate the people, they were politically weaker than ever before.

The adoption of the resolution of the 15th Plenum of the 2nd Party Central Committee concerning the line on the revolution in the South provided a torch lighting the way for this revolution. The resolution pointed out: "Only the victory of the revolution can end the suffering of the people of the South, can defeat each policy of the U.S. imperialists and the lackey clique in the South to enslave the people, partition the country and provoke war... The basic course of development of the revolution in the South is uprisings to put political power into the hands of the people... This course, which is based on the specific situation surrounding the revolution at this point in time, is the course of using the strengths of the masses, of relying mainly upon the political forces of the masses and coordinating them with armed forces in order to bring down the regime of the imperialists and feudalists and establish a revolutionary government of the people..." This correct strategic planning of the party satisfied the most fervent aspirations and met the most pressing requirements of the masses. To the cadres and compatriots of the South, it came like a rainstorm in the midst of a long drought and caused the spirit of revolutionary struggle to surge among our 14 million fellow countrymen in the South. Local armed uprisings, which we call coordinated uprisings, broke out in Ben Tre, Minh Hai and many other places during the first days of 1960, spread quickly throughout the rural areas of the South and greatly increased the strength of the revolution while setting the enemy's forces on a course leading toward serious crisis. It was clearly as a result of this wise strategic planning of the revolution and the revolutionary war by

our party that the revolution in the South promptly reversed its situation, from one of serious difficulties to one of becoming a surging tide, from facing the imminent danger of being crushed and being unable to pick itself up to the masses arising and achieving an absolute superiority of political forces over the Americans and Diem.

During the period from 1966 to 1968, after defeating the "special war" strategy, the revolution in the South faced a new challenge: the U.S. imperialists had poured several hundred thousand troops into the South, initiated the limited war strategy in the South and unleashed the air and naval "war of destruction" against the North, thus bringing the war to its highest level. At first, after having sent some 200,000 expeditionary troops into South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists arrogantly boasted about the "omnipotence of the U.S. Army," had visions of "crushing the liberation army of the South," were smugly confident in "the invincible might of American air power" and threatened to "push the North back to the Stone Age."

From the very outset, our party asserted: the United States is rich but not strong. This correct and clear-sighted observation, a fact known by all today, was not shared by everyone back then. Our party maintained that the U.S. military was not in a position of strength, but a defensive position of defeat and weakness in the South and had come to prevent the collapse of the puppet army. Sending in the U.S. military was the "least preferred" policy of neo-colonialism, a kind of colonialism that must hide and disguise its true self in order to deceive the people. The arrival of the U.S. military further exacerbated the already sharp antagonisms between our people and the U.S. imperialists, between the U.S. imperialists and the American people and even the people of the world. With the arrival of the U.S. military, the enemy became even weaker in the one area in which they had always been the weakest, that is, politically. Militarily, our attitude was neither subjective nor naive. We did not underestimate the strengths of several hundred thousand aggressor forces armed with very modern equipment. However, by the time that the U.S. military arrived, we had become much stronger in terms of armed forces. The revolution in the South was no longer in its infancy but had become a revolutionary movement, a revolutionary war that had been and was continuing to develop widely and strongly, from Quang Tri to Ca Mau, from the mountainous jungles and the rural lowlands to the cities. Our political forces and armed forces had been deployed throughout the South. The three elements of our military forces had come into existence and developed and were gaining a solid foothold in strategic areas. We were no longer in the position of having to preserve our forces and had seized the strategic initiative. With the arrival of the U.S. military, we continued to pursue an offensive strategy. We resolutely attacked and counter-attacked and deployed our forces on the battlefield in a way that drew the enemy out so that we could attack them, pin them down and kill them, in a way that forced the enemy to fight our style of war.

The resolution of the 12th Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee held in 1966 on the new situation and tasks confirmed: "Even if the U.S. imperialists send several hundred thousand expeditionary troops into the South, the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy will still not change by much. Although the war between ourselves and the enemy has become

increasingly difficult and intense, our people have the solid foundation they need to retain the initiative on the battlefield, have the forces and conditions they need to defeat the immediate and long-range plans of the enemy...."

As the enemy was escalating the war to its highest level, President Ho Chi Minh gave the whole of our party, army and people strategic determination, gave them a most powerful motive for fighting and winning victory over the United States: they might send in 500,000 troops, 1 million troops or even more than that to intensify the war of aggression in South Vietnam. They might mobilize thousands of aircraft and intensify the attacks against the North. However, they cannot shake the iron will and determination of the heroic people of Vietnam to resist the United States for national salvation. The more aggressive they become, the more serious the crimes they commit will be. The war might drag on for 5, 10, 20 years or even longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and a number of cities and enterprises might be destroyed but the Vietnamese are determined not to be afraid! There is nothing more precious than independence and freedom. On the day of victory our people will rebuild our country and make it grander and more beautiful."(1)

In early 1968, with the U.S. imperialists having poured into South Vietnam more than 500,000 troops, thereby bringing the total number of all enemy forces in the South, American, puppet and vassal forces, to 1.2 million men, and with the "limited war" strategy of the U.S. imperialists having reached its highest level of development and being supported by the largest armed force since its inception, our party immediately saw that although the enemy's forces were very large, they were weak in many respects, most weak within the cities. The surprise attacks and mass uprisings that we staged in virtually all cities of the South during the Mau Than Tet in 1968, which dealt thundering blows to war nerve centers of the Americans and puppets, struck panic and chaos among the enemy's forces. As early as 1965, when the United States began sending forces into South Vietnam, Le Duan reminded us: "Knowing how to win victory over the enemy in an unexpected manner is one of the important factors in winning victory, is a combat guideline that all military leaders must be able to skillfully apply.

Winning victory over the enemy in an unexpected manner does not mean winning victory by chance or luck, rather, it requires awareness, advance preparations and a plan to overcome every difficulty and obstacle, requires a thoroughly revolutionary spirit, very high determination to fight and win...requires that our strategic guidelines and intentions be kept absolutely secret... It also requires that we know how to seize opportunities, to use opportunities to attack when enemy forces are in panic or disarray on the battlefield or when the U.S.-puppet regime is in serious political or economic crisis."(2) Our large victory in the Tet offensive and uprisings in 1968 was a decisive blow in defeating the "limited war" strategy of the enemy. It faced with the enemy with a new crisis of strategy, forced them to begin to gradually de-escalate the war and gave them no choice but to adopt a different strategy--the "de-Americanization of the war" followed by the "Vietnamization of the war," a product of this crisis of strategy, one which many military commentators of that time called a "half-bat, half-rat" strategy consisting of the "limited war" reduced in scale within an improved and enhanced framework of the

"special war," a strategy that exhibited the factors of inevitable defeat and failure from its very inception.

The years from 1973 to 1975 were a period during which the revolution and the revolutionary war in the South developed strongly and changed the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy: we were stronger than the enemy. This situation was the combined result of 18 years of fighting and defeating the United States and forcing the United States to sign the 1973 Paris Agreement. From the standpoint of our party's strategic planning, it was also due in very large part to the forced withdrawal by the United States of several hundred thousand troops from South Vietnam and the consolidation and development of our armed forces and political forces in the South. During the first half of 1973, in the face of the new and very complex circumstances surrounding our struggle and although we maintained our forces and battlefield positions at many places, there were some places at which the revolutionary movement encountered difficulties and experienced losses. Our party promptly asserted: the enemy is attacking the movement at a number of places not because they are strong but because we have made mistakes. The position and forces of the revolution in the South are stronger.

The resolution of the 21st Plenum of the 3rd Party Central Committee in 1973 pointed out: "The course of the revolution in the South is the course of violent revolutionary force..." and the strategy of the revolution in the South is an "offensive strategy." The resolution set the following as the guidelines of the thoughts and actions of our entire army and all our people: rapidly achieving a new position and building new forces by every means possible and being determined to win final victory, liberate the South and reunify the country. Whereas the resolution of the 12th Party Plenum set the basic guidelines for completing the historic mission of "driving out the Americans," the resolution of the 21st Party Plenum charted the course for completing the other historic mission established back in the spring of 1968 by President Ho Chi Minh: "Bringing down the puppets."

In the winter and spring of 1974-1975, especially in the spring of 1975, the strategic planning of our party, as carried out on a day to day basis by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee headed by General Secretary Le Duan grew and developed by a degree unprecedented. Our strategic planning during that historic period was very correct and timely, was ingenious and experienced. The Political Bureau correctly assessed the new situation of the revolution and revolutionary war in the South. It kept fully abreast of latest developments on the battlefield and correctly predicted the directions in which the enemy situation and our situation would develop. It made very accurate, time and flexible strategic decisions and predicted that the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation could be brought to a conclusion through 2 years of extraordinary efforts. At the same time, it predicted that the liberation of the South could be achieved more quickly, could be achieved in 1975 if an historic opportunity were to present itself at an earlier date. After putting this strategic decision into effect, the Political Bureau kept very closely abreast of changes on the battlefield each day, sometimes on an hour to hour basis. It very quickly decided how to deal with strategic situations, sometimes even how to handle campaign situations that related to strategy, thereby further increasing the speed of our

offensive and the momentum of the enemy's rout and collapse and giving U.S. and puppet leaders no time to react, no time to deal with us and forcing them to make one mistake after another. As we saw, the skilled guidance provided by the Political Bureau resulted in the final, decisive strategic battle being concluded as quickly as possible with the lowest possible losses and highest possible efficiency: the entire 2-year strategic plan was completed in less than 2 months, thus bringing the 20 year war of resistance against the United States for national salvation to a conclusion.

One other notable success of our party in planning our strategy was that it applied the combined strategy of the Vietnamese revolutionary war to fight and win victory over the U.S. pirate aggressors.

This was not merely a matter of military art, but also a matter of revolutionary method, of the art of guiding the revolutionary war under conditions in which the enemy possessed large forces, possessed large military and economic potentials and was waging a neo-colonialist war of aggression.

With regard to forces, we continued to mobilize all the people to fight the enemy with the armed forces serving as the nucleus of this fight in view of the new circumstances that existed. We not only built the three elements of the armed forces with the assistance and combat support of the people, but also developed the political forces of the masses, forces that numbered in the millions, into a direct combat force that stood face to face with the forces of the enemy and struggled against them day and night, into a very large and tightly organized political army armed with effective "weapons" of struggle and methods of fighting the enemy that were extremely courageous and intelligent, diverse and flexible. As a result, during the revolutionary war in the South, both the political forces and armed forces were strategic forces, both played a very basic and very decisive role. Not only the liberation army of the South, but also the political forces of the South became powerful armies of the revolution, became formidable adversaries of both the puppet and American armies. This clearly marked a new stage of development of the movement of all the people fighting the enemy, marked a new pinnacle in the broadly popular nature of our nation's war of national salvation, marked the emergence of a new strength of the revolutionary war in the South. With regard to armed forces, we made every effort to build local forces, to establish forces on the local level to fight the enemy everywhere and establish sources of local rear service support; at the same time, full importance was attached to strengthening our main force troops and forming powerful "fists" with the aim of killing many enemy main force troops in battle. We built up our main force troops at a rapid rate on the basis of infantry companies, the individual branches and combined strategic military corps encompassing all branches, which were thoroughly trained, equipped with modern and relatively modern technical weapons and sent from the great rear area of the socialist North to fight on the great frontlines in the South. However, the building of local armed forces was not uniform and this limited the people's war movement on the local level at some times and places, even limited the activities of our main force troops.

With regard to battlefield deployment, we continued to build and constantly improve the battlefield deployment of the people's war under the new

circumstances of the resistance against the United States. Our battlefield deployment encompassed all three strategic regions, the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities and connected them within one common battlefield deployment. At the same time, we established impenetrable positions in between and interwoven with the positions of the enemy, established positions deep behind enemy lines and close to each of their strongholds, thereby dispersing, isolating and surrounding enemy forces and making it possible for us to annihilate them everywhere. We established a comprehensive battlefield deployment, one that enabled us to successfully conduct offensive military campaigns, offensive campaigns that combined armed forces, political forces and enemy proselyting forces and conduct phases of political struggle and armed uprisings among the masses within each locality, within each strategic area.

With regard to fighting methods, under the guidelines of being determined to fight and knowing how to fight and win victory, we applied the methods of fighting of the people's war in the resistance against France and raised them to a new level of development. The methods of fighting employed in the revolutionary war in the South were the fighting methods of a combined strategy, the strategy of resolutely and continuously taking the offensive while knowing how to win victory over the enemy gradually, how to defeat each of their strategic plans and tactics and eventually defeat their entire neo-colonialist war of aggression. These fighting methods mobilized all forces of the revolution and revolutionary war for the fight on the frontlines, employed every available form and method of struggle and tapped the largest possible combined forces with the aim of achieving the highest possible results. They were also fighting methods that combined armed operations and political activities, revolutionary war and armed uprisings; that developed armed uprisings into revolutionary war; that provided for continued uprisings even in the course of the revolutionary war; that combined attacks and uprisings, uprisings and attacks; that combined military, political and enemy proselyting attacks, combined military, political, diplomatic (when the conditions existed) and legal (after the signing of the Party Agreement) attacks; that combined attacks against the enemy on the battlefield and at the negotiating table; that won the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the communist parties, the revolutionary movements and the peace-loving people of the world, including the American people. In the military struggle, in the conduct of the war itself, our fighting methods combined both guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare (today, in the war to defend the fatherland, they combine the local people's war and the war fought by the main force military corps), combined the combat operations of all three elements of the military: main force troops, local troops and militia-self-defense forces; combined large, medium and small-scale attacks and widespread attacks to wear the enemy down, attacks to wipe out their forces completely and attacks to rout the enemy. They were also fighting methods that closely combined an effective battlefield deployment and strong forces with good opportunities, with knowing how to create and seize opportunities, how to force opportunities and make full use of them. They combined bravery and intelligence with well trained forces armed with increasingly modern weapons, combined the resourcefulness and skill of commanders and staffs with the tenacity and creativity of troops and the people. Our methods of fighting during the resistance against the United States were endless in their variety

and development, as a result of which neither the puppet army nor the U.S. army knew all of them. They were taken by surprise time after time, defeated in battle after battle. The enemy was very cunning and clever but still made mistakes and fell into traps. They retaliated furiously, attacked and counter-attacks but still had to turn back and regroup, take the defensive, withdraw and ultimately collapse entirely...

The combined strategy of the revolutionary war in the South was most evident in the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975, in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. It was then, under the strategic planning of our party, conducted on a day to day basis by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, that the mobilization of the revolutionary forces in the South, the revolutionary forces of the entire country reached its highest level, our battlefield deployment in the South reached its highest level of perfection and the fighting methods of the Vietnamese people's war reached their highest level of development in the 20 year resistance against the United States for national salvation, in the entire 30 years of the war of national liberation.

The experiences gained in strategic planning as well as in the other fields from the Dien Bien Phu campaign to the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign are broad and very valuable. Those that stand out the most are that our party always firmly adhered to revolutionary-offensive thinking, pursued an offensive strategy, correctly assessed the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy during each period, applied and constantly refined a combined strategy and created the largest strength possible in order to win victory over the U.S. pirate aggressors.

Today, we must perform two strategic tasks: successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist fatherland. We must make every effort to build a developed economy while constantly working to build a strong and solid national defense system, closely combine the economy with national defense, national defense with the economy and create a new combined strength under the new conditions that exist now. This is an extremely important area of strategic planning of our party in the socialist revolution within our country today. We must be determined to defeat the wide-ranging war of sabotage and the war of encroachment and occupation of the enemy while constantly improving the country's overall state of preparedness so that we are ready, regardless of the situation, to win victory over a large-scale war of aggression should they recklessly unleash one. This is also an extremely important area of strategic planning in the work of defending the fatherland today. We must constantly concern ourselves with building the people's armed forces, both main force and local forces, and constantly refining the military science and art of the people's war to defend the fatherland. Since the day that victory was won over the United States, the weapons and equipment of our army have been and are continuing to be strengthened and made more modern. Our armed forces and people must continue to study and creatively apply the advanced experiences of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries; on the other hand, they must attach importance to reviewing the experiences gained during the period of the resistance for national salvation, especially from the time of the Dien Bien Phu campaign to the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, in order to sharpen their fighting skills and meet the new requirements of today's war to defend the fatherland.

Our party, army and people, under the correct leadership of the party and with the broad experience gained in the 30 years of the war of liberation, the 20 years of the resistance against the United States for national salvation and the 10 years of building and defending the fatherland, will surely build socialism and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap,"[Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, Volume 2, p 430.
2. Le Duan: "Thu vao nam,"[Letters to the South], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1985, p 150.

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THE ROLE OF THE SOCIALIST NORTH AS THE REAR AREA IN THE CAUSE OF RESISTING THE UNITED STATES FOR NATIONAL SALVATION, LIBERATING THE SOUTH AND REUNIFYING THE FATHERLAND

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 29-35, 78

[Article by Senior General Le Trong Tan]

[Text] Ten years have passed since the great victory of the spring of 1975, since the total liberation of the South, since the glorious and complete victory won by our people in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, since our entire country became independent, became reunified and began the advance toward socialism.

On this the 10th anniversary of the spring of great victory, as we look back on the factors that led to that victory, let us examine in detail the role played by the socialist North as the rear area--which was one of the constant factors in the victories of the revolutionary war--in the cause of liberating the South and reunifying the fatherland. In the new stage of our country's revolution, the lessons learned concerning the role of the rear area in the war are still very useful to us in our effort to achieve victory in our two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist fatherland.

Following our victory in the resistance against France and the total liberation of the North, our party asserted: "In its current stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks:

First, carrying out the socialist revolution in the North;

Secondly liberating the South from the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, reunifying the country and completing the national, democratic revolution throughout the country.

These two strategic tasks are closely interrelated and spur each other's development.

(...)Carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is the task of most decisive significance in the development of the entirety of Vietnam's revolution, in the cause of reunifying the country."(1)

The decision to advance the North from the national democratic revolution to the socialist revolution was consistent with the laws of development of our country's revolution. At the same time, with the South still under the rule of the U.S. imperialists and the country still not completely independent, this decision also defined the role and responsibility of the North as the rear area of the frontline in the South. The realities of the 10 year fight against the United States and the victory over the United States proved that the North, the invincible fortress of socialism, excellently fulfilled its obligation as the strong base of the revolution throughout the country and as the solid rear area of the loyal, brave and staunch frontline in the South, the bulwark of the fatherland. The North not only completed its task as the strategic rear area of the entire country well, but also successfully completed its task as a frontline defending itself and sharing the burden of the fight with our fellow countrymen in the South. As President Ho said: "The U.S. imperialists mistakenly think that they can, through the barbarous destructive power of their bombs and shells, weaken the North, prevent the great rear area from supporting the great frontline and weaken the fighting strength of the South. The truth is that the North will become stronger in every respect with each day that passes in the fight against the U.S. pirates and will always wholeheartedly support the struggle for liberation by our fellow countrymen in the heroic South. With each day that passes in the fight against the U.S. pirates, our fellow countrymen in the South will become more closely united, their strength will grow, their victories will increase in size."(2)

To talk about the rear area in the war is to talk about the political-moral base and the material-technical base that were built and mobilized to support the frontline, about the sources of manpower and materiel that were used to directly support the battlefield, to promptly, correct and fully meet the requirements of the frontline. As the frontline won increasingly large victories, especially decisive victories in strategic battles, the support requirements of the rear area grew in both magnitude and the quality of support required, became increasingly urgent and required increasing speed. It can be said that from the late 1960's until the great victory of the spring of 1975, the entire country going into battle became a more intense spirit with each day that passed, a spirit that grew again and again. Turning their efforts toward the frontline, toward the fraternal South became the aspiration, the will, the sacred historic mission of the several million compatriots and soldiers of the North. "Everything for the frontline, everything for the defeat of the U.S. pirate aggressors" became the mandate of millions of hearts beating as one. The sacred words of Uncle Ho that "the South lives in my heart" inspired the compatriots and soldiers of the entire country, became the symbol of the confidence and fighting strength of both the South and the North and strongly inspired the rear area to do its very best to support the frontline without fear of sacrifice and hardship, without regret over the loss of property, blood or life. The North drafted, trained and sent to the South millions of cadres and soldiers to supplement the main force military corps and even the local forces. During the resistance against the United States, millions of outstanding soldiers were sent to the battlefield within just one military region in the delta. In particular, between late 1974 and the great victory in the spring of 1975, the North selected and sent to the South several hundred thousand troops to support the general offensive.

During the 10 year fight against the United States, the North, through the "everyone does the work of two persons" movement, the "not 1 kilogram of paddy, not 1 soldier less than needed" movement, the "share half of our rice" movement and other movements, transported to the battlefield millions of tons of rice, ammunition, food, machinery and technical equipment over roads, by rivers and by sea despite fierce and continuous attacks by the enemy. During the 2 years 1973 and 1974, the years spent preparing for the general offensive, the North sent to the battlefield tens of thousands of tons of materials of all types. The transportation of grain, ammunition, medicine and troops from the rear area to the frontlines in the face of the very heavy attacks being mounted by the U.S. imperialists in both the South and the North involved many tense months and years of continuous combat, of extremely brave, tenacious and resourceful fighting by our troops, our assault youths, our entire army and all our people.

The mechanized transport corps, which possessed high capacity and mobility and had to provide for the movement of very large numbers of troops and very large quantities of materials and technology under very urgent requirements, excellently completed their mission of constantly moving forward toward the battlefield, all the way to the stronghold, to the nerve center of the enemy. As a result, all units and main force corps grew and became strong through the modern weapons and material-technical bases sent to the frontline. Tens of thousands of cadres were sent to augment local political and armed forces, the security forces and the bases among the masses in the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities. The network of strategic rear service bases and local rear service bases on the various battlefields, having been supplied with large stockpiles, competently supported mobile operations, the buildup of forces and large-scale combat coordination among the various branches. The infrastructure--roads, pipelines, telephone carrier lines, the network of troop stations and medical treatment and recuperation facilities for wounded and ill soldiers--was built and expanded.

Taking the view that Indochina itself was but one battlefield and with the support, coordination and wholehearted assistance of the parties and peoples of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia, the North actively supported the Lao and Cambodian battlefields with manpower and materiel and worked with these two fraternal countries to build technical rear service bases and open strategic and campaign roads along the Trung Son mountain range and the Mekong River. The North closely coordinated with our friends in the combat operations and buildup of forces, in consolidating the liberated zone and providing material and rear service and technical support in order to achieve smooth coordination among all the activities being conducted on the entire Indochina battlefield, win large victories for each nation and gloriously complete each nation's cause of liberation.

It can be said that every ton of supplies, every person sent from the rear area to the battlefield represented the sweat and blood of and the sacrifice of life by compatriots and soldiers in the North along the roads of the country.

The most intense and heroic period of the participation by the entire North in the battle came in the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975 when, together with the compatriots and soldiers of the South, we won a great, magnificent victory, one that brought additional glory to the history of the revolution and revolutionary war waged by our nation under the skilled leadership of the illustrious Communist Party of Vietnam.

Realizing the decisive importance of the socialist North as the rear area of the revolutionary war in the South, the U.S. imperialists and their lackey clique constantly looked for every cunning and barbarous tactic they could find to attack the North in a vain attempt to completely destroy our rear area, crush the nerve center of the resistance and sever the revolution in the South from its solid base of support. Therefore, while making every effort to send manpower and materiel to the great frontline, the North had to constantly maintain its vigilance, maintain its combat readiness and fight to defend the great rear area. In the fight against the air and naval war of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists, a fight that was carried out in many difficult and decisive stages between 1964 and late 1972, we won continuous, resounding victories and shot down thousands of modern aircraft of the American Air Force. This fight was exemplified by the "Dien Bien Phu in the skies" in December of 1972, which forced the U.S. imperialists to de-escalate the war and sit down and negotiate on our terms.

Thus, the socialist North, in very glorious fashion, completed its mission as the great rear area of the great frontline in the South throughout the resistance against the United States for national salvation, especially during the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975, and fulfilled its international obligation to the revolutions of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia.

There were many reasons why the North undertook and excellently carried out the role and mission of the great rear area in the resistance against the United States for national salvation and experiences of value to us today in our work of building and defending the socialist fatherland can be drawn from the role and mission that the North fulfilled during that period.

The most basic, overriding reason for the North's success was that our party adopted a correct and creative line. The political line that was set by the 3rd Congress of the Party and developed upon and concretized by the subsequent plenums of the 3rd Party Central Committee provided a basic guideline for advancing our nation to the pinnacles of victory in socialist construction in the North, completing the national, democratic revolution nationwide and fulfilling our international obligation.

That line was an independent, autonomous line, the line of brandishing the two banners of national independence and socialism, of combining and correctly carrying out the two strategic tasks of building socialism in the North and liberating the South from the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, winning the independence of the entire country and reunifying the country. It mobilized the combined strength of the nation and coordinated it with the strength of our times, coordinated the strengths that existed within our country with international strength and created a large, combined strength for

fighting and winning victory over the United States. It was the correct and creative military line of waging a full-scale people's war, establishing and developing the role played by the great rear area for the great frontline and implementing the strategy of Indochina being a single battlefield. It was an economic line that was well suited to the law of advancing the North to socialism and building the North into the strong and solid rear area of the revolution in the South.

Under its correct and creative line, our party adopted correct policies for developing the North into the strong and solid rear area of the people's war to liberate the South and defend the North. Our party learned, applied and creatively combined the laws of revolution and the laws of war with economic laws against the background of a country that was partitioned, one half of which was building socialism, one half of which was waging a war of liberation, in order to develop a strong and solid rear area to actively support the frontline. Lenin once stated: "To truly fight a war, you must have a well organized rear area. The best army and even the persons most loyal to the revolution will immediately be wiped out by the enemy if they are not fully armed, fully resupplied with food and fully trained." (3) The advance by the North toward socialism was the surest guarantee of success in building a great rear area for the great frontline in the South. And, the fulfillment by the North of its role as the great rear area was also the result of building the socialist system. The purpose of developing the socialist North into a strong and solid rear area was not only to develop the decisive role played by it in the liberation of the South, in the development of the revolution nationwide, but also to properly handle the large amounts of aid being received from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as well as the progressive forces of the world to support our people's resistance against the United States for national salvation. The development of the North into the socialist rear area also had the purpose of making preparations to become a battlefield that directly shared in the fight with the battlefield in the South. In conjunction with building the rear area in the socialist North, our party also attached importance to developing local rear areas and safe bases in the South to properly handle the supplies from the rear in the North and mobilize material support locally.

It can be said that, on the basis of the correct line adopted by it, our party established creative, comprehensive policies that resolved the problem of developing a great rear area for the great frontline.

The party achieved major success in organizing the implementation of its correct and creative line and policies through the state apparatus, the front organization and the mass organizations. It performed widespread practical organizational work with the aim of mobilizing and making full use of each force in society and each material as well as psychological force in the performance of specific tasks. Of utmost importance was the need to vigorously develop upon the superior nature of the socialist system and make the North solid and strong politically, economically and in terms of national defense. Even in the midst of the war, the North, while fighting and building, always strengthened its potentials in every area in order to have all the manpower and materiel needed to advance the war effort to victory.

With regard to the factors of politics and morale, through the various revolutionary movements and the political struggle of the masses, through the "three readies" movement, the "three responsibilities" movement among women and the "we'll go anywhere the enemy is" movement of the armed forces, through the "for the fraternal South" campaigns and through moving, profound propaganda and educational measures, we achieved a very high degree of political and moral consensus among the people, brought everyone together as one in implementing the line and policies of the party and instilled in everyone the kindred desire to bring the North and the South together within one house, to reunify the fatherland and the determination to fight and die for the truth "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom," for the sacred, noble goals of achieving the independence of the entire country, reunifying the country and advancing the entire country toward socialism. The rear area in the North truly became an extremely powerful psychological force, one strong enough to overcome every difficulty and obstacle and insure the liberation of the South. The compatriots and soldiers of the North, together with the rest of the country, went into battle to defend the North, to liberate the South and were determined, along with the compatriots and soldiers of the South, to achieve the joyous day of complete victory for the entire nation. Today, as we look back on the nation's glorious resistance against the United States for national salvation, we take even greater pride from the fact that in the nation's history of building and defending the country, including the history of the revolutionary war led by our party, never before were our noble national spirit, patriotism and revolutionary heroism displayed as highly or with such strong vigor as they were during the years and months spent fighting and winning victory over the United States, never before was the combined strength of all the people fighting the enemy mobilized as much or raised to as high a pinnacle as it was during the fight against the United States, most notably during the years spent preparing for and carrying out the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975. Through the clear-sighted leadership provided by the party, through the very creative and talented organizational work performed by the state apparatus and the mass organizations in defending the North and liberating the South, this enormous moral and political motivating force truly became our most powerful strength in cutting across the mountains, opening roads, overcoming every hardship and sacrifice and winning total and thorough victory.

As regards the economy, through the basic tasks of the first 5-year plan (1961-1965) and subsequent yearly plans and with tremendous assistance from the socialist countries, our party and state led and organized "one step in the process of socialist industrialization and the building of material and technical bases of socialism while completing socialist transformation and developing the economy of the North into a socialist economy."(4) As a result, the economic and material-technical potentials of socialism in the North were continuously strengthened in order to provide increasingly large support to the battlefields. These enormous potentials, including very large, direct contributions made by the people, were mobilized and transported to the frontline in a very skillful manner by the various levels of government in close coordination with one another, with the armed forces playing the key role. As a result, we achieved high efficiency and provided the battlefields with a full measure of high quality support.

Militarily, the North constantly heightened its vigilance, maintained combat readiness, victoriously waged the people's war against the savage air and naval war of destruction of the enemy and defeated each of the cunning plans and tactics employed by the U.S. imperialists to annihilate the North, to push the North back to the Stone Age, to interdict and neutralize the resupplying of the great frontline in the South by the great rear area. At the same time, the North was the place that selected and trained troops to be sent to the South to fight, was a constant source of fighting strength for the frontline.

The strength with which the North defending itself and supported the South was truly the invincible strength of the Vietnamese people's war in the new age, was the strength of our country, of our socialist system and the new age, was a brilliant manifestation of the party's line on the revolutionary war and its policy of building and defending the rear area.

In conjunction with continuously developing the large role played by the North as the rear area, our party attached importance to combining this effort with the development of local rear areas in the South, which consisted of the liberated zones, the bases in the mountainous jungles of the Central Highlands and eastern Nam Bo, the bases along the seacoast and in the Mekong Delta and the revolutionary bases within the cities. These large and small bases were gradually connected to one another and to the large rear area in the North, thereby establishing a solid and effective interconnected strategic battlefield deployment and creating the conditions for building a network of bases to receive large stockpiles of rear service materials and technology to competently support the armed forces and political forces in their operations and combat. But the distinctive characteristic and the most solid base of support of the local rear areas in the South were the participation in them by millions of compatriots and soldiers in the heroic South who fought and died under the revolutionary banner of the party and by tens of thousands of brave American-killers on the various battlefields of the bulwark of the fatherland.

With the socialist North becoming stronger in every respect with each passing day, we had more favorable conditions and new capabilities for receiving and making more effective use of the large assistance provided by the fraternal socialist countries and friends. Between 1964 and 1975, our armed forces received a large amount of effective material and technical support to equip the army with modern weapons and equipment, supply additional necessary material-technical bases and help to increase our fighting strength and actual combat efficiency on the battlefield and carry out the strategy of the party. It was only as a result of the socialist North becoming strong and solid in every respect that the vast rear area that was the socialist community was able to fulfill its large role in effectively supporting and assisting our people in their resistance against the United States for national salvation. We clearly succeeded in carrying out the very correct and creative policy of our party of "combining the building of the North as the great rear area with building local rear areas in the South. This coordination guaranteed that the strengths of the entire country, of the socialist system in the North and the people's democracy set up within the liberated zones of the South were tapped, that the strengths resulting from all the revolutionary gains made by our people in several decades of fighting to win total victory over the U.S. imperialists and their lackey clique were tapped."(5)

The North also succeeded in fulfilling its glorious mission because it closely coordinated the development of the entire country's rear area with the development of the strategic rear area of all three countries of Indochina and assisted Laos and Cambodia in building their own rear areas, thereby supporting the victory of the Lao revolution and the Cambodian revolution while supporting the requirement that Indochina be one single battlefield and strengthening the strategic and militant alliance among the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The basic reasons presented above hold a wealth of lessons and experiences for the various levels and sectors to employ in the two strategic tasks we face in the present stage of the revolution, in general, and in building the rear area of the people's war of national liberation and the people's war to defend the fatherland, in particular. These lessons and experiences not only need be learned by the people's armed forces, but are also very useful to the various party committee echelons and levels of state government, which have the task of organizing and managing the work of building a rear area that is strong and solid in every respect and ready to carry out a mobilization for the frontlines, for war.

Today, in the new stage of Vietnam's revolution, we are making every effort to perform our two strategic tasks well: successfully building socialism and firmly defending the Vietnamese socialist fatherland. With our country at peace but still having to fight and be ready to deal with various war situations instigated by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and other types of reactionaries and lackeys, the goal of "developing Vietnam into a socialist country that has a modern industrial-agricultural economy, a progressive culture and advanced science-technology, a solid, strong national defense system and a civilized and happy life" is also the goal and essence of the effort to build the rear area of the people's war to defend the socialist fatherland in the current, new stage. The rear area of our country today is not what it was during the fight against the United States, but has become the rear area of a unified nation, of a socialist Vietnamese fatherland that possesses territorial integrity, is led by the Communist Party of Vietnam, is organized and managed by the proletarian dictatorship state, has nearly 60 million people as its masters and enjoys comprehensive cooperation with and effective assistance from the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries. The building of the rear area today is much larger in scale than was the building of the rear area of the North years ago. In the face of the plans and tactics of sabotage and aggression of the enemy, building and strengthening the national defense system and preparing the country to fight foreign aggression, preparing for a mobilization to shift the country from a peace time to a war time footing are the new elements of the line on building the war time rear area in the new stage in the history of our nation, never have we faced such large and urgent requirements in building the country, strengthening the national defense system and preparing for a mobilization for war as we do today. On the other hand, never before have we enjoyed subjective and objective conditions as favorable as those that we have today for developing our country into a socialist country that has a solid rear area capable of defending itself.

We must build our entire country into a fully developed rear area, one that is strong politically and spiritually and has a prosperous economy, a strong national defense system, advanced science and technology and a comfortable and happy life. At the same time, on the basis of the decision and strategic plan of the party, we must build the strategic rear area of the nation, of the battlefield of the three countries of Indochina and the rear area of each battlefield in a manner consistent with each war situation that could develop. Everyone must clearly recognize the importance and urgency attached to building the rear area throughout the country, on each battlefield and within each locality and basic unit, especially building the rear areas along the northern border, along the seacoast and on the islands in order to help defeat the war of encroachment and occupation and the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the enemy today.

Under the unified and direct leadership of the various party committee echelons, the various levels of government must establish constant and close coordination between economic construction and the strengthening of the national defense system, adopt thorough plans and concrete measures and effectively organize and manage the sectors and the military agencies on the various levels. Only in this way can we build a rear area that possesses the combined strength of the entire country and is ready to be mobilized for war, to win victory over every war of aggression.

Reviewing the lessons learned concerning the role of the rear area in war gives us even stronger confidence in the correct and creative leadership of the party, in the great strength, the patriotism and the love of socialism of the people and our army in the cause of defending the socialist fatherland. Each one of us must display a high spirit of vigilance, a high sense of responsibility and fulfill our obligation to build a strong and solid rear area for the entire country, one strong enough to defeat a war of aggression that the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and lackey reactionary powers might launch against our country regardless of the scale of such a war, regardless of the situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Proceedings of the 3rd Congress, published by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, Hanoi, 1960, Volume I, p 174.
2. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap"[Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, Volume 2, pp 503-504.
3. V.I. Lenin: "Collected Works," Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, Volume 35, p 497.
4. Proceeding of the 3rd Congress...pp 85-86.
5. Truong Chinh: "May van de quan su trong cach mang Viet nam"[Some Matters Military in the Vietnamese Revolution], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1983, pp 252-253.

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CSO: 4210/9

THE SPRING OF 1975, A NEW PINNACLE OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY ART

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 36-41

[Article by Colonel General Hoang Minh Thao]

[Text] The development of military art in just wars, as evidenced by history, generally leads to a new pinnacle of military art in the final stage of the war following a process of application and development. The fight waged in the spring of 1975 in the offensive campaigns that brought the resistance against the United States for national salvation to glorious victory is an example.

The new pinnacle of our party's military art that was reached in the spring of 1975 was reflected in the new characteristics of the situation.

First, following 30 long years of fighting the enemy, as a result of the party's correct people's war line and clearsighted guidance of the war effort, all three elements of the people's armed forces and our political forces and mass armed forces experienced extraordinary growth. In conjunction with the new scale of organization of our main force troops, local forces, guerrilla militia forces and even our political forces also developed very widely. In early 1975, our armed forces and political forces in all zones, the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities of the South, had a strong foothold and had established a people's war battlefield deployment that extended deep into enemy territory and across the whole of the enemy front. The tornadoes of attacks and uprisings, uprisings and attacks became increasingly numerous and widespread and were on the verge of becoming a full-blown typhoon of a general offensive and mass uprising. The combined forces of the people's war that had been established by our party at that time were the largest, strongest and most highly organized combined forces ever put together in our country.

Secondly, for the first time in the military history of our country, main force military corps had been established at a point in time near the start of the general offensive and for the purpose of directly preparing for the general offensive. Together with the birth and growth of the technical services and branches, the presence of the main force military corps gave the fighting strength of our army a new quality. Our troops were highly mobile, were highly capable of breaching enemy lines and were able to fight

continuously and take advantage of quickly developing opportunities. This enabled us to organize large strategic groups in order to mount large-scale, successive campaigns and enabled us to quickly move forces into many strategic areas to attack the enemy, attack fortified defense complexes and smash all defensive positions of the enemy in the South. This represented an unprecedented combat capability of our army.

Thirdly, having fought the United States for nearly 20 years, we had established a network of strategic roads and pipelines that extended from the great rear area to the vital areas along the great frontline. This network enabled us to easily move large corps and large branch and technical forces by mechanized means in combat. While enabling us to provide rear service and technical support for large-scale coordination in combat among the various branches, this development also enabled us to forward, with a high degree of efficiency, the material aid that the socialist North, the Soviet Union and the socialist community were providing to support the liberation of the South. This was a new development, one that we had brought about, in the strategic ties between the rear area and the frontline, ties that extended over a distance of more than 1,000 kilometers. Fourthly, the decision by the Political Bureau to liberate the South placed upon the armed forces the largest and most comprehensive responsibility ever: working with the political forces of the people to bring down the entire puppet government apparatus and crush the huge, 1,350,000 man puppet army which was armed with modern U.S. technology and was defending itself within a rather tightly structured defense network within which their forces were linked to one another by huge military base complexes and strong, complex pockets of resistance that extended across the breadth and depth of the battlefield, such as Da Nang, Quy Nhon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Kontum, Saigon, Gia Dinh, Can Tho, etc. In the history of the war, a war marked by a balance of forces between the two sides, a strategic battlefield deployment such as the one that we had established then, a deployment that extended from one end of the enemy's territory to the other (from Quang Tri to Saigon), from their forward defense perimeter to their deepest defense line, was rare. As a result, when the general offensive and uprising were launched, all battlefields and strategic fronts coordinated closely and prevented the enemy from dealing with us effectively, from rescuing one another, forcing them instead to simply defend against us locally. This was one of the many reasons that explained the enemy's collapse in the space of only 55 days and nights.

Under such basically favorable conditions, it is possible to display a high degree of creativity from the standpoint of military art for the purpose of supporting the established political task, creativity in everything from the use of strategems, the arrangement of our battlefield deployment, the destruction of the enemy's battlefield deployment, the establishment of a superior battlefield position and creating and seizing opportunities to striking the first blow, achieving strategic mobility, striking the decisive strategic blow, etc. In the space of those 55 days and nights, we applied all the experience gained in our history to achieve these ends. Therefore, the character of our military art as applied in the spring of 1975 was revolutionary and popular as well as highly modern and creative.

There are many matters that need be studied regarding the military art employed during that stage of the war. Here, only a number of matters pertaining to strategy and campaign art will be discussed.

First, there was the art of employing strategems to seize the initiative and attack the enemy.

Our art in the use of strategems is the art of forcing the enemy to deploy and move their forces as intended by us. By doing so, we forced the enemy to reveal weaknesses in their battlefield deployment. We then secretly amassed forces of sufficient strength and struck the first blow at a place where the enemy was vulnerable but which was strategically important to them. When we tied the hands of the enemy's strategic mobile forces in another strategically important area, they were no longer free to send in forces to counter-attack, to restore their lines where they had been breached and became cut off, which faced them with the decision to either change the deployment of their forces or restructure their battlefield position. As a result, the enemy continued to reveal new weaknesses, allowing us to strike continued blows and crush their basic strategic battlefield deployment, thereby leading them from one defeat to another, to total defeat.

Strategems created a battlefield deployment from which we could take the initiative, created a fluid situation. This fluid situation gave rise to opportunities. Seizing these opportunities in order to strike decisive blows resulted in rapid changes in battlefield deployment and an evolution in the comparison of forces, resulted in the emergence of a new situation, a qualitatively new and different state. It was in this way that the dialectical relationship and the logical interaction among the factors of Vietnamese military art exerted a very sharp impact when we embarked on the strategic general offensive in the spring of 1975.

Following the signing of the Paris Agreement, with the United States forced to withdraw from the battlefield, the puppet army lost its main base of support in combat. Because the United States was only able to provide limited aid, the combat capabilities of the puppet forces declined dramatically (it was truly comical when Thieu appealed to their forces to "fight the enemy the way the poor do!"). Although they had lost some steam, the enemy was still large and quite strong by the start of the 1975 offensive and were still being strengthened in one area or another.

By means of continuous tactical strikes and through our force deployment (there were two of our main force corps on the southern and northern sides of the Ben Hai River and one in the outskirts of Saigon), we stretched the enemy out at both ends of their territory and forced them to assume a defensive posture in the middle (Hue-Da Nang and Saigon). As a result, the enemy lost the initiative on the battlefield. They were constantly deprived of opportunities to use their strong reserve forces (while our general offensive was still in their forward areas, there were times when both puppet paratroop divisions as well as marine divisions were forced to perform first-wave tactical missions, which made a farce of the principle of using them as general strategic reserve forces!). Of primary importance here was that the enemy was exposed in a very important strategic area in central Vietnam: the

Central Highlands. To take advantage of this vulnerability, we secretly concentrated a number of divisions in the Central Highlands, shattered the enemy's battlefield deployment within a strategically important region and brought about a major strategic change. The enemy was taken by surprise, unable to deal with the situation and unable to pick themselves back up.

Because the enemy had been tricked, had fallen for our strategem, we were able to move the enemy's forces around to suit our intentions. Thus, we controlled the situation and seized the initiative. Initiative is the lifeline in warfare.

Secondly, there was the art of establishing a strategic battlefield deployment. Establishing a battlefield deployment is mainly a matter of organizing and deploying forces that possess suitable capabilities at suitable places and times. When discussing battlefield deployment, it is necessary to first examine the basic factor of battlefield deployment--the factor of forces--and how this factor is utilized. Just prior to the 1975 general offensive, we had deployed strong and dynamic forces on all battlefields. Together with augmenting our troop strength and equipment to give our units a full table of organization, we established and deployed, for the first time ever, combined corps on the main fronts, Tri-Thien and eastern Nam Bo, and independent divisions within Military Region 5 and the Central Highlands. These corps, which were both strategic, mobile "steel fists" and stationary, concentrated main forces equipped with unprecedented amounts of technical equipment and trained in combat coordination on the campaign level among the various branches and were backed by reserve forces to provide combat support when and where it was needed, gave us an overall force superiority over the enemy in every direction. This force deployment did not exist in 1972. We also had improved our entire network of roads and rear service bases on the strategic and campaign levels to provide material support and mobility. Following the signing of the Paris Agreement, we organized this network quickly and widely. In particular, we improved the remarkable and intricate Ho Chi Minh network of strategic roads through the construction of a marvelous oil pipeline in 1973 and 1974, as a result of which we were able to send to the strategic fronts eight to nine times more materiel than in 1972. This not only provided us with immediate combat support capabilities, but also provided us with reserve forces to strengthen our battlefield deployment in depth. Beginning during the final half of 1973, our determination to counter-attack and defeat the enemy's acts of encroachment, counter-attack all the way into their strongholds, together with our repeated victories that gave us both strategic and combat initiative, especially in 1974, created a good attitude among our troops and helped to establish an advantageous battlefield deployment prior to the 1975 spring offensive. On the Tri-Thien front, by shattering a portion of the Hue defense line, we threatened the enemy not only from the north, but also from the west and south. The special forces bases of the enemy within the liberated zone and bordering the Central Trung Bo and Central Highlands fronts were pulled out by the roots, thereby connecting the areas of our liberated zone and expanding our strategic and campaign rear service bases. In other words, we wiped out the positions along our flanks manned by stationary forces of the enemy and forced them to take the defensive and fight in areas predetermined by us. On the Nam Bo front, our advantageous battlefield position was strengthened on the momentum of the continuous

victories won in the attacks to destroy police posts and expand the liberated zone, especially on the Zone 9 battlefield.

Thus, by the way we deployed our forces, by organizing rear service support, by seizing the initiative, by expanding the liberated zone, by establishing a dependable rear area on each strategic front...we established an effective and solid battlefield deployment.

This battlefield deployment that had never previously existed in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation stemmed from the battlefield deployment of the people's war that we had been building for decades in the just war being fought by the entire country against the enemy, a battlefield deployment that employed two methods of fighting the enemy, by political forces and military forces, by all three elements of the military under an offensive strategy and by the methods of a revolutionary war of attacks and uprisings, uprisings and attacks, annihilating the enemy and gaining control, gaining control and annihilating the enemy. Although it is difficult to imagine, we established battle positions deep within enemy territory and in between enemy positions from Tri-Thien to Saigon and the Mekong Delta. The enemy's forces were not only forced to deal with us in Tri-Thien-Hue, but also to deal with us at the same time on the doorstep to Saigon, their final stronghold. As a result, their forces were spread out and stretched thin in one long, thin battle line. They had no powerful reserve forces, were unable to go to one another's rescue and simply defended against our attacks with whatever forces they had on hand locally.

Thirdly, there was the art of creating and seizing opportunities and improving our position on the battlefield. We had adopted a 2-year plan to liberate the entire South in 1975-1976. That plan was the result of seizing an opportunity on the basis of analyzing the situation as it existed then. The development of the revolution, as well as the overall evolution of mankind, is usually characterized by steady progress culminating in sudden, explosive development. However, in contrast to what occurs in many other fields of society, sudden explosive development in a revolutionary war creates, in chain reaction fashion, the opportunity for another sudden and explosive development, with the result being a substantive leap forward. Such an opportunity only lasts for a moment and cannot always be foreseen, regardless of how good our strategic vision might be. As we know, the different situations that developed during the war and the specific results of our campaigns created opportunities. In the spring of 1975, the revolution in the South made "20 years progress in 1 day." Following the Central Highlands campaign, strategic opportunities no longer arose on a day to day basis, but hour by hour. Opportunities had been created, opportunities had to be seized. On 18 March 1975, having kept closely abreast of the dialectical development of the situation and on the basis of accurately analyzing events, the Political Bureau of our Party Central Committee confirmed that the strategic general offensive, having begun with the Central Highlands campaign, was under way in 1975 and decided to reduce the 2-year plan to liberate the South to a 1-year plan. On 25 March, foreseeing the inevitable defeat of the enemy at Hue and Da Nang and seizing a new opportunity, the Political Bureau decided to liberate the South before the onset of the rainy season. On 31 March, still not done, the Political Bureau set the final date: the war would be brought

to a conclusion in April. Since then, 10 years have passed. As we look back on the events of 1975 from the critical perspective of history, we can state: it was entirely correct to shorten the time frame of the strategic plans that had been adopted. Seizing opportunities is an element of the art of command, one factor of which is subjective dynamism. The art of seizing opportunity in the spring of 1975 never stemmed from military adventurism, to the contrary, it stemmed from precise calculations based on a scientific analysis of the real possibilities for winning certain victory. It was a matter of methodology. We had experienced a long, very long revolutionary war, a war in which victory had to be won gradually. Therefore, we were accustomed to basing our strategic plans on a specific process of development, accustomed to creating and seizing opportunities based on the developments in the war situation. However, in the spring of 1975, when very new factors emerged, factors that we ourselves had created, factors, it can be said, that caused opportunities to arise in an instant, our party seized these opportunities as quickly as they arose. The battle of Buon Me Thuot, the opening battle in the southern Central Highlands campaign, shook the enemy's strategy. The enemy fled in panic from the Central Highlands in a hastily planned operation. Taking advantage of the enemy's mistake and seizing the campaign opportunity that had been created by a tactical opportunity, we quickly liberated the entire Central Highlands. When this campaign opportunity led to a strategic opportunity, we liberated the entire South in the shortest possible amount of time. Objectively speaking, the emergence of new opportunities in 1975 was the end result of the long process of revolutionary war and changes in our favor in the comparison of forces following the signing of the Paris Agreement plus the heavy defeats suffered by the puppet army in 1973 and 1974. These opportunities developed by leaps and bounds from the opening, key attack on the strategically important city of Buon Me Thuot. Bold and dynamic vision, flexibly vision were required to recognize that particular opportunity as one that would lead to a strategic opportunity.

However, an opportunity is not a material factor that produces victory in and of itself. Part of seizing opportunities is the art of managing the war situation. Never before had we launched a series of corps and multi-corps campaigns and won thorough victory in such a short time. To launch such a series of campaigns, it was first of all necessary to mobilize and concentrate large forces on the strategic level and supply a huge amount of materiel. For the Central Highlands campaign, the opening campaign, we assembled five divisions. By the time of the Ho Chi Minh campaign, the final campaign, this figure had risen to five corps. When forces are limited (force limitations exist in every war), taking positive and determined steps to mobilize your forces and increase the speed and intensity of their mobility can provide you with strong forces everywhere, can give one force the strength of 10. In the 1975 offensive, rapid mobility enabled many corps and divisions to participate in two or three campaigns (including campaigns on the scale of an entire military region) within a short amount of time. This was the result of our skill in organizing and managing the war situation.

We also determined the particular characteristics of the enemy within each area and guided each specific campaign on this basis instead of taking the same approach toward each. In the Central Highlands, where the enemy's forces were stationary and their deployment was stable, we guided the preparations

being made very closely and prepared gradually. When we attacked, we held strong forces in reserve and were prepared to deal with any situation that arose. In Hue and Da Nang, where the enemy was in a fluid state, was in panic and disarray, we emphasized the factor of opportunity and urgently mounted attacks directly on the centers of those cities even before we had time to assemble sufficient forces. In Saigon, which the enemy, although strategically shaken and in a posture of strategic defeat, had to defend at all costs because it was their final stronghold, we mobilized every capability available to us and assembled an overwhelming superiority of forces and struck with victory assured. This was correct, scientific and bold guidance on the part of the strategic command and staff. The victories won in those offensive campaigns were fatal blows to the enemy and spurred the strong development of our strategy. One "southern Central Highlands campaign" led to the liberation of the entire Central Highlands and steered the war in a new direction. One "Hue-Da Nang campaign" gave us control over all of central and southern central Vietnam and pushed the strategic frontline 500 kilometers further to the south. One "Ho Chi Minh campaign" led to the liberation of the entire South and brought the war to an end. It must be emphasized in addition that we also applied and closely coordinated the principal laws that governed the nation's long war of resistance. The combat operations of local forces and uprisings by the masses augments and developed upon the results achieved through our offensive campaigns. In actuality, it was on the basis of small-scale combat operations combined with uprisings that the people seized political power in many municipalities, cities and large rural areas.

The art of managing the war situation in the spring of 1975 was also evident in how we organized the rear area. While the various offensive campaigns were being conducted in the South, we established in the North many infantry divisions and many air defense regiments to serve as strategic reserves and prepare us to deal with the possibility of a war of destruction or a strategic attack being launched against the rear area. Hundreds of thousands of recently drafted troops were sent along with the tactical corps to the frontline. Within a very short amount of time, we had mobilized everything needed to provide the battlefield with material support and established the Battlefield Support Department within the Party Central Committee. All of these efforts proved that the apparatus of the strategic command operated with urgency, accuracy and efficiency.

Today, 10 years after the victory over the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the complete liberation of the South, we are faced with the plans and acts of sabotage and aggression of a new enemy--the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. Our military art has always been the military art of resisting foreign aggression. It has incorporated the 4,000 years of experience of our forefathers and been brought to a new pinnacle of development by our party. Today, it must be further improved and developed to meet the new requirements of defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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CSO: 4210/9

QUANG NAM-DA NANG AFTER 10 YEARS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 42-53, 72

[Article by Hoang Minh Thang, secretary of the Quang Nam-Da Nang Provincial Party Committee]

[Text] The Initial Achievements

Quang Nam-Da Nang began building the new life under the following circumstances: the province had just emerged from a very savage war, three-fourths of its villages and hamlets had been destroyed, two-thirds of its farmland had been abandoned and 25 percent of its population had been wounded. Under their cruel and insidious "denounce the communists" and "pacification" policies, the Americans and puppets completely destroyed the means by which some 700,000 residents of the countryside earned their livings and forced them to live in concentration camps and strategic hamlets. The more than 110,000 routed puppet soldiers and government personnel who remained in the province and their families had no jobs. More than one-half million persons lacked food and required relief aid on a daily basis. The U.S. imperialists had not only used bombs and shells to destroy the environment, but had also sown the poisonous seed of reactionary cultural decadence, encouraged a vulgar, dissolute and immoral pleasure-seeking way of life and caused sweeping social ills. However, under the leadership and guidance of the Party Central Committee and government and the persistence and support of the sectors on the central level, of other provinces and municipalities, the party organization and people of Quang Nam-Da Nang have displayed revolutionary heroism, upheld their tradition of unity and consensus, made every effort to overcome their difficulties and meet every challenge, launched continuous revolutionary movements of the masses to move forward in all fields of production, combat, work and studies and win relatively comprehensive victories in socialist transformation and socialist construction. Between 1976 and 1984, the gross social product increased 3.2 times; the value of total agricultural output increased 2.5 times; the value of total industrial output increased nearly 5 times; the amount of grain mobilized increased 5 times; the value of export goods rose rapidly; budget revenues increased 2.5 times; and the number of persons attending school rose to 1 of every 3. The standard of living of the people has been stabilized and even been markedly improved in many areas of the province. The number of families with tile homes has increased five-fold compared to the period immediately preceding liberation day.

The above mentioned achievements have been recorded mainly because our party organization has gained a thorough understanding of the line of the Party Central Committee, displayed a high spirit of collective ownership, a high spirit of self-reliance and dared to think and act and because of the dynamism and creativity of the people of the entire province.

Below, allow us to present some initial thoughts concerning economic construction and development during the past 10 years.

Firmly Adhering to the Laws of the Socialist Revolution and Flexibly Applying the Resolutions of the Party Central Committee to the Circumstances of the Locality

Socialism is the ideal, the dream of all our people, of our entire party. For the sake of this ideal, the people of our province fought and died to resist the United States for national salvation and defend the province. Now, we were beginning to realize this dream, with our first effort being to restore the two-thirds of the province's farmland that was lying fallow, was covered with bombs, mines and barbed wire. The majority of farmers, having been resettled by the enemy in the municipality, in the cities, towns and concentration camps, lacked grain, had no housing and lacked implements and tools when they returned to their former villages. The province had only a dozen or so enterprises and factories, all of which were privately owned and used raw materials from foreign countries.

To overcome that situation, we had to proceed forward on the basis of our arable land and labor. Therefore, we urgently mobilized people into the countryside to disarm bombs and mines, clear land and put practically all of our farmland into production. Before developing the province's master economic plan, we planned water conservancy projects for the entire province. We concentrated our capital and labor on the construction of numerous electric pump stations in the key rice growing areas of the province's northern districts in order to initiate intensive cultivation and multicropping; at the same time, with assistance from the central level, we constructed the large Phu Ninh farmland irrigation project, thereby turning tens of thousands of hectares of arid land in the province's southern districts, which once could only be used to raise one crop per year producing an average yield of only 7 to 8 quintals per hectare, into two and three crop fields producing 5 to 6 tons per hectare.

It is a basic law of revolution that efforts be immediately shifted to the socialist revolution upon the completion of national liberation. We realized that achieving socialism requires that we have modern material-technical bases, that we have a system of large-scale, socialist production. To achieve large-scale, socialist production and develop a modern industry and agriculture under the conditions of our province, we realized that we first had to focus our efforts on stepping up agricultural production and consider agriculture to be the front of foremost importance in order to successfully resolve the grain problem. At the same time, we had to attach very much importance to developing industry, small industry, the handicraft trades, the forest industry and ocean fishing with a view toward accelerating the formation of an industrial-agricultural economic structure within the

province. However, to implement this economic development line, our province had to carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture, industry and commerce. Therefore, during the early years of economic restoration and development, our province adhered to the guideline "combining transformation with construction, with primary emphasis upon construction." During the period from the 11th Congress of the Provincial Party Organization (April, 1977) through the 12th Congress (1979) to the 13th Congress (1981), the province focused all of its efforts in the transformation, construction and development of the economy on developing the four strengths of the local economy: agriculture, industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, ocean fishing and the forest industry.

On the basis of the economic zoning guidelines of the Central Committee, the province's industrial-agricultural planning and the master plan for each district, we gradually carried out the redistribution of labor, reorganized production along the lines of large-scale socialist production and gradually established large-scale, specialized farming areas with the aim of establishing an agro-industrial structure within the scope of the districts and an industrial-agricultural structure within the province from the very outset.

Despite the difficulties being encountered with capital and materials, the province boldly invested in the construction of material-technical bases for agriculture, especially in water conservancy projects, the restoration of fields to production, the opening of new land to cultivation, the construction of agricultural stations and farms...importance was attached to intensive cultivation, multicropping and the expansion of the amount of land under cultivation and all three of these measures were carried out through revolutionary movements of the masses. As a result of restoring fields to production, opening new land and practicing multicropping, especially as a result of upgrading the spring-summer crop to a main crop and raising three rice crops per year, the amount of area under cultivation within the province has doubled compared to 1976. Scientific and technical measures have gradually been widely applied by the masses and have yielded marked returns. In particular, water conservancy systems consisting of many large, medium and small projects have been urgently constructed by the state and the people working together. The most significant of these projects, the Phu Ninh reservoir project, is now in use following 2 years of urgent construction work.

In conjunction with investing in the construction of material-technical bases for agriculture, we have carried out the socialist transformation of agriculture in keeping with the spirit of Political Bureau Resolution Number 254 and the resolution adopted by the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee on 10 April 1977. For the agricultural cooperativization movement, we made the following preparations: the remnants of landowner and feudal exploitation were quickly and systematically abolished and cropland was distributed to farmers who lacked land or had no land, thus providing "land to the tiller." Even during the movements to clear land and restore fields to production, disarm bombs and mines and build water conservancy projects, we provided farmers with practice in collective production through production solidarity teams that operated under quotas and work contracts. In

preparation for improving and building fields to accommodate agricultural mechanization, we established new population centers as we relocated some 700,000 farmers from the cities back to the countryside and conducted a campaign to move hundreds of thousands of gravesites from mounds and hillsides to central locations so that fertile land could be devoted to production. We promptly conducted a pilot project in the establishment of cooperatives within a number of areas of the province in order to gain experience for expanding the establishment of cooperatives. In late 1977, on the basis of the condition of fields, the class situation in the countryside, the revolutionary awareness of the mass of farmers and the experience gained in the establishment of agricultural cooperatives in the North, the province established a pilot project cooperative in Duy Phuoc in Duy Xuyen District and subsequently established six other cooperatives in the other districts. At the same time, it selected Duy Xuyen District as the site of a pilot project in organizing cooperatives on a district-wide scale. On the basis of the success of the pilot project cooperatives and after making concerted, active preparations in many areas, which included the urgent training of more than 10,000 cadres for cooperatives, the province launched the agricultural cooperativization movement in the autumn of 1978. In 1979, 1 year earlier than planned by the province, cooperativization was virtually completed with 254 agricultural cooperatives accounting for more than 95 percent of total cropland and 96.8 percent of the province's agricultural labor force having been established. This was a turning point of historic significance.

While agitating among farmers to join cooperatives, we set appropriate prices to be paid to establish public ownership of buffalo, cattle and implements. Farmers accepted these prices and eagerly joined cooperatives. Collective production must prove superior to private production. Therefore, we encouraged farmers to make every effort to build water conservancy projects, thus insuring that water conservancy truly fulfilled its role as the measure of foremost importance in production, in intensive cultivation and that the construction of water conservancy projects was carried out one step ahead of or in conjunction with cooperativization. At the same time, we rapidly introduced scientific and technical advances in agricultural production to develop it along the lines of centralization, specialized farming and intensive cultivation. On the other hand, we expanded the amount of area under cultivation by practicing multicropping and opening new land in order to quickly produce sufficient grain to meet the needs of the people and produce many agricultural products to support the industrialization of the country and meet national defense needs. To create the initial material-technical bases for the development of cooperatives, we supplied thousands of tons of raw materials and building materials to cooperatives at no charge, even though we had only recently emerged from the war, even though we were experiencing shortages of everything and our budget was still small. The province invested tens of millions of dong and necessary materials to assist the farmers of the ethnic minorities in the mountains (the former base area of the revolution) in building roads and hundreds of hectares of rice paddies, thereby laying the initial groundwork for the settlement of nomads, for gradually improving the livelihood and the material and spiritual lives of the minorities.

By means of these correct and positive policies and measures, the agricultural cooperativization movement in Quang Nam-Da Nang developed quickly, strongly

and steadily. The superior nature of collective production plus socialist awareness greatly multiplied the strength of the class of collective farmers and accelerated the development of production. As a result, Quang Nam-Da Nang has achieved self-sufficiency in grain, has contributed more grain to the state with each passing year, has grain with which to assist a number of places and has established areas specializing in the production of industrial and export crops, thereby laying the base for the development of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades. Resolving the grain problem on our own, eliminating any further need for grain from the state and opening possibilities and prospects for the development of a balanced economy in such a short amount of time represent a victory of profound significance for our province.

Under the leadership of the party, Quang Nam-Da Nang abolished exploitation and the sources of exploitation in the countryside and established the new production relations. The class of collective farmers has been formed, thereby creating a new situation, creating new forces and bringing about the steady development of the province's agricultural production. During the past 10 years, the majority of the agricultural cooperatives that have been established have developed continuously, their material-technical bases have been strengthened and the living conditions of their members have been improved. This development has been characterized by the agricultural cooperatives adopting the new method of operating, instituting product contracts with groups of laborers and individual laborers, introducing science and technology in field production, practicing intensive cultivation and multicropping, developing livestock production, expanding the trades and gradually raising their yields and output in a stable manner. Many cooperatives have joined the 10-ton and 20-ton per hectare per year clubs.

During the past 10 years, while transforming and developing agriculture toward large-scale, socialist production, Quang Nam-Da Nang has attached importance to the development of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades.

Prior to liberation day, Quang Nam-Da Nang's industry was very small and was dependent upon foreign sources of supplies and raw materials. The province's small industry and handicraft trades were insignificant. Immediately following liberation, the provincial party organization saw the basic, favorable conditions that existed for restoring, building and developing the industrial, small industry and handicraft economy. Quang Nam-Da Nang is located in the center of the country. Da Nang is the second largest municipality in the South and has a major seaport. Da Nang and the two cities of Tam Ky and Hoi An have a rather highly skilled, large labor force. The province also has agricultural areas, forests and vast offshore waters. If these economic potentials were developed well, they would provide the conditions for developing industry. It was on the basis of this assessment that the 11th Congress of the Party defined the potentials and strengths of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades and set the following target: "Gradually developing the province into a relatively comprehensive industrial-agricultural province in order to gradually meet the everyday needs of the people and accumulate capital for socialist industrialization.

In view of the fact that we had very little initial liquid capital, we decided to rely upon the people, to tap the creative potentials of the people, of the corps of scientific-technical cadres and existing craftsmen and establish many different forms of organization: state-operated enterprises, joint public-private enterprises, cooperatives, cooperative teams, etc. At the same time, we obtained aid from the central level in order to develop this production sector very quickly and very strongly. We were conscious at the very outset of the relationship, the reciprocal impact between agriculture and industry and the course of development of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale, socialist production. Therefore, while carrying out agricultural cooperativization, we attached importance to planning the development of the trade sector within the agricultural cooperatives and combining agriculture with industry from the very outset, at basic units and within the scope of the districts. We have focused our efforts on developing local raw materials. At the same time, we have begun to expand our trade and ties with other localities in order to open additional sources of supplies and raw materials for the development of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades. Besides developing primarily light industry, we have also been making efforts to construct a number of heavy industrial installations. Back in 1982, we began encouraging every sector, every level and all basic production and business units (including private businesses) to look for every way to develop sources of supplies, materials, equipment, technology and capital outside the plan assigned by the upper level and instituted appropriate pay and benefits for skilled craftsmen in order to quickly raise product output and improve product quality.

In particular, throughout the process of socialist transformation of industry and commerce, the Quang Nam-Da Nang party organization closely adhered to the most important element and foremost requirement of socialist transformation, namely, reorganizing production and distribution along socialist lines by means of forms and methods of management suited to each sector and trade in order to make good use of the non-socialist segments of the economy while gradually reducing their scope and transforming them to serve the interests of socio-economic restoration and development.

In keeping with the party's view concerning utilizing the five different segments of the economy for a certain period of time during the period of transition, our party has focused its efforts on building, strengthening and developing the state-operated economy and the collective economy so that they play the dominant role within the province's economy. Determined steps have been taken to transform the capitalist economy by many different measures based on the specific objective: we abolished the compradore bourgeoisie and set up joint public-private enterprises within the production sectors and other necessary sectors in order to make use of the capital and business experience of the bourgeoisie. Laborers working within the small industry and handicraft sector have been encouraged to join cooperatives and cooperative teams or join private enterprises or the household economy and work under contract as satellites of state-operated enterprises, joint public-private enterprises...

In keeping with the view of "combining transformation with construction, with primary emphasis upon construction," we reorganized the basic units within

industry, small industry and the handicraft trades within the province and have created every possible material condition for them to enlarge their facilities and develop their production.

Through education, agitation and the application of a number of appropriate policies, the province has encouraged 459 large private business in commerce to take their capital and set up 400 basic production units. We have also encouraged handicraftsmen to pool their capital in the establishment of thousands of small-scale production units. In addition to nationalizing the basic production and business units of 14 compradore bourgeoisie, the province has turned 23 enterprises within industry, transportation and the service sector into joint public-private enterprises and adopted a policy that recognizes their capital as theirs and provides for the payment of interest to them (interest payments are made separately, not deducted from their capital; interest rates range from 8 to 15 percent, depending upon whether their capital was contributed to the joint public-private corporation before, during or after transformation). As regards handicraftsmen, we have raised the amount of income that is exempt from taxes to a level twice as high as it previously was. Individual bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie participating in joint public-private enterprises who are well versed in technology, are highly skilled or skilled in management have been utilized and boldly assigned the job of enterprise director or deputy director. Hundreds of large merchants and thousands of small merchants have been shifted to small industry and handicraft production. Tens of thousands of handicraftsmen have pooled their capital and tools and established thousands of basic small industry and handicraft production units. With the several dozen industrial, small industry and handicraft units that have been established through capital and labor of the people and the 23 joint public-private enterprises that now exist, Quang Nam-Da Nang has established the following sectors: energy, machine manufacture, building materials production, the processing of agricultural, forestry and marine products, consumer goods, tool manufacture, mining, exportation, etc. By practicing frugality, salvaging every possible piece of iron and machine part and displaying creativity in their work, the working class and laboring people of the province have developed industry, small industry and the handicraft trades at a rapid rate. The value of the sector's total output increased 4.65 times between 1976 and 1983.

By the start of 1985, a machine network extending from the provincial level to the districts, villages and cooperatives had been established in Quang Nam-Da Nang, a network consisting of 19 state-operated enterprises, 77 cooperatives, 297 private machine shops, 366 blacksmith shops and 50 enterprises in the energy, chemical, building material, textile, leather, garment, dyeing, grain-food processing and other sectors. We have thus created a structure that reflects relatively rational balance between the production of means of production and the consumer goods industry and have been able to better meet the province's needs for raw materials, production tools, consumer goods and so forth better with each passing day. Industry's share of the value of total industrial and agricultural output has risen from 12.8 percent in 1976 to 60 percent in 1985, with group A increasing from 12.7 percent of the value of industrial output in 1976 to 30 percent in 1985.

The fishing grounds of Quang Nam-Da Nang, which measure 62,000 square kilometers and contain a very wide variety of commercial marine species in abundant quantities, constitute a large source of valuable food products and exports goods. However, the marine products sector had been encountering very many difficulties, especially with ship engines of all types, fuel and lubricants, nets, gear, spare parts and so forth, all of which had to be imported. In the face of this situation, the 12th Congress of the Provincial Party Organization (December, 1979) decided that we "must take the initiative and turn the fishing industry around, with special importance attached to the harvesting and processing of marine products for exportation. The fishing industry must be maintained and developed on the basis of exporting marine products." The 12th Congress also decided to "upgrade brackish and fresh water pisciculture to an important economic sector, one that yields high economic returns and can partly compensate for the drop in the ocean fish catch resulting from the shortage of fuel and lubricants." Under these guidelines, the marine products sector rapidly increased its output: from 28,000 tons in 1981 to 35,000 tons in 1984. The value of marine product exports increased seven-fold between 1976 and 1984. As a result of earning foreign currency, the province has been able to import thousands of additional tons of fuel, lubricants and fishing equipment each year.

In conjunction with turning the fishing industry around and guiding its development, a pilot project in the socialist transformation of the fishing industry is also being gradually carried out in order to gain experience. So far, we have established a number of fishing cooperatives and production cooperative teams within which distribution is based on labor and the means of production contributed to the cooperative or team and a number of rear service support cooperatives for the fishing industry, thereby coordinating operations at sea and on shore, combining the economy with national defense and combining fishing with agriculture and forestry. Although the results achieved to date have not been high, initial, useful experiences can be drawn from these organizations and a number of models that appear to be well suited to the period of transition can be seen to be emerging.

As it did with the ocean economy, the province's party organization recognized the potentials and strengths of the forest economy at a very early date and adopted a specific policy. The resolution of the 11th Congress of the Provincial Party Organization (April, 1977) defined the task of the forestry sector: "Successfully combining forestry (the protection and repair of forests, afforestation and the harvesting and processing of wood and forestry products) with the planting of industrial crops and livestock production; at the same time, measures must be taken to provide a truly stable supply of grain to the people of the mountains with a view toward ending the indiscriminate destruction of forests. To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to gradually stabilize the settlement of the ethnic minorities and adopt plans to turn over forests and forest land to villages for commercial utilization in accordance with the planning, plans and policies of the state." In December, 1979, the resolution of the 12th Congress of the Provincial Party Organization again stressed that "agriculture and forestry must be combined within the entire forest economy. In particular, the afforestation movement to cover the barren hills in the areas along the province's boundary must be intensified."

In the transformation and development of the forest economy of the province over the past 10 years, an achievement deserving of attention is that the sandy area of the province has been virtually covered with vegetation and shelter belt forests have been established along the seacoast through a widespread afforestation movement being carried out by the people. Planning the distribution of land to the people to enable them to establish household gardens (a 1,500 square meter garden per household in the sandy area, 500 square meters per household in the lowlands and from 1,000 to 2,000 square meters per household in the mountains) has yielded good results.

In the space of 9 years (1976-1984), some 22,000 hectares of land were planted with forest trees with capital from the state, 6,000 hectares of which have now become forests. In 1982, the province began a pilot project in assigning forests and forest land to villages and cooperatives. By 1984, 86,000 hectares had been assigned. The coordination of the settlement of nomads with the development of the forest industry has begun to be established and has produced results at a number of places in Giang, Tra My and Phuoc Son. Slash and burn cultivation has been greatly reduced. In conjunction with stepping upon the harvesting, transportation and processing of timber and firewood to meet some of the needs of production, construction and everyday life and the harvesting of a number of exported forestry products, such as cinnamon, rattan, pharmaceuticals and so forth, which have contributed significantly to our exports, a number of forestry combines have gradually come into existence within the province, combines that coordinate afforestation, harvesting, transportation and processing.

The distinctive feature of the transformation and development of the economy in Quang Nam-Da Nang has been the correct and consistent approach taken by the province's party organization with regard to developing a relatively diversified economy in conjunction with accumulating capital from within the economy itself in order to build material-technical bases, create the conditions for expanding production and, on this basis, gradually improve the people's living conditions.

In recent years, the province has invested more than one-half billion dong (from the local budget and loans for investments in intensive development) in the construction of material-technical bases, 80 percent of which has been invested in the material production sectors and 20 percent of which has been invested in the other sectors. Meanwhile, as a result of doing our best to look after the living conditions of the people, adopting rational policies and implementing the guideline "the state and the people working together" at an early date, more than 2 billion dong have been contributed by collectives and the people to the rebuilding of the province, a figure 5 times higher than the amount of capital invested by the state. As a result of the factors mentioned above, our province has now laid the initial foundations for becoming an industrial-agricultural province.

Having Adopted a Correct Economic Development Policy and Guidelines, It Then Became Necessary To Establish a Correct Economic Management System

V.I. Lenin once said: "Today, management has become the main and central task..." "We must fully realize that in order to manage successfully,

besides being able to convince people, besides being able to win a civil war, we must be able to perform practical organizational work. This is the most difficult task, because it is a matter of organizing in a new way the most deep-rooted, the economic, foundations of the life of scores of millions of people."(1) And, also according to V.I. Lenin, that which guarantees the vitality and victory of socialism is the establishment and implementation by the proletariat of a social organization of labor more highly developed than that of capitalism. "In the final analysis, labor productivity is the most important, the most fundamental guarantee of the victory of the new social order."(2) The experience of the past 10 years of economic construction within our province have helped to verify the above statements by V.I. Lenin as entirely correct. We fully realize that once a correct economic development policy and guidelines have been adopted, we must know how to organize management, adopt correct economic policies and establish a correct economic management system. Our party has established the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages." Within the economic field, this mechanism guarantees that the working people exercise their right of collective ownership in organizing and managing production and distribution. This management system, therefore, encompasses the interests that have been defined by our party in its view concerning the three economic interests: the interests of all society, the interests of the collective and the interests of the individual laborer. Correctly combining these three economic interests is the fundamental economic aspect of the relationship between the state and the various strata of the working people, is the force motivating the people to vigorously exercise their right of collective ownership in socialist construction with increasingly high labor productivity.

Consequently, a correct management system must reflect coordination and balance among the three economic interests and insure that these three interests are identical. This unity of the three economic interests is the fundamental aspect of the relationship between the state and the working people within the economic field. The unity of these three economic interests is the basis for achieving a combined strength in economic construction. Our province's experience in economic management over the past 10 years shows that it is necessary to lay the foundation for the worker to exercise ownership in economic terms, primarily by establishing a complete system of appropriate economic relations between the state and the working people within production and business units. The highest standard to be met in laying this foundation is insuring that the system of policies and measures enacted to stimulate the development of production and coordinate the three types of economic interests is realistic and practical. The economic management system characterized by bureaucracy and subsidization robs the basic production units of their dynamism and thwarts innovations and the display of initiative and creativity by them; on the other hand, it narrows the scope of the relations between basic production units and state management agencies.

To provide economic management, our province has put together a system of leverage policies and measures and adopted forms of organization and stages of development for the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism in conjunction with establishing the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership, the state manages." Within this mechanism, the government has played an especially important role in everything from organizing and

regulating the economy through plans that are closely tied to economic accountability to the implementation of leverage policies backed by a strong organization, by a corps of cadres who are well versed in economics and keep abreast of the situation within the locality. Within this mechanism, the spirit of collective ownership of the working people has become a strong motivating force. A typical example of this was clearly evident at the construction site of the large Phu Ninh farmland irrigation project. There, under the leadership of the provincial party organization, laborers of Quang Nam-Da Nang worked as hard as they possibly could, even though they did not know from one meal to the next if they would have enough to eat, even though they were subjected on a daily basis to the propaganda and lies of counter-revolutionaries. They worked tirelessly, eagerly "arising before dawn, packing a lunch and heading off to the irrigation project, not working their own fields until they returned home in the evening." As a result, this major irrigation project was completed in excellent fashion. This is the communist work spirit that V.I. Lenin praised.

The lessons and experiences that can be drawn by our province from its economic management over the past 10 years are: if the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership, the state manages" is correctly applied, it is possible, even though the skills of management cadres are still weak and materials are still in short supply, to launch a broad movement among the masses to actively participate in economic construction and, as a result, possible to overcome many seemingly insurmountable difficulties and record considerable achievements.

In keeping with the various resolutions of the Party Central Committee, we have implemented the principle of democratic centralism within management, made the plan the center of management, coordinated the plan with market relations and the broadening of economic ties and coordinated management by sector with management by locality and territory. We have instituted the formulation of plans from the basic units upward. Plans are based on the needs of the basic units, on developing each potential of the locality and are usually higher than the plan norms assigned by the upper level. The results that have been achieved through the implementation of plans within our province have proven that our plans are positive in nature. In particular, they have proven that our plans are plans of the people, that the main foundation upon which our plans rest is the strength of the people. The manpower and material of the people have enabled the construction of numerous projects and factories, such as the Hoa Khanh Textile Enterprise, the 29 March Textile Enterprise, the Plastic Enterprise, transport corporations, marine product processing enterprises, schools, medical aid stations, bus depots, social welfare facilities, etc. Many basic production units have only been receiving 30 to 40 percent of their capital and supplies from the state and some have received no capital at all from the state but have still managed to firmly maintain their production and develop.

In our management of plans, we have maintained the legal nature of the plan itself while tapping the dynamism of basic units and have focused efforts on completing key plans while boldly assigning management responsibilities to the districts and basic units and helping them implement their plans well.

Our province has also taken effective steps to closely tie planning to economic accountability. Although much progress has been made in this area, there are still many weaknesses and shortcomings due to the fact that bureaucracy and subsidization are still quite prevalent in management work.

The distinctive feature of the management work performed in Quang Nam-Da Nang is that the provincial party organization has adopted numerous leverage policies designed to stimulate the development of production, create jobs and income for a large number of workers within the municipality and the cities and towns and open directions in which labor, arable land and the trade sector can be combined in a comprehensive way in order to develop the economy in the countryside. Within agriculture, we established the policy immediately after liberation that anyone who restored a field to production was given the right to use it for 1 year. In essence, that policy abolished private ownership of cropland and encouraged farmers to work hard to restore fields to production and clear new land. As a result, the amount of farmland within the province increased from 57,000 hectares following liberation day to 120,000 hectares in 1977. In the cooperativization campaign, the province's policy was not to set prices for beef buffalo and cattle, only for the draft buffalo and cattle, implements and tools brought into the cooperative, with the minimum prices paid being no less than 85 percent of current market prices. As a result of that policy, we avoided the problem of farmers selling off their buffalo, cattle, equipment and farm implements before joining cooperatives (in 1978, prior to cooperativization, the buffalo and cattle herd numbered 120,000 head; in 1983, it numbered 164,000 head). The policies of allowing fertilizer to be purchased with paddy (35 to 40 kilograms of paddy per ton of fertilizer), providing an initial material subsidy (each agricultural cooperative was given 10 cubic meters of lumber, 10 tons of cement, 100 tons of lime...) and selling large tractors to agricultural cooperatives provided the conditions for cooperatives to steadily develop.

Within industry, forestry, fishing, commerce and the other sectors, we have applied a piecework wage and revenue based salary policy; a policy that recognizes the capital contributed to and pays different rates of interest on the shares in joint public-private enterprises; policies that encourage the businesses of many sectors and trades; a policy reducing the taxes paid by marketing cooperatives during the initial period of their operation, etc. The provincial party committee has adopted appropriate policies concerning small merchants who have participated in the revolution, such as raising the ceiling on the amount of their goods confiscated with payment above the ceiling established by the central level. To avoid subsidization in commerce, the provincial party committee has implemented a policy of salaries based on business revenues. State store personnel are paid on the basis of business revenues and the profit margin realized from business revenues. Together with establishing and developing state stores, the provincial party committee has decided to intensify the activities of the network of marketing cooperatives. Duy Hoa District is the leader of the nation's marketing cooperative sector. The provincial party committee is currently launching a movement in "following the example of Duy Hoa" throughout the commerce sector. Unreasonable regulations concerning the granting of loans to marketing cooperatives (in principle, a loan was not to exceed the existing capital of a marketing cooperative) have been rescinded and the decision was made to allow the

marketing cooperatives to borrow money on the basis of their business requirements beginning in early 1984.

The task of managing distribution and circulation has been made exceedingly difficult by the facts that the economy still consists of many different segments and the struggle between socialism and capitalism is still complex. The experience of the past 10 years has shown us that in order to manage this work well, the state must control the sources of goods, control the flow of money and tightly manage the market. We must guide every activity involved in the four basic elements of social reproduction, from production to distribution, circulation and consumption, must control the products of the economy throughout the province, control the vast majority of agricultural products and the goods of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades. We must gradually establish exclusive control over grain. With this in mind, we have flexibly combined the plan with the market by utilizing two forms of plans, legally binding plans and target plans (essentially directed plans) and three forms of circulation, circulation through state-operated commerce, through marketing cooperatives and through trade under two-way contracts among units and sectors and business cooperation with the service sectors, with private commerce, in order to control the sources of goods, control the flow of money and not allow the free market to monopolize prices through speculation and black marketing activities that disrupt economic order. As a result, we have reduced the difficulties encountered by the people in their everyday lives and the heavy burden of "subsidies" borne by the state.

Organizing and managing the economy are an art, are new and complicated jobs to us. Therefore, our party organization has established the following procedure: whenever a new, major position or policy of the Party Central Committee and government are to be implemented or whenever an advanced experience of a province or municipality is to be applied, a pilot project is conducted first and the practical experience gained from it is reviewed before broader application is undertaken. In recent years, the province has conducted pilot projects involving seven agricultural cooperatives, the Dien Duong Fishing Cooperative, the Duy Hoa Marketing Cooperative, the Binh Duong Model of combining agriculture and forestry, etc. In particular, the Binh Duong Model has emerged as a form of "village level socio-economic model." A village in the sandy coastal area of Thang Binh District, a village that was destroyed and lost two-thirds of its population during the war, Binh Duong grew and established a cooperative under the guideline of practicing intensive cultivation to raise crop yields, combining labor with arable land and offshore waters, coordinating crop and livestock production, coordinating fishing with the processing of marine products, combining the economy with national defense... Binh Duong has launched movements to plant forests, build water conservancy projects, plant grain and export crops, establish collective and household livestock production and fulfill obligations to the state. It has established a shelter belt forest consisting of slightly less than 9 million beefwood trees and planted more than 20,000 coconut and cashew trees, which constitute an important economic resource of the locality. Its annual catch of marine products exceeds 300 tons. Establishing ties among agricultural production, forestry and fishing along lines that attach importance to exports has ushered in a new stage of development for the locality's production and business sectors. Including the grain output within

the household economy, Binh Duong's grain production now exceeds 300 kilograms per capita per year. This is a lesson in the very dynamic and diversified method of operating.

The Duy Hoa Marketing Cooperative is a good model of commerce. Possessing a high spirit of supporting production and serving the people, the Duy Hoa Marketing Cooperative has done a very good job in both procurement and sales: it sells local goods and buys local goods. It buys whatever farmers have to sell and sells whatever it buys. It sells products at any time and buys products at any time. The cooperative makes all necessary payments in cash, buys products on credit and sells them and also pays in advance for products to be delivered at a later date. It delivers products directly to consumers and sells the products that are required and preferred by customers. These are flexible trading methods, methods that are consistent with the function and task of a collective economic organization of working farmers, methods that create many favorable conditions for consumers, for controlling sources of goods, controlling the flow of money and quickly turning capital over, thereby helping to manage the rural market, eradicating the negative phenomena of competing in the procurement and sale of goods, of speculation and hoarding by private merchants and gaining the democratic and voluntary participation of every agricultural cooperative member in the marketing cooperative. By developing upon the fully convincing experiences of the advanced model units described above, the various revolutionary movements of the masses have developed in a widespread, rapid and stable manner.

Heightening the Leadership Role of the Party Organization in Socialist Construction

To turn the resolutions of the party into revolutionary actions by the masses, our party organization has established as a task of foremost importance that of constantly heightening the leadership role of the party organization in every revolutionary job.

Upholding the tradition set during the two wars of resistance against France and the United States, the traditions of "clinging to the people, clinging to the land, clinging to the basic units" and "relying upon the people, making the people our base," the party organization set the guideline for its actions in the new stage as "by the laborer, for the laborer." On the basis of this guideline, during the very first days following liberation, the party organization launched mass movements to build the economy, build the party organization. As a result, many positions and policies of the Party Central Committee and government and many specific tasks and policies of the province have been enthusiastically carried out by party members and the masses and yielded marked results.

The party organization has constantly concerned itself with training and raising the overall standards of the corps of cadres in order to meet the requirements of tasks. It requires that the cadres of all levels and sectors within the province be competent, possess revolutionary qualities, maintain close ties with the masses correctly understand their state of mind, know how to elicit and listen to the true voice of the masses and have a deep

understanding of the legitimate interests and needs of the masses in order to be correct and timely in their decisions and actions.

The achievements that Quang Nam-Da Nang has recorded over the past 10 years are vivid expressions of the political qualities, the leadership skill and the will to fight of the party organization, a party organization that has been tempered and challenged in both the fight of past years and in the work of building the province today. The party organization possesses these political qualities, these leadership skills and this fighting strength because it has given special attention to guiding the implementation of the directives and resolutions of the Party Central Committee on party building, thereby insuring that the party's leadership is truly the factor that determines each and every victory. This is the cause and effect relationship in combining the political task with party building.

Recently, we have oriented each activity involved in building the party toward the goal of successfully carrying out the political task set by the 13th Congress of the Provincial Party Organization. In conjunction with studying Marxism-Leninism in order to learn the laws and methods of revolution, we have given our attention to guiding the various levels of the party organization in delving deeply into the way that things are done, eliminating bottlenecks and bringing about economic development; teaching cadres and party members to fulfill their vanguard role and set good examples in leading the masses in successfully performing the tasks that have been established; and launching spirited revolutionary action movements to restore fields to production, clear land, build water conservancy projects, practice intensive cultivation and multicropping, develop industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, produce export goods, fulfill the military obligation, maintain combat readiness and help to defeat each plan and act of aggression of the enemy.

On the basis of performing good political and ideological work, we have devoted many efforts to building the party organizationally. Following liberation day, when we had but few cadres and party members, we utilized and developed upon the capabilities of those local cadres and party members as well as the cadres regrouped in the North that had returned to the province who possessed job qualifications, skills and experience to insure that each activity of the basic units, of the committees and sectors was carried out smoothly and effectively. Urgent and positive steps have been taken to develop the party and improve the quality of its members. As a result, we have established basic organizations of the party in practically all agencies, units and localities (even at places in the remote, wilderness areas of the mountains where there was once no party members) to serve as the nucleus leading the revolutionary movements of the masses. We have lowered the average age of the corps of party members, of party committee members and improved the leadership skills, increased the fighting strength and raised the economic management and technical standards of party committees, of the state apparatus from the provincial to the basic level. We have especially concerned ourselves with building the fighting strength and cultivating the dynamism and creativity of the basic organizations of the party. We have gradually defined the duties and methods of operation of the basic organizations of the party within the different sectors and the various fields of economic and social activity. We have screened and correctly assigned

core leadership cadres at basic units. The mass organizations have been further solidified and strengthened.

We have been gradually carrying out the party's task of a strategic nature of building the districts and strengthening the district level in order to make the district level a level that manages a comprehensive plan and has its own budget, a level that manages production, circulation and distribution, looks after the material and spiritual lives of the people, maintains political security and social order well and strengthens the national defense system and in order to make the districts military fortresses. We consider building the district party organizations to meet the standard of a "solid and strong district party organization to be the key in building the districts. Attention has been given to assigning additional cadres who possess good political qualities and the necessary skills to the district level to make it strong enough to manage the economy and society within the district and truly make the district the base for the development of basic units. Dien Ban and Hoa Vang, the two key districts of the province, are becoming a comprehensive management level. Their two party organizations have been recognized as solid and strong district party organizations by the Party Central Committee.

To perform its large tasks in the new stage, tasks which mainly entail socio-economic management, our party organization must constantly improve its ability to provide leadership and increase its fighting strength. At the same time, it must raise the level of socialist awareness of the masses, improve their ability to exercise collective ownership and organize the masses better. It must also heighten the role and responsibility of the state agencies and mass organizations, broaden the functions, authority and tasks of these agencies and organizations, improve their methods of operation and tap their dynamism and creativity.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "Selected Works," Su That Publishing House, 1959, Book II, Part I, pp 401-402.
2. V.I. Lenin: "Collected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1968, Volume 29, p 478.

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CSO: 4210/9

A LOOK BACK ON HAU GIANG'S TEN YEARS OF AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 54-59

[Article by Le Phuoc Tho, secretary of the Hau Giang Provincial Party Committee]

[Text] A full 10 years have passed since our nation, our country turned a new page in its history following the great victory of the spring of 1975. Ten years are but a brief moment in time compared to our forefathers' glorious, several thousand year history of building and defending the country. However, it is enough time for us to examine and evaluate the achievements that have been recorded and confirm our strongpoints and the good lessons and experiences that have been gained in each field of activity with a view toward strengthening our revolutionary optimism while engaging in serious criticism of ourselves concerning the weaknesses that still exist so that we make every effort to overcome and rectify them, to continue to steadily and successfully advance socialist transformation and socialist construction in Hau Giang, thereby making more worthy contributions to the country's common revolutionary cause.

The development of Hau Giang over the past 10 years has been a matter of both historical and logical evolution. This evolution and development have been marked by very many things that are good and even things that are not good, by countless objective difficulties and also by very many efforts that we have yet to complete. In reality, many new things unprecedented in the province's history, have emerged during the past 10 years in Hau Giang but, compared to the requirements of socialist construction, these new factors represent only the first blossoms of spring.

The great victory won in the spring of 1975 ended the several hundred years of our country's enslavement by enemies forever. Under the guidance of Political Bureau Resolution Number 254, Resolution 24 of the Central Committee and, in 1976, under the brilliant light of the resolution of the 4th Congress of the Party, the Hau Giang party organization immediately began leading socialist transformation and socialist construction--an entirely new and very difficult and complex undertaking.

All of the economic activities in Hau Giang (as well as the entire country) during the past 10 years have reflected one overriding characteristic: advancing to socialism from an economy in which small-scale production predominates and bypassing the capitalist stage of development. On the other hand, the wounds of the war, the harmful political and economic, ideological and psychological, cultural and social consequences of U.S. neo-colonialism could not be healed or overcome all at once. Therefore, the 4th Congress was entirely correct and displayed true insight when it observed that the revolution which we are carrying out is a process of comprehensive, deep and thorough revolutionary change, the process of combining transformation with construction, construction with transformation, with primary emphasis upon construction, the process of building everything from the bottom up, from the infrastructure to the superstructure, from production forces to production relations, from our material life to our cultural and spiritual lives... Embarking on peace time construction immediately upon emerging from the war, the tasks of managing the economy and society in accordance with the economic laws of socialism, of "establishing a network of new organizational relations, an exceedingly complex and delicate network encompassing the planned production and distribution of the products necessary for the life of tens of millions of persons..."(1), were brand new tasks to the majority of Hau Giang's cadres and party members. Therefore, incompetence and confusion were unavoidable. In the case of the majority of the province's working people (in Hau Giang, the working people are mainly farmers), it was not easy to instill the concept of their role as the collective masters of socialist society.

However, the Hau Giang party organization, in strict compliance with the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee, correctly evaluated the advantages it had in its favor: the spirit of oneness and joint efforts that pervaded the entire party organization, especially following the merger of the two provinces; the high degree of political and moral consensus within the party organization and among the people; and the patriotic tradition of the people of Hau Giang and their confidence in the party's line on the socialist revolution. At the same time, it recognized the immediate and long-range difficulties being faced. At that turning point in the revolution, our party organization was able to pinpoint the areas of primary importance, the key areas, and focused all efforts on carrying out the political tasks set by the party.

Our party organization recorded its first important success by gaining an understanding of and correctly applying the law that production relations be consistent with the nature and level of development of production forces. In all modesty, we can proudly report to the party and the people of the entire country: during the past 10 years, especially since 1980, the new production relations have been gradually established and steadily strengthened within the countryside and even within the municipality, city and towns of the province. Socialist production forces have been significantly strengthened and reached a gratifying stage of development. There was a time when, due to misconceptions, impetuous thinking developed at one place or another and farmers were forced to join production collectives. Generally speaking, however, the Hau Giang party organization has avoided two incorrect approaches to agricultural transformation for several years now: only viewing socialism from the perspective of public ownership, placing sole emphasis upon numbers

and establishing many production collectives, the more the better, regardless of whether production develops, regardless of what happens to the living conditions of the working people and their socialist awareness and, secondly, the approach of seeking the so called "development of production" in any form. The realities of life have increasingly shown that these approaches only lead to spontaneity and anarchy and that any results achieved in these ways in no way benefit our common cause.

The initial success recorded by Hau Giang during the period of testing and selecting was that it correctly defined and utilized suitable transitional forms of organization and stages of development following an initial period of groping, a period that did not last very long. Gratifying was the fact that a wide variety of styles of development emerged from within the revolutionary movement of the masses. Our party organization, displaying a full sense of responsibility, closely watched and cultivated these sprouts. Over time, more than a few things that were outmoded, were no longer suitable have withered away on their own; at the same time, a rather large number of robust green shoots have sprouted and been growing vigorously everywhere in the province. A solidarity team that developed from work rotation and exchange into the 9th Collective has now become the 19 May Agricultural Cooperative in Ke An Village, Ke Sach District, a cooperative that has recorded an average yield in excess of 10 tons of paddy per hectare per year for 12 continuous seasons. A production collective in the town of Long Phu is now the Khuan Tang Cooperative, a cooperative that has set a good example of intensive cultivation and multicropping for the entire area in which the soil is polluted with salt. Emerging with a suitable mode of management, the Hau River State Farm, by correctly applying the system of product contracts and successfully satisfying the different economic interests and establishing economic ties, has developed the potentials of its labor and arable land and asserted itself as a profitable state-operated agricultural economic unit worthy of being studied by the other state farms in the province, etc. Today, having overcome many difficulties and complex problems, Hau Giang has completed the redistribution of cropland and established more than 5,000 production collectives and 26 agricultural cooperatives, which account for 62.27 percent of the land under the cultivation of rice. Although not all collective production units are advanced units, the socialist production relations have, generally speaking, proven superior to private production from the standpoint of the rate of economic development, the improvement of living conditions and the contribution of grain to the state. These are gratifying results, results that will make it possible for Hau Giang to virtually complete the transformation of agriculture by the end of this year.

When viewed against the background of Hau Giang's specific circumstances, namely, the need to make every effort to heal the wounds of the war while restoring and stabilizing production, stabilizing everyday life, the unprecedented floods that occurred in 1977 and 1978 and the very heavy damage caused to crops by planthoppers at a time when the quantity of agricultural materials supplied by the state has been steadily declining, the results achieved in agricultural production, especially grain production, represent extraordinary efforts by the people and party organization of Hau Giang.

Except during years of major natural disasters, all three targets, the targets

on the amount of area under cultivation, yield and output, have regularly been met. Hau Giang's paddy output soared from only a little more than 800,000 tons in 1976 to 1.52 million tons in 1984, which represents an annual rate of increase of 10 percent. For the first time in the history of its agricultural production, Hau Giang raised its grain output per capita to 616 kilograms, thereby laying the foundation for improving the living conditions of the people, strongly developing livestock production and the other sectors and trades and establishing an industrial-agricultural economic structure within the province. Hau Giang has 6 percent of the country's farmland. The province currently produces 10 percent of the country's total grain output.

Dedicated to working with and for the sake of the entire country, Hau Giang has been contributing more and more grain to meet common needs. The amount of grain mobilized has increased with each passing year. During the first year following liberation, only 240,000 tons were mobilized, which included the paddy confiscated from the Western Cereal Grain Corporation of the puppets. By 1984, this figure had risen to 420,000 tons. The people of Hau Giang are very pleased by the fact that our province leads the country, accounting for 10 percent of the total quantity of grain mobilized nationwide.

The revolution in production relations within Hau Giang's agriculture has been and is creating the conditions for the working people to be the masters of the means of production, of labor, of distribution and circulation. Among the various factors that have stimulated the development of production, there is no longer any doubt that agricultural transformation has played the role of opening the way for development and has been a major force.

The achievements in agricultural production, especially grain production, in Hau Giang have helped us to confirm that the guidelines, methods and stages we have established are well suited to the initial stage of the period of transition, are fully consistent with the specific conditions of Hau Giang. They are also the results of actively and widely applying technical advances in agricultural production.

After spending the first several years concentrating our forces on clearing land and restoring fields to production, our province initiated intensive cultivation and multicropping and boldly established and expanded high yield rice growing areas despite the limited availability of agricultural materials. We began with a pilot project in 1979. Today, a stable 10th month rice crop is raised on more than 100,000 hectares. In addition, some land has been devoted to the production of high yield winter-spring and summer-fall rice. The various levels of the party and government within the province have concerned themselves with closely guiding the well coordinated implementation of integrated technical measures, from the construction of water conservancy projects to the preparation of fields and the improvement of field surfaces, from the selection and restoration of the traditional rice varieties of the locality to the use of new main crop varieties suited to the different ecological zones, from improving the seasonal schedule within each area to instituting pest and disease prevention and control measures to protect crops and livestock, etc.

As for the reasons behind the continuous development of the province's agriculture over the past several years, in addition to the leadership factor, mention must first be made of the spirit of collective ownership, the diligent labor and the love of science and technology of the collective farmers of Hau Giang. And, it would be a major shortcoming not to mention the enormous contributions made by the cadres and students of the Can Tho College and the Mekong Delta Rice Plant Research Institute in popularizing new rice varieties, training scientific and technical cadres for the province and providing professional training in many areas to the network of agricultural technicians in all districts and villages of Hau Giang.

Together with the development of grain production, primarily rice production, the hog, duck, fish and poultry production sectors of the province have also developed rather well. Annual industrial crops, such as sugarcane, coconuts, jute and beans, and fruit orchards, which now cover a total of more than 50,000 hectares, are becoming important sources of raw materials for the province's local industry and export activities. The organizing of the production of the raw materials mentioned above is being planned in detail.

The people and party organization of Hau Giang are also extremely pleased over the development of the marine products sector, which is increasingly asserting itself as the second economic strength of the province. The new factors that were beginning to emerge from the former Con Dao state-operated fishing fleet (when under the management of Hau Giang Province) are being strongly developed upon by the Hau Giang marine products sector in all of its activities from fishing, harvesting and cultivation to procurement, processing and exportation. In 1984, Hau Giang caught 5 times more shrimp and fish and raised 5.7 times more (in terms of the amount of area under cultivation) than in 1980. As a result of implementing product contracts and establishing a suitable division of management responsibilities between the province and the districts, Hau Giang's marine products sector has continuously met its plan targets. Once a sector that operated at a loss, it has, for several years now, achieved balance between revenues and expenditures within the sector and contributed to the overall balance between revenues and expenditures within the province. Marine products are our province's most important export and face very bright prospects.

The development of Hau Giang's agriculture over the past 10 years has been very closely linked to the development of industry within the locality. Of course, the development of the industrial sectors of the province, especially those that support agricultural production and the processing of agricultural and food products and the consumer goods industry, has not been commensurate with the enormous economic potentials of the province, a province that lies in the center of the western Nam Bo lowlands. Generally speaking, however, progress has been made. Industry's share of the value of agricultural-industrial output has risen from only 7 percent in 1976 to 33.53 percent in 1984. State-operated industry only accounts for 18.3 percent of the value of overall industrial output and although it has made much progress, its progress remains slow.

Another important result that has been achieved is that Hau Giang, by complying with the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee, has

carried out the socialist transformation of private, capitalist industry and commerce, abolished the compradore bourgeoisie, removed powerful, dishonest merchants from the market and shifted a portion of the small merchant population to jobs in production. At the same time, we have been making every effort to build the forces of socialist commerce everywhere. Well versed in the views, lines and positions of the party and state, Hau Giang has not been sitting and waiting for a large and strong socialist commerce system to emerge. Rather, we have taken positive steps to organize forces to engage in decisive struggle with the free market and, in this way, the province's organized market has steadily grown. Today, it accounts for 41.33 percent of total retail sales and controls 50-60 percent of total wholesale sales.

Over the past several years, Hau Giang has gained a clearer understanding of economic ties and has established properly oriented economic ties with the aim of achieving the goals of developing production, providing jobs, creating much material wealth for society and improving the standard of living of the people. The resolution of the 6th Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee was an important milestone along the path toward dismantling the system of administrative management characterized by bureaucracy and subsidization. It has helped us to confirm the steps that Hau Giang has taken and confidently initiate efforts to achieve this end. The implementation of a mode of management such as the one implemented within the Con Dao fishing fleet, the Hau River State Farm and the marine products sector, the expansion of high yield rice growing areas and distribution and circulation in Hau Giang over the past several years reflect the Hau Giang party organization's spirit of daring to think, daring to act, daring to assume responsibility.

In conjunction with the development of production, we have given full attention to looking after all aspects of everyday life, from food, clothing, shelter, education, transportation and medical care, from the material life to the emotional and spiritual lives of the people, especially in the rural areas. Under the guideline "the state and the people working together," Hau Giang has brought about many changes in the fields of public health, education, culture and physical culture-sports and made many improvements to the face of the Hau Giang countryside. Of course, there is still much more than must be done to meet the requirements and satisfy the aspirations of the people.

In 1977, Hau Giang virtually wiped out illiteracy. General school enrollment has continuously risen and increasingly large numbers of cadres have received political, professional and economic management training. The network of roads and water routes, especially in the countryside, has been expanded, thereby linking the hamlets and villages within the province and creating the conditions for broader economic and cultural intercourse and the establishment of the civilized way of life.

The achievements that have been recorded in agricultural transformation and development as well as the changes brought about in the social life of Hau Giang over the past 10 years have been the combined results of our party organization firmly maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the right of collective ownership of the working people, displaying dynamism, creativity and self-reliance and applying the lines and policies of the party

in a manner consistent with the characteristics of the local situation to develop existing potentials and perform established tasks. Socio-economic transformation and development have been closely tied to firmly maintaining security and national defense, heightening our vigilance, being ready to win victory over the wide-ranging war of sabotage of the enemy and supporting and protecting the creative labor and the quiet, happy life of the people. These are the results of steadfast efforts to build a party organization that is solid and strong politically, ideologically and organizationally. They reflect the growth of the corps of cadres and party members, especially on the basic level, from the standpoint of their class stand, their command of theory, their ability to perform practical organizational work and their ability to manage the economy and society. They also reflect the socialist awareness of the people of Hau Giang.

Of course, in the course of its growth, Hau Giang has not avoided mistakes and problems caused by inexperienced and lack of skill in socio-economic management.

In 1985, in keeping with the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the resolutions of the plenums of the Party Central Committee and with a deeper understanding of the country's two strategic tasks, Hau Giang will make every effort to achieve the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat, develop upon the strongpoints and achievements of the difficult period just passed, correct our shortcomings and weaknesses, display high revolutionary zeal and tap every creative talent of the entire party organization and the people of Hau Giang in a continued effort to successfully implement the five-goal program set by the provincial party committee. At the same time, we will accelerate the building of the districts and the strengthening of the district level and make every effort to improve our economic management with a view toward recording many more achievements in socialist transformation and socialist construction within each field of life in our province in order to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the founding of the party, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the 10th anniversary of total victory over the U.S. imperialists, the liberation of the South and the reunification of the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1975, p 60.

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CSO: 4210/9

TIEN GIANG'S AGRICULTURE TEN YEARS AFTER LIBERATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 60-64

[Article by Huynh Van Niem, deputy secretary of the Tien Giang Provincial Party Committee]

[Text] During the 30 years of war, the imperialist aggressors, especially the U.S. imperialists, inflicted serious damage upon agriculture throughout the South. In Tien Giang, a key province in enemy pacification efforts, greenery was truly considered an enemy by the enemy. During the pacification stage, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys adopted the so called 3-year rice exporting program (that is, a program to shift from having to import rice to producing surplus rice for exportation) and implemented the policy of "property ownership" by farmers: in a few of the areas they controlled, the enemy loaned capital to farmers and introduced new techniques to initiate multicropping and raise crop yields with the aim of deceiving people and providing propaganda to support their colonialism. At the same time, they were attacking vast rural areas in the South with renewed intensity.

The 30 years of the war were 30 years during which the people of Tien Giang waged a bitter struggle with the enemy and steadfastly remained in their fields and orchards to fight and produce. Through their three-pronged struggle, they forced the enemy to allow the people (mainly women, teenagers and children) to work their fields. In areas where fighting was occurring, there were many times when both the people and troops participated in combat and supported combat operations during the day and spent their nights planting or harvesting crops in order to keep production on schedule. Wherever they were stationed, agencies and troop units encouraged the people to raise crops and did so themselves in order to reduce the burden being born by the people. As a result, during those years and months in both disputed areas and liberated areas, where it was thought that no one could survive, troops and the people lived and fought on the basis of local sources of grain.

Following the complete liberation of the South, agriculture within our province was stagnant and faced extremely large difficulties. One-quarter of the province's rice fields had been lying fallow for many years. Practically all fruit orchards had been destroyed. The majority of canals and ditches had been filled in. The roads leading into hamlets had been completely destroyed. Bomb craters and mine fields were everywhere. Deserving of attention is that

at a time when the green revolution was bringing about strong developments in agriculture at many places in the world, in Tien Giang, only slightly more than 30,000 hectares had begun to be used to raise two short-term rice crops per year and produce high yields through intensive cultivation. The majority of the province's rice fields (some 80,000 hectares) was still being used to raise only one crop of a local, long-term variety of rice by methods that our forefathers had used for hundreds of years, the yield of which never exceeded 2 tons per hectare per year.

During the 10 years since liberation, Tien Giang Province's agriculture has undergone very large changes. As of 1984, the province had 205,000 hectares under cultivation (turnover rate: 1.86 times per year), an increase of 85,000 hectares compared to 1975. Output stood at nearly 800,000 tons, more than double the output produced in 1976 (390,000 tons). The province's average yield was 7.27 tons per hectare per year, an increase of 4.02 tons per hectare compared to 1976. The allocation of crops is now broader than it was before the war. Today, in addition to rice, Tien Giang raises many different vegetable, subsidiary food and bean crops, with the majority of the surplus produced being consumed locally. The fruit orchards of the province have been repaired and new ones have been planted. The production of industrial crops, such as coconuts, sugarcane, cashews, rushes, terminalia catappa and so forth, is developing. During the past several years, the province has been promoting the planting of forests (cajuput, nipa frutucans, sesbanina grandiflora, eucalyptus, hopia and so forth). The province's hog herd, duck flock and other livestock and poultry, which were virtually wiped out during the war, have now developed quite well: in 1984, the province had 200,000 hogs (excluding sucklings) and 2 million ducks. More than 30,000 hectares of acidic, saline fields that had been abandoned for many years are now being gradually restored to production. Within this area, the province has established nine state farms, which have been producing products for 3 to 4 years now.

Our province's agriculture is developing. Intensive cultivation and specialized farming are becoming well established. The transformation of agriculture has been virtually completed, having brought 87 percent of farm households into collective production within production collectives and cooperatives. Today, the province has nine state farms, 67 cooperatives and 2,000 production collectives.

The material-technical bases that have been restored and constructed since liberation day have been and are effectively supporting agricultural production within the province. During the past 10 years, the province virtually completed the dredging of old canal and ditch networks and dug 1,274 new canals while constructing 11 large, medium and small electric pump stations and 413 sluice gates and dams. The construction of water conservancy projects within fields has been closely coordinated with leveling field surfaces and constructing area and plot embankments. In the three western districts of the province and the municipality of My Tho, partial irrigation and drainage have been established for two rice crops plus one subsidiary food crop per year or three rice crops per year. In the three eastern districts, the construction of a water conservancy system supporting the production of

two rice crops or one stable rice crop per year has been started. Here, there are also many jobs that must still be done to resolve the water problem.

The province has given its attention to developing its mechanized forces. The tractor unit of the province and the tractor stations of the districts plow and harrow 35 to 40 percent of the province's cropland each year. The small pumps that were in the province prior to liberation have been maintained and new pumps are supplied each year. Rice threshing machines are in widespread use. The use of insecticide sprayers to control planthoppers has steadily increased. In its advanced from manual labor to mechanization, the province continues to attach importance to developing the draft buffalo and cattle herd, to improving the hand implements used in supplying water to fields, in harvesting and transporting rice.

Significant development has occurred in Tien Giang's crop protection network and flood control efforts. Today, through the use of new varieties that are resistant to planthoppers and other pests, through the crop protection network extending from the provincial level to the districts and basic units, through existing materials and technical equipment and through the crop protection contract between crop protection agencies and production units, the prevention and control of pests and diseases within the province are timely and effective. As a result, damage to crops has been limited even during peaks in the development of pests and diseases.

The victory most deserving of attention in the production of grain during the past several years within our province has been the increasingly widespread use of new, short-term varieties of rice that are resistant to planthoppers and other pests and bear high yields. Today, following the improvement and construction of fields and the introduction of suitable farming methods, the areas north of the Nguyen Van Tiep Canal, where the soil is hard and cracked during the dry season and flooded to a depth of 1 meter during the rainy season, and the areas near the sea which are inundated by salt water and where rainwater is the only source of water, have become high yield rice growing areas, become the largest rice producing areas of the province, even though it was once maintained that short-term, "dwarf" varieties of rice could not be raised there.

The mobilization of agricultural and food products for the state has been increasing with each passing year for more than 5 years. In 1984, compared to 1976, the province mobilized nearly four times more grain (231,000 tons compared to 59,000 tons), 40 times more pork (8,000 tons compared to 200 tons) and 4,361 tons of sugar compared to none at all.

Having spent 10 years building the new life, the people of Tien Giang (the majority of whom are farmers) now enjoy a relatively stable standard of living. Although difficulties still exist, much progress has been made with regard to food, shelter, transportation, education and health care of the people in the countryside. Under the guideline "the state and the people working together," the various localities of the province have gradually recorded large achievements in building the new countryside. Starting with nothing more than a few, small facilities left behind by the enemy in the zone they controlled, every village now has an office, a public health station, a

maternity clinic, a level II school and a network of village roads. Some villages have constructed a theater and marketing cooperative. Roads accommodating motor vehicles lead into the majority of the villages. Cultural, literary-art and physical culture-sport activities are being promoted. Today, although differences among villages still exist in one area of life or another, the life of all villages within the province has, generally speaking, undergone many exciting changes. Over the past 10 years, significant material-technical bases have been constructed on the district level, such as a network of stations and farms supporting agricultural production, agricultural and food product processing plants, public transportation forces and cultural, social and other projects. These initial assets have helped the districts to take the initiative in organizing and managing the economic, cultural, social, security and national defense aspects of life within the district. On the village level, every village has capital with which to build material-technical bases and public welfare projects. Capital formation has occurred within every cooperative and production collective.

The above mentioned initial achievements of our province prove the following:

First, Tien Giang correctly defined, at the very outset, the strength of the locality, namely, the development of a diversified agriculture, most importantly the development of grain production, and established the task of focusing our efforts on developing agriculture, using it as the base for the development of industry, and gradually building an industrial-agricultural economic structure. Immediately after the South was liberated, the provincial party committee directed the full measure of its zeal and knowledge toward mobilizing the province's entire party organization and population to devote their efforts to grain production. The past 10 years have been a process of continuous efforts by all levels and sectors to overcome the aftereffects of the war. The recent victories on the agricultural front have, above everything else, been victories of the strong, steadfast and creative revolutionary will and actions of the people of our province.

Secondly, simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions in a manner consistent with the characteristics of the locality is a matter of very important significance. The victories that our province has won have also been victories of the scientific-technological revolution carried out within Tien Giang. This revolution has brought improved technical standards, introduced scientific-technical advances in production and continuously strengthened our technical capabilities. Tien Giang has planned and adopted specific economic-technical guidelines for the entire province, for each district, each subarea and each sector: water conservancy, communications and electric power. These guidelines were recently amended and adjusted and have become the targets of long-term and yearly plans. Recently, the introduction of technical advances has been developed into a program for the high yield, intensive cultivation of rice and we have been establishing organizations to select and reproduce rice varieties, breeds of hogs, coconut varieties and so forth that have been researched and successfully used in wilderness areas and areas of sulfate, saline soil. The development of Tien Giang's agriculture today demands constant, new contributions by scientific and technical cadres.

Agricultural cooperativization within Tien Giang has had a major impact upon the development of the province's agriculture in recent years. However, in this process, Tien Giang has experienced ups and downs filled with difficulties. At first, because we rushed to bring them into collective production before they understood all the it entails, farmers adopted a negative attitude and expressed dissatisfaction, with the result that production stagnated, crops failed and fields were abandoned. It was when the principles of cooperativization were being correctly implemented, cooperativization was steadily proceeding from low to higher stages of development and product contracts with groups of laborers and individual laborers were introduced that we succeeded in launching the revolutionary movement throughout the province. Having laid a widespread foundation in the form of production solidarity teams and a number of production collectives, pilot project cooperatives were organized. In the space of roughly 2 years (1982-1984), we brought 87 percent of the province's rice fields and farm households engaged in the production of rice into collective production and virtually completed cooperativization, mainly in the form of production collectives. At present, the entire province is carrying out a plan to improve the quality of production collectives and gradually merge them to establish cooperatives; at the same time, suitable measures are being taken to carry out transformation with regard to fruit orchards and land planted with industrial crops. In conjunction with the cooperativization movement, our province has been making every effort to strengthen and step up the activities of the state farms and the network of stations, farms and enterprises supporting agricultural production. Within the cooperativization movement, the rice yields and output of the entire province have risen rather rapidly, consequently, differences in the level of intensive cultivation being practiced from one field to the next and one area to the next are gradually being eliminated.

The results achieved through the transformation of production relations and the application of scientific-technical advances in production in recent years have also been the results of the ideological and cultural revolution. This revolution has been a process of teaching socialism, providing increased knowledge of science and technology, organizing and managing the socialist economy and struggling against spontaneous phenomena, methods of farming that are conservative and backward and styles of operation that are either outmoded or ineffective. Therefore, through the transformation and development of agriculture, a higher ideological and moral consensus has emerged among the masses and this, too is a factor that has given rise to much creativity in the organizing of production and the introduction of technical advances within Tien Giang's agriculture.

Thirdly, we have looked after the material and spiritual lives of the people, the vast majority of whom are farmers. During the two wars of resistance against France and the United States, the farmers of Tien Giang actively participated in the resistance and suffered enormous loss of life. After liberation, the Tien Giang party organization asserted that it was necessary to rapidly stabilize and constantly improve the living conditions of farmers if we were to continue to mobilize them to carry out the socialist revolution. Every effort made by the province has focused on developing agricultural production, stabilizing the living standards of farm families, increasing our

contributions to the state and building hamlets and villages. As a result of this concern, the lives of farmers, including the families of war dead, families who have served the revolution and so forth, have steadily improved. This has caused farmers to feel closer allegiance to the new system with each passing day, work hard in production and move agriculture steadily forward.

Generally speaking, following nearly 10 years of development, Tien Giang's agriculture has taken extraordinary strides and its momentum is forward. However, it remains small-scale production and we must continue to reorganize it in order to gradually advance to large-scale, socialist production. In the immediate future, Tien Giang must make major efforts to achieve uniformity in intensive cultivation among all areas of the province, with attention to the three districts in which the soil is polluted with salt, in an attempt to bring the province's output to 1 million tons of grain per year. We must give much more attention to improving farm implements in order to make farm work less strenuous and gradually achieve agricultural mechanization. At the same time, we must improve the operations of the state farms and stations, especially the seed farms and crop protection stations, to insure that rice and all other crops develop well. To overcome Tien Giang's present weakness, namely, the lack of a diversified agriculture, we must quickly expand the production of the other crops and step up livestock production while establishing specialized farming areas that produce large quantities of high quality products in order to provide many raw materials for industry and many products and commodities for exportation.

We will attach importance to perfecting the new production relations in the countryside; gradually but steadily upgrading production collectives to cooperatives; completing the transformation of fruit orchards and the production of industrial crops and closely combining it with the transformation of industry and commerce; establishing a new division of labor that is more rational and efficient; and building the socialist countryside better with each passing day. In the years ahead, Tien Giang must continue to concern itself with reorganizing production and building the countryside within the scope of the villages while making every effort to establish an agro-industrial structure within the districts and strengthen the district level.

The above are the major targets of the party organization and people of Tien Giang. To achieve the targets that have been set on the agricultural front, our province's party organization will continue to strongly promote the revolutionary movement of the class of collective farmers, continue to train and motivate the corps of intellectuals to make more practical and comprehensive contributions in the field of agricultural production and further strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers.

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CSO: 4210/9

THREE IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED ON THE OCCASION OF THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE TOTAL LIBERATION OF THE SOUTH

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 65-72

[Article by Pham Thanh]

[Text] On 30 April 1975, the Saigon puppet government surrendered, Saigon was totally liberated, the South was totally liberated. That joyous news spread quickly throughout our country and the entire world. Our people from the North to the South felt uncommon joy and inspiration. Our friends throughout the world shared in our joy and viewed us with utmost admiration and respect. The enemy was stunned by what to them was a brutal fact: they had lost, the people of Vietnam had won victory. The question arose: how did that remarkable event come about? How was it possible for a nation that is not very large, a nation that has a backward economy, to win victory over the ringleader of imperialism whose economic and military potentials were many times greater? It is difficult for any analysis to provide us with a more accurate answer to these questions than has been provided by the three important books published by Su That Publishing House on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the total liberation of the South: "The South, Bulwark of the Fatherland" by President Ho Chi Minh, "The Major Documents on the Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation" by our party and "Letters to the South" by Le Duan, general secretary of the Party Central Committee.

As we know, in 1920, determined to discover the path to national salvation, President Ho Chi Minh discovered Marxism-Leninism and found the path to national liberation. It was the path of the proletarian revolution. From then on, his determination to liberate the country was based on the only scientific theory of revolution, a theory which he tirelessly preached among our people.

On the basis of that determination, President Ho Chi Minh, together with our party, steadfastly led our people in 15 long years of struggle to bring independence to the nation, a struggle which culminated in the victory of the August Revolution in 1945. The Declaration of Independence read on 2 September 1945 stated: "A people who have courageously opposed French enslavement for more than 80 years, a people who have resolutely sided with the allies against the fascists during the past several years, such a people

must be free! Such a people must be independent." "Vietnam has the right to freedom and independence and has, in fact, become a free and independent country. The entire nation of Vietnam is determined to safeguard this freedom and independence with the full measure of our spirit and forces, with our lives, with everything we have." It was the adamant declaration of a nation that had won its independence, a nation highly determined to preserve and defend its independence.

Throughout the resistance against the French colonialists, the determination to struggle for national liberation was always closely tied to the determination to reunify the country. In the face of the French colonialists' plan to cut off South Vietnam from the rest of our country, President Ho Chi Minh affirmed: "The compatriots of Nam Bo are citizens of Vietnam. Rivers might run dry, mountains might crumble, but this truth will never change!"

The determination to win and maintain the country's independence, to reunify the country stemmed from ardent, deep patriotism. President Ho Chi Minh, the symbol of this revolutionary feeling of our party and nation, said: "Everyday that the fatherland is not reunified, that my fellow countrymen continue to suffer is another day that I do not enjoy my food nor sleep in peace. I solemnly promise my fellow countrymen that with your determination, with the determination of all our people, the South will surely be brought back into the fatherland."

The determination with which our nation's long war of resistance against the French colonialists was fought, determination that was personified by President Ho Chi Minh, carried us to the glorious victory of Dien Bien Phu that forced the French imperialists to sign the 1954 Geneva Accords recognizing the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of our country. But, with the Geneva Accords, the South was still not liberated. In the face of that situation, President Ho confirmed: "Central Vietnam, South Vietnam and North Vietnam are all territories of ours, our country will surely be reunified, the compatriots of our entire country will surely be liberated."

The U.S. imperialists kicked out the French imperialists and installed a lackey government in a vain attempt to turn South Vietnam into a new style colony of the United States. In the face of the U.S. imperialists, an enemy many times larger and more powerful than the French imperialists, our entire party and all our people steadfastly maintained their determination to liberate the remaining portion of the fatherland.

When the Ngo Dinh Diem administration obstinately refused to implement the Geneva Accords, President Ho Chi Minh said: "Our fellow countrymen in the South and throughout the country must continue to resolutely press their demand that the regime in the South respect the will of the people. Vietnam is a unified country. The North and the South are one. No reactionary force can divide them. Vietnam will surely be reunified."

When, with intense effort, the U.S. imperialists mounted the special war, inflicting untold suffering and sorrow, with the intent of subjugating our

people in the South, President Ho Chi Minh voiced the determination of our people in the resistance against the United States when he said: "It was not until hundreds of thousands of persons were brutally killed and hundreds of thousands of others were condemned to a slow death in the prisons and concentration camps of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime that our people in the South realized that there was no other alternative but to fight to defend themselves and their families. They were forced to make the painful choice between two alternatives, to take up arms and fight or be annihilated. "

After being defeated in the special war, the U.S. imperialists shifted to the local war in which hundreds of thousands of U.S. and vassal troops directly participated and unleashed the war of destruction against the North with the intent of bombing the North "back to the Stone Age." However, the more cunning and ruthless the enemy became, the more the determination of our party, of our people grew and became stronger. The destructive acts of war of the U.S. imperialists against the two zones of our country only served to make our people even more determined to endure every sacrifice and fight until final victory was won. This determination was reflected in the famous words spoken by President Ho Chi Minh, words that became our national oath. He warned the U.S. imperialists: "Johnson and his clique must realize that they can send a half million, 1 million or many more men to intensify their war of aggression in South Vietnam. They can use thousands of planes in intensified attacks against the North. However, they can never break the iron will, the determination of the heroic Vietnamese to resist the United States for national salvation. The more truculent they become, the more their crimes will grow. The war might last for 5, 10, 20 or more years. Hanoi, Haiphong, a number of other municipalities and many enterprises might be destroyed but the Vietnamese will not be intimidated! There is nothing more precious than independence and freedom. On the day of victory, our people will rebuild our country and make it grander and even more beautiful.

Before his death, President Ho Chi Minh once again told our people to keep this determination strong: "The war of resistance against the United States might drag on. The losses of life and property suffered by our compatriots might be high. But, whatever happens, we must be determined to fight the U.S. pirates until total victory is won.

Our mountains, our rivers, our people will always be. When the U.S. pirates are defeated, we will rebuild our land and make it ten times more beautiful."

These moving words of our beloved President Ho Chi Minh were also the solemn oath taken by all our people, an oath of determination to win and maintain the independence and unity of the fatherland.

The determination expressed by our party and people in the cause of national liberation, especially in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, was entirely accurate. This was clearly proven in practice. The accuracy of our people's determination was reflected in the fact that our party always correctly assessed the situation and the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy and, on this basis, adopted a correct revolutionary line and method.

Following the signing of the Geneva Accords, the United States kicked out the French and installed the dictator Ngo Dinh Diem as lackey president in the South in order to turn the South into a neo-colony of theirs. Our party immediately observed: "The U.S. imperialists are the main enemy of the peace-loving people of the world and have now become the immediate enemy of the people of Indochina." In 1959, in the face of the increasingly bold policy of aggression of the U.S. imperialists and the policy of oppression and terror of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the South, the resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee was adopted, a resolution that marked an important turning point in the guidance of the revolution in the South. The resolution clearly pointed out that although the revolution in the South could develop by peaceful means, "because the Americans and Diem are determined to hold onto the South and will not willingly give up their power or cease taking violent action to wipe out the revolution in the South and commit aggression against the North, our party must continue to actively make full preparations under the basic guideline of coordinated uprisings to topple the U.S.-Diem regime." At the same time, the resolution predicted that "there is the possibility that coordinated uprisings by the people of the South will evolve into a protracted armed struggle."

The adoption of a correct line on the revolution in the South and its steadfast adherence to that line until victory was won constituted a major success for our party. However, regardless of how correct a line might be, it is difficult to implement that line without correct revolutionary methods. Through the book "The Major Documents on the Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation," we see that our party made some very important innovations in revolutionary methods. As a result, the revolution in the South developed strongly and steadily advanced to victory.

The questions that faced our people were: could we win victory over an enemy as large and powerful as the U.S. imperialists and how would we have to fight them in order to win?

Analyzing the situation and the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy at that time, our party stated that the U.S. imperialists were not strong and that our people could win victory over the United States provided that we knew how to fight them. And, on the basis of the realities of the war of resistance, our party gradually developed effective methods of fighting in order to win victory over the United States. Every resolution of the party represented a search for innovations by which to further define our revolutionary methods, our methods of fighting.

Examining the objectives and intentions of the U.S. imperialists, the ringleaders of imperialism, whose economic and military potentials were many and whose ambition was to rule the world by means of neo-colonialism, our party decided to contain their efforts to the special war in the South in order to win victory over them in that war. When the special war became the limited war and the war was widened to the North, our party's policy was to force them to de-escalate and contain them to the limited war in the South in order to win victory over them in the South. Due to the war's protracted, arduous and complex nature, the party also decided to "steadfastly lead the revolution in the South in the direction of winning local victories, gradually

pushing the enemy back and advancing to a general offensive and general uprising; however, the revolution in the South might also go through a transitional stage before winning total victory."

While confirming the protracted nature of the war of resistance, many resolutions of the party stressed that "regardless of how long the war might be, we must be determined to win maximum victory" and know how to seize opportunities in order to win victory in a relatively short amount of time.

The basic thinking behind the party's resolutions concerning the revolution in the South was the thinking of taking the offensive and waging a violent revolution. This thinking was the soul of the revolutionary methods employed by our party during the various stages of development of the revolution in the South.

In view of the fact that the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation was both a war of resistance against neo-colonialist aggression and, in some respects, a civil war, special forms of violent revolutionary force had to be employed. Our party succeeded in developing forms of violent revolutionary force that were consistent with the laws of the revolutionary war in the South. The resolution of the Political Bureau Conference held from 29 October to 5 November 1963 pointed out: "The fundamental strategic guideline governing the revolutionary struggle of the people in the South is: political struggle coordinated with armed struggle. The political struggle plays a basic and very decisive role. However, the armed struggle also plays a very basic and very decisive role. It is the military struggle that plays the role of most direct and decisive importance."

In the process of leading the revolution in the South, our party brought Vietnamese military science and art to a high level of development. It managed the war to suit its intentions and deprived the enemy of every option but to take the action we intended them to take in order to ultimately precipitate their total defeat. As the war dragged on, our party became increasingly skilled and precise in managing the war. This can be clearly seen in Resolution 20 adopted by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee in October, 1974, the resolution that led to the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975. The resolution observed: "The Saigon puppets are weakening quickly and in every respect and are gradually being put on the defensive. We have won large victories, victories which, although only initial victories, are solid victories of important significance. While the U.S. imperialists still plan to continue to impose neo-colonialism in the South, it is now much more difficult for the United States to intervene directly and, even if they do, we are still determined to win victory, determined to liberate the South." The resolution predicted: "There is also the possibility that the situation will develop by leaps and bounds and permit us to enter the period of decisive victory in our revolutionary war. We face major strategic prospects and opportunities." On the basis of this assessment, the resolution expressed the following resolve: "To achieve the greatest possible exertion of effort by the party, the army and all the people in both zones of our country and bring our revolutionary war to its highest stage of development by means of a general offensive and general uprising, wipe out or rout the vast majority of the puppet forces, topple the puppet

government on the various levels, put all political power into the hands of the people, liberate the South, complete the people's national democratic revolution in the South and advance to the peaceful reunification of the country."

And, as predicted by the Political Bureau, that resolution became reality.

We would fail to see the full creativity displayed by our party in establishing the line on the revolution and directing the revolutionary war in the South if we only examined the resolutions of the party. Because, like every other resolution, the resolutions regarding the resistance against the United States for national salvation consisted mainly of conclusions that had been reached to guide our actions, not of detailed arguments supporting these conclusions.

"Letters to the South" by Le Duan, general secretary of the Party Central Committee, is a collection of important documents that shed light on the theory underlying the party's line on the resistance against the United States for national salvation and provide us with a fuller and deeper understanding of the party's resolutions. In these letters, Le Duan, who bore the primary responsibility to the Political Bureau and the Party Central Committee for the revolutionary movement in the South, and other members of the Political Bureau made enormous contributions to the development and refinement of the theory and line on the people's national democratic revolution and the theory and line on the revolutionary war as well as to organizing the implementation of these lines.

"Letters to the South" reflect the independent spirit with which our party adopted the line on the revolution and the revolutionary methods of Vietnam. It was chiefly as a result of the independent thinking it displayed in its activities that our party correctly resolved a host of issues in order to lead the revolution in the South to total victory: evaluating the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy and establishing our determination to fight the enemy; developing a correct revolutionary line and revolutionary methods for the revolution in the South; and developing the science and art by which the revolutionary war was guided.

To correctly assess the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, it was first necessary to view the comparison of forces correctly. In many letters to the party committees in the South, Le Duan clarified our party's view concerning the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy within Vietnam. He pointed out that "when we talk about strengths and weaknesses, we are talking about the specific comparison of forces at a given time and place, not about a simple matter of arithmetic." "To evaluate the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, as well as prospects for changes in this comparison of forces, we must do so within the framework of the 'special' type (or third type) of war being waged by the U.S. imperialists in Southeast Asia"(and, later, within the framework of the limited war waged by the United States in the South).

Within this framework, we first examined the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy from the standpoint of the comparison of forces

between the revolution and counter-revolution in the world. Then, we examined it from the standpoint of the intentions and tactics of the U.S. imperialists in that war. Finally, we examined it from the standpoint of a fluid, not static, situation and the standpoint of the prospects for change in the comparison of forces.

Summarizing our approach to the comparison of forces, Le Duan put the matter quite succinctly: "In the final analysis, the success or failure of a revolution is decided by the comparison of forces. In every war, the strong are victorious, the weak are defeated. However, strengths and weaknesses are defined from the perspective of a revolutionary point of view, from the perspective of how the situation is developing; are defined on the basis of an overall assessment of both military and political forces, both position and opportunity, of objective conditions and the art of leadership; are defined on the basis of examining these factors in the process of their development and at a given place and time."

In his "Letters to the South," Le Duan's greatest concern was to clarify our party's revolutionary methods. Because, we "must and can win victory over the United States if we know how to guide the revolution in a determined and skillful fashion."

The revolutionary methods that were applied by our party throughout the course of the people's national, democratic revolution in the South can be summarized in one phrase: utilizing the combined forces of the people's war to win victory over the war of aggression of the U.S. imperialists.

The combined forces of the people's war originated in the just nature of the revolutionary war and in the strength of violent revolutionary force. Le Duan pointed out that violent revolutionary force was the basic measure in the revolutionary struggle of our people to defeat the enemy and achieve national liberation. Violent revolutionary force was the violent force of the masses. By means of the violent force of the masses, the revolution was constantly on the offensive. When the enemy was strong, attacks were launched to stop them; when the enemy was weak, attacks were launched to push them back.

Utilizing the combined forces of the people's war mainly involved skillfully combining the two aspects of violent revolutionary force: political struggle and military struggle. In many of his letters, Le Duan deeply analyzed the importance and the capabilities of the political struggle and set forth a wide variety of flexible and diverse forms of political struggle. At the same time, he again pointed out that the principle method being employed by the enemy to subjugate our people was the use of military power; therefore, the military struggle to defeat the enemy was of decisive significance.

In the political struggle, Le Duan emphasized the need to establish a broad united national front to increase the strength of the revolution and proposed very flexible forms of fronts, even a "neutrality front," in order to gain support for the revolution from every force, even the least stable, thereby establishing fronts at home and a world people's front supporting Vietnam's revolution.

In the military struggle, Le Duan cited the importance of building military forces that consist of all three elements of the military and coordinating the activities of these three elements within a strategy that encompassed suitable tactics and methods of fighting in order to achieve the combined strength of the military forces with a view toward raising their combat efficiency. Enemy proselyting conducted for the purpose of routing the enemy's army was also an effective offensive force. He cited the examples of the Russian October Revolution and the August Revolution to convince everyone of the need to establish a federated worker-farmer-soldier front.

Thus, the combined strength of the revolutionary war emerged from the coordination of the three offensive prongs: political struggle, military struggle and enemy proselyting.

The coordination of these three aspects of the struggle was not the same throughout every area and region of the South. On the basis of the features and characteristics of each region, our party proposed the establishment of three strategic regions, the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities, under the guideline of proceeding "on two feet and through three forms of struggle" and coordinating these forms of struggle within the three different regions. Combined strength was achieved here by appropriately coordinating the struggle in all three strategic regions in order to win maximum victory within each area, in each battle, in each campaign and eventually on the entire battlefield of the South.

Closely tied to the three strategic regions was the issue of base areas, which Le Duan considered to be of major strategic importance to the people's war. The North was the base of the revolutionary war nationwide. In the South, the mountainous jungles provided the most favorable conditions for building a base area for the entire zone. There were also local base areas within each region. The combined strength achieved here was the combined strength of the base areas, the rear area and the frontline.

Throughout the course of the resistance, diplomatic struggle was a necessary requirement. In particular, at one stage, it occupied a position of importance. Therefore, the combined strength of the people's war was also expressed in the coordination of the political and military struggles with the diplomatic struggle. Le Duan said: "While asserting that military struggle and political struggle on the battlefield are of decisive importance, we must know how to seize opportunities and make flexible use of the weapon of diplomacy to help fight and win victory over the enemy as effectively as possible, considering this to be an important front in the struggle."

Summarizing, Le Duan said: "The utilization of the combined forces of the people's war involved applying the law governing the revolutionary war in our country as well as all of Indochina, the law of staging uprisings and attacks, attacks and uprisings and advancing to a general offensive and uprising to defeat the forces of the enemy. In other words, it was a process of combining political struggle with military struggle, military struggle with political struggle (the political struggle encompassed both enemy proselyting and diplomacy), the process of the masses arising and seizing control in order to wipe out the enemy, wiping out the enemy in order to consolidate and broaden

their control, the process of combining coordinated uprisings by the masses with revolutionary war, winning victories gradually and advancing to total victory."

The general secretary's "Letters to the South" also provide a model of the art of leading the revolution and directing the war effort. This art of our party was displayed first by our party's ability to define the requirements of our war effort in a way that enabled us to fight the enemy and win victory as efficiently as possible.

This art was also evident in the party's ability to define the requirements involved in fighting the enemy at each place and during each period. Having correctly established these requirements, our party adopted correct, appropriate slogans and established suitable forms of organization, suitable methods of fighting the enemy. In particular, it skillfully employed the combined strength of the people's war to meet these requirements.

The party's art in leading the revolution and directing the war effort was especially evident at the turning points in the war. Those turning points were: the "coordinated uprisings" in late 1959 and early 1960, the tet offensive in 1968 and the spring of 1975.

Seizing opportunity and achieving the element of surprise are one of the unique aspects of our party's art in leading the revolution and guiding the war effort. Applying Lenin's concept of opportunity, Le Duan, on the basis of the realities of the revolution in the South during this period, defined a host of complementary subjective and objective factors that created opportunities for the revolution; at the same time, he stressed subjective efforts and the factors of primary importance. Along with seizing opportunity, our party knew how to win victory over the enemy by surprise. Le Duan considered "knowing how to win victory over the enemy unexpectedly is one of the important factors in winning victory, is a combat guideline in which all military leaders must be well versed." Even "our final attacks must be surprise attacks that have been planned and prepared as thoroughly and fully as possible." Just as the general secretary predicted, the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975 and the great, complete victory won by us took the enemy completely by surprise.

The three books that have been published on this occasion contain thinking and theories of very important value. In a brief, introductory article such as this, it is impossible to discuss the full contents and value of this collection of books. For this, specialized research projects are required. Of importance to us is not to study these books for the purpose of honoring a remarkable achievement recorded in the past, but to draw from them lessons for the present and the future. We will find in them useful lessons to be applied in our people's present cause of building socialism and defending the fatherland.

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CSO: 4210/9

THE PATH TO SOCIALISM IN HOA THANH DISTRICT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 73-78

[Article by Tran Van Len, secretary of the Hoa Thanh District Party Committee]

[Text] Hoa Thanh District, the site of Black Virgin Mountain, a base area throughout the two wars of resistance against France and the United States, measures 19,500 hectares and has a population of 158,000, 95 percent of whom are religious followers. Hoa Thanh has 11,000 hectares of farmland, only 4,300 hectares of which lie in rice fields, nearly 500 basic production units in industry, small industry and the handicraft trades and 12 markets, the largest of which is the Hoa Thanh Market (the former Long Hoa Market), which is a center of trade between Ho Chi Minh City and the places within our province. Hoa Thanh is also the center of the Cao Dai Religion. Located within the district are the Tay Ninh Holy Temple and the central offices of the Cao Dai Religion, which are staffed by 3,000 high ranking clergy and 7,000 other functionaries. Hoa Thanh was occupied by the enemy for many years, was a model of their pacification and was a district in which as many as 16,700 soldiers of the former regime remained following the rout of their units in the spring of 1975.

Turning its hands to rebuilding the locality following the total victory of the resistance against the United States, our district party organization has encountered more than a few difficulties, difficulties posed by natural disasters, the southwestern border war against the Pol Pot regime, the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, the activities of clandestine reactionary organizations and our own weaknesses and inexperience in economic management. Through the realities of the struggle between socialism and capitalism, we have gained a clearer understanding of the position and functions of the district level, gradually learned how to effectively and creatively apply the party's revolutionary line to the specific situation of the locality and have charted a correct course for ourselves, one that has yielded marked results. The course we have charted is that of reorganizing the production and life of the people within the district through suitable forms of organization; simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions; combining transformation with construction, carrying out construction wherever transformation is completed and carrying out transformation for the purpose of carrying out construction, with primary emphasis upon construction in all five

areas of industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, agriculture, commerce, communications-transportation and cultural-social activities; and establishing and developing a unified industrial-agricultural structure throughout the district.

During the past 2 years, Hoa Thanh has brought about gratifying changes.

Within industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, 95 percent of the means of production have been brought within state-operated organizations, joint public-private enterprises and cooperatives, among which the state-operated system is truly playing the dominant role. At present, we have established 10 state-operated units within the machine sector, the building materials sector, the sugar processing sector, the forestry products harvesting and processing sector, etc. The cassava processing sector has 50 ovens, each of which has a capacity of 20 tons per day, one-third of which are state-operated, the remainder of which are joint public-private. All processed flour is delivered to the district cassava flour corporation (more than 5,000 tons in 1984). The milling sector has 25 state-operated units. The remaining mills, which have a capacity of less than 4 tons per day, are managed by agricultural cooperatives and production collectives.

Small industry and handicraft cooperatives have been organized in all villages. Ten of these cooperatives are combined cooperatives consisting of many trades, each of which is practiced by only a few dozen households. These "combined" cooperatives have had the effect of establishing economic ties, centralizing large sources of capital, reducing the number of units that are not directly engaged in production and regulating the income of cooperative members.

Applying the party's policy on transformation in a manner consistent with the locality's specific situation, we assembled the majority of small employers and encouraged them to work for the state using their own production tools. The total value of the fixed assets of the small industry and handicraft sector that have been brought into joint public-private enterprises now exceeds 500 million dong. Practically all persons who possess manual skills and highly developed technical skills are continuing to participate in production and have become workers and personnel of the state. On the basis of the new production relations, strengthening material-technical bases, applying scientific and technical advances and upholding the right of collective ownership of laborers have stimulated the development of production. Machine products, such as 50 ton per day sugarcane presses, granulated sugar crystallization vats, rice threshing machines, pump housings and cylinder sleeves for all types of internal combustion engines, are being manufactured. In 1982, the small industry and handicraft sector produced 420 million dong in total output, only 11 million dong of which were managed by the state. In 1983, it produced 650 million dong in total output and the state managed 500 million dong. Since production was reorganized, all state-operated and joint public-private enterprises have been operating at a profit. In 1983, the machine enterprises contributed only 30,363 dong to the budget; however, during the first 10 months of 1984 alone, they contributed some 800,000 dong. Production within the small industry and handicraft cooperatives has continuously developed. Total output, which reached nearly

12 million dong in 1983, rose to 38 million dong during the first 10 months of 1984. As a result, the income of workers has also risen: workers at state-operated units earn an average of 1,500 dong per month (excluding bonuses) and workers at cooperatives earn anywhere from 1,500 to 2,500 dong per month.

On the agricultural front, socialist transformation has also been accelerated. Agricultural cooperativization was virtually completed in Hoa Thanh in October, 1984. At present, the district has 170 collectives and 3 agricultural cooperatives, which account for 80 percent of the district's farmland and 94 percent of farm households. All land under the cultivation of sugarcane and cassava has been cooperativized. Some 76 tractors, 50 horsepower and larger, have been organized into three tractor collectives and are being efficiently utilized. The various forms of collective production and the implementation of product contracts with groups of laborers and individual laborers have encouraged farmers to work hard, apply scientific-technical advances (such as the use of new varieties, the construction of small-scale water conservancy projects and so forth) and raise crop yields. Total agricultural output reached 300 million dong in 1984. Income per workday within agriculture is 15 to 17 kilograms of paddy and as high as 20-25 kilograms at some places. The district's per capita grain output is 279 kilograms per year. Once a district with a food shortage, Hoa Thanh is now meeting its own food needs and fulfilling increasingly large grain obligations to the state.

With regard to commerce and market management, as a result of lax management in past years, the unorganized market developed strongly and overpowered the organized market. On the other hand, because of their inexperience in business management, the marketing cooperatives did not know what else they could do other than sit and wait for goods to arrive from the upper level and distribute them, consequently, nine-tenths of the marketing cooperatives were weak and had lost the confidence of the masses. All administrative measures, such as banning the sale of certain products and requiring prices to be posted, proved ineffective. Private merchants became increasingly numerous and posed difficulties to production and everyday life. In 1976, there were 5,000 private merchants within the district. By 1980, there were 7,000. This situation raised an urgent issue: in conjunction with transforming and reorganizing production within industry, small industry, the handicraft trades and agriculture, it was essential that we carry out the transformation of private merchants and manage the market.

To transform private merchants, manage the market and stabilize prices, socialist commerce must be strong enough to control the sources of goods. Therefore, in conjunction with requiring private merchants to re-register for business licenses, we have been making every effort to strengthen the marketing cooperatives from the district to the village levels. At present, there are 200 sales points within the district. All marketing cooperatives have uniformly developed into strong, solid cooperatives and are operating at a profit. In addition to retail stores set up within the hamlets, the marketing cooperatives have also organized push-cart units that travel to remote areas to sell goods and procure raw materials and discarded materials. The district's marketing cooperatives have 40,968 members. Some 50,000 shares in marketing cooperatives have been purchased (by 65 percent of the persons

old enough to purchase shares) and the value of each share has risen from 5 to 25 dong.

We have reorganized merchants and shifted a number of them to production and the services. We have brought the remaining merchants into various transitional forms of organization, such as cooperatives and joint businesses with the state, with the aim of utilizing their sources of capital and skills. These forms of organization have helped the state to control the flow of money and goods, manage prices, stabilize tax collections and gradually bring private merchants into the collective way of earning a living, thereby balancing the three interests (of the state, the collective and the individual laborer). As a result, private merchants have readily accepted these measures. Seven of these joint businesses have now been established, primarily through capital contributed by private merchants.

Gross commerce revenues within our district now stand at 600 million dong. The state tightly controls such strategic products as rice, meat, cloth, beans, sugar, dried fish sauce, vegetables, fruit, etc. Socialist commerce now controls the market, accounting for 75 to 80 percent of retail sales and 70 to 75 percent of wholesale sales, thereby creating favorable conditions for developing production and stabilizing and improving the people's living conditions.

In communications and transportation, following the redistribution of means of transportation that was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the province, the means of transportation remaining in Hoa Thanh District were organized into one district state-operated vehicle unit consisting of seven trucks with a capacity of 5 to 7 tons, one land transport cooperative consisting of 70 trucks with a capacity of less than 2.5 tons and one river transport cooperative consisting of 33 boats ranging in capacity from 2.5 to 50 tons. Besides the state-operated truck unit and the cooperative, our district also has one specialized trucking unit with 15 trucks at various enterprises, trucks which range in capacity from 5 to 7 tons.

In the field of culture and social relations, Hoa Thanh has had to constantly struggle against actions that exploit belief in spiritual powers and dogma, superstitions and the vestiges and poisons of the old system. Transforming and building the district culturally and socially, molding the new man and building the new countryside are considered a task of central importance.

During the past several years, we have found and confiscated tens of thousands of reactionary, pornographic books, magazines and music tapes of all types, dismantled the administrative system of the Cao Dai Religion from the central to the village levels and only allowed this religion to concern itself with "religious affairs." We also quickly established libraries, outdoor theaters, meeting halls, a movie corporation, a cultural services corporation, a state-operated film art enterprise and 15 amateur political song and art-literary units. The wired radio network has spread to all villages. In addition to public loudspeakers, there are also household loudspeaker networks. In many villages, as many as 200 loudspeakers have been installed in households. This system promptly supports the effort to publicize the positions and policies of the party and state, provides for the flow of information within villages and

hamlets and brings the voice of the revolution to the masses. We have constructed an adequate number of schools and classes and equipped them with sufficient teaching and learning aids. Each year, more are being constructed and more aids are being supplied in order to meet our rising needs. During the past 2 years, a total of 19 million dong have been spent on school and classroom construction, 590,000 dong of which have been provided by the state. At present, the district has 2 middle level general schools, 30 basic level general schools, 16 kindergartens, 10 child care centers and 1 formal supplementary education school. One of every three citizens is attending school. We have also organized "compassion classes" in the villages for children who are unable to attend school during the day. These classes are taught by volunteers from the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union.

In addition to the public health network that has been established in all villages, the district has a 130 bed hospital, a district folk medicine association with a membership of nearly 300 practitioners of folk medicine and a folk medicine network that extends into all hamlets. As a result of attaching importance to guiding the planned parenthood movement, the birthrate has declined from 2.6 percent (1976) to 1.8 percent (1984).

The campaign to establish the civilized way of life, establish families of the new culture has been intensified, cadres and party members have been setting good examples and the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union has been playing the role of shock force in this effort. Weddings and funerals, which were previously arranged by religious organizations, are now organized by the Fatherland Front, the Red Cross and the mass organizations.

In summary, under the light of the resolution of the party's 5th Congress and the subsequent resolutions of the Party Central Committee and under the guidance of the Tay Ninh Provincial Party Committee, Hoa Thanh District has, on the basis of its specific situation, taken positive steps to reorganize production and everyday life in line with the socio-economic goals set by the party, taken positive steps to gradually establish and develop an industrial-agricultural structure within the district. The district has established close ties among production, distribution, circulation and consumption. the small industry and handicraft cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, credit cooperatives and marketing cooperatives are closely tied to one another, closely tied to the system of corporations and state-operated enterprises of the district and are developing together. The material and spiritual lives of the people of the district have been stabilized and gradually improved. Security and national defense have been firmly maintained. The building of the party has been improved. The corps of cadres has been trained and grown. Many young, able bodied cadres with leadership and organizational skills have emerged.

We have achieved these results because our district party organization is a party organization of unity and consensus that has strictly implemented the general line of the party and its line on economic development as expressed in the various resolutions of the party congress, the party plenums and the Tay Ninh Provincial Party Committee in a spirit of initiative, creativity and self-reliance.

The 3rd Congress of the Hoa Thanh District Party Organization, which was held in early 1983, took a hard look at our shortcomings in leadership, re-evaluated the potentials and strengths of the locality, unanimously defined the economic structure of the district as an industrial-agricultural structure, adopted a plan and measures for implementing this structure and encouraged cadres and party members to display responsibility, display the spirit of daring to think and act. The action program adopted by the district was widely discussed within the party and among the mass organizations.

Organizational development has been closely tied to ideological work and the mobilization of the masses. The district people's committee and the staff committees of the district have been strengthened. The village level has been strengthened. A member of the district party committee is in charge of practically every village. Key villages are under the direct guidance of a member of the standing committee of the district party committee. The mass organizations have been strengthened. Economic organizations and material bases supporting the state-operated system in achieving the dominant role have been quickly constructed and been a strong force attracting the masses. To meet the requirements of our constantly expanding production, we have boldly assigned young, qualified cadres who have been tested and have matured at basic units to the management apparatus of the various sectors. Some 1,985 cadres, included among whom are 673 scientific-technical cadres whose level of education ranges from an elementary level education to a college level education, 776 economic management cadres, practically all of whom have an elementary level education, 326 state management cadres and so forth, have been trained in accordance with our cadre planning. Party activities within the district have been put on a regular basis. The principle of democratic centralism is being fully upheld and all leadership efforts are inspected. The mass organizations have steadily grown and introduced outstanding persons to the party, 220 of whom became party members in 1984. Thirty of the thirty-seven party chapters have been nominated for recognition as pure, solid and strong party chapters. Since the implementation of the resolution of the 4th Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee, not one cadre or party member has violated the party's standards of discipline.

Trusting the masses and respecting the right of collective ownership of the working people, we have attached importance to mass agitation and intensified our efforts in this area in both breadth and depth. We have steadfastly publicized and explained the lines and policies of the party, especially the policy on the freedom of religion and the freedom not to believe in a religion. We have tapped the socialist patriotism of the masses and gained their participation in revolutionary movements to build and defend the fatherland. Understanding and recognizing their role as collective masters within the new society, as a result of which they have foresaken the prejudices instilled in them by the enemy, and with their economic interests guaranteed, the masses (the vast majority of whom are religious) have turned to earning their livings collectively with enthusiasm. They have actively participated in the construction of the Dau Tieng Reservoir (excavating and spreading more than 1 million cubic meters of dirt and stone and pouring more than 5,000 cubic meters of concrete), have fulfilled their grain obligations, maintained security, helped to strengthen the national defense system, etc. As a result, production has developed and living conditions have stabilized.

Hoa Thanh's contributions to the state have steadily risen. It has exceeded its grain obligation and military draft quota every year. Each village has from 5 to 8 militia companies. The district has a total of 1,800 people's security teams. Having gained increasing confidence in the revolution, the masses have reported negative phenomena, black marketing activities and illegal, reactionary activities to the authorities. Some 31 major and minor cases of clandestine reactionary activities within the district have been uncovered and prosecuted. In particular, in 1983, we broke up two organizations of reactionaries masquerading as religious clergy, the "International Reconciliation" organization and the "Royal Flush" organization masterminded by Ho Tan Khoa, the head of the Cao Dai Religion. Ho Tan Khoa was put on public trial before some 50,000 people and the followers of the Cao Dai Religion themselves demanded that Khoa be expelled from the Cao Dai Religion.

Hoa Thanh District also has many difficulties and shortcomings. We must introduce scientific and technical advances in production and everyday life more quickly, build more material bases, more stations and farms for agriculture and raise crop yields. We must solidify the socialist economic forms and basic units that have begun to be established. We must provide additional professional and specialized cadres for business and accounting. We must educate the 8,200 children who are not receiving an education, 2,000 of whom are illiterate. We must continue to heighten our vigilance, sweep away the poisons of the reactionary and decadent culture, etc. Nevertheless, the very encouraging initial results recorded by our district over the past few years are eloquent and vivid proof that the district is the most suitable base for reorganizing production and everyday life, for simultaneously carrying out the three revolutionary, that Hoa Thanh's path to socialism has opened and brought to light many fine prospects.

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THE AGRICULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF HUNGARY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 pp 85-88

[Article by Ho Bat Khuat]

[Text] On 4 April 1945, following many years of arduous struggle, the people of Hungary, with the decisive assistance of the Soviet Red Army, threw off the rule of the dictatorial Horthy regime and the fascists, liberated the country and brought it into a new era: the era of independence, freedom and socialism.

In its four decades of socialist construction, Hungary has recorded major achievements in many fields, achievements which include the rapid development of agriculture.

Prior to liberation day, Hungary's agriculture was backward. Compared to world averages, crop and livestock yields were low. Injustice in the ownership of cropland was quite severe: the landlord class represented only 0.9 percent of the agricultural population but controlled nearly 50 percent of the cropland. The vast majority of peasants lacked cropland or had none at all. Their plight was one of chronic hunger and privation. As a result, Hungary was called the country of 3 million beggars.

Today, that gloomy picture no longer exists. Hungary's agriculture has become one of the advanced agricultures of the world. Although it only has about 0.15 percent of the world's farmland, Hungary produces 0.8 percent of the world's agricultural output. Once a country that lacked food, a country that had to import grain, Hungary today is not only fully meeting the grain and food needs of its people, but also allocates more than 30 percent of its total agricultural output for exportation. In 1984, it produced 1,460 kilograms of cereal grains and 210 kilograms of meat per capita, thereby ranking first in the world.

The agricultural achievements mentioned above are the results of the correct policies and measures of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on the agricultural front.

Most importantly, they are the results of transforming, building, organizing and managing agricultural production at the right time and place and in a

smoothly coordinated manner. Hungary carried out agrarian reform immediately after liberation. More than 1.8 million hectares of cropland (that is, nearly 20 percent of the country's land) were distributed to 642,000 peasants who lacked cropland. In the autumn of 1948, Hungary launched agricultural cooperativization. Hundreds of agricultural cooperatives were established. Their members harvested much more than they did as private peasants. By the start of 1955, the agricultural cooperatives accounted for nearly 20 percent of the land under cultivation within the country. During the period of the counter-revolutionary rebellion, the reactionaries sabotaged a number of agricultural cooperatives. However, the socialist segment of the countryside showed its vitality: after the counter-revolutionary rebellion was crushed, all of the cooperatives that had been destroyed by the enemy were quickly restored. By April, 1959, 42 percent of the villages in Hungary had established agricultural cooperatives. In late 1961, Hungary virtually completed the socialist transformation of agriculture. Since then, the agricultural cooperatives have continuously been consolidated, developed and improved. In 1960, Hungary had 4,507 cooperatives. By 1983, they had been consolidated into 1,300 cooperatives. At present, each cooperative has roughly 3,500 hectares of farmland and produces an annual output worth roughly 50 million forints. In Hungary, the merger of cooperatives has not simply been a matter of combining the farmland and material-technical bases of cooperatives. More importantly, it has created new production units that are larger and more efficient than the old units. The cooperatives have also been built along the lines of one of the fundamental forms of the socialist enterprise. The operations of the cooperatives must be coordinated with the targets of the national economy and the interests of all of society.

Along with carrying out agricultural cooperativization, Hungary has also attached importance to the establishment and development of state farms. These are agricultural enterprises managed by the state. In addition to cropland, they also encompass processing plants. At present, Hungary has 130 state farms, which have a total of roughly 650,000 hectares of farmland. The average state farm has nearly 5,000 hectares of farmland and produces agricultural products worth 170 million forints. Although they only represent 12.4 percent of the country's total farmland, the state farms produce 18 percent of the country's agricultural output.

Production by the families of cooperative members and state farm workers and private production also account for an important portion of Hungary's agriculture, supplying more than 30 percent of total agricultural output. This component, which is, generally speaking, closely linked to the large-scale production units, receives assistance from these units in the form of seed, breeding stock, feed for livestock, etc. It undertakes those jobs that the large-scale production units are unable to perform, such as making full use of arable land by means of labor performed after regular work hours, the labor of retired persons, etc.

Agro-industrial unions, which operate as an independent structure, are a new form of organization within Hungary's agriculture. These unions, which consist of agricultural cooperatives, industrial units, commerce units and so forth, are designed to coordinate economic activities from many different perspectives and make effective use of new, large-scale production

capabilities. Although only established in 1976, the agro-industrial unions have had the effect of stimulating the centralization and specialization of production with the aim of achieving increasingly high economic efficiency.

To maintain and raise the value of agricultural products, the production and processing of agricultural products must be a continuous, unified and rational process. For this reason, the food processing industry in Hungary is very closely tied to agricultural production and is a sector under the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.

Under the guidance of the party's economic line, Hungary's agricultural leaders have been employing a system of different factors to regulate economic activities. A correct price policy is the most important measure, is a measure that has a strong and direct impact upon productivity and the structure of production. The tax policy, the capital investment policy, the means of regulating financial activities, the organizing of research and experimental projects, the dissemination of technical knowledge and the establishment of technical councils as well as mandatory requirements and administrative measures all play a role in developing agricultural production. These regulatory factors, be they direct or indirect, are not applied in a manner divorced from the planning system. In Hungary, planning always plays the decisive role in guiding agricultural production.

Regulating the structure of agricultural production so that it is balanced and coordinated is the most important factor stimulating agriculture's development. In Hungary, the ratio between crop production and livestock production was 62:38 in 1938, 54.7:45.3 in 1976, 51:49 in 1980 and 47.3:52.7 in 1983. These changes have occurred in this ratio because, over the past 20 years, the livestock production sector has been developing at a faster rate than the crop production sector. This has enabled Hungary's agriculture to achieve an increasingly high rate of development. However, in actuality, the livestock production side of this ratio cannot increase indefinitely because crop production and livestock production are organically related and depend upon each other for development. Therefore, correctly determining the position and percentage represented by each type crop and species of livestock within agriculture's structure is a matter of major significance. Prior to 1965, the ratio between the amount of land devoted to wheat production and the amount devoted to corn production was inappropriate, as a result of which Hungary had to import wheat each year. After 1965, the amount of area under the cultivation of wheat was rationally increased and Hungary became self-sufficient in wheat. At present, wheat, barley, rice and corn account for more than 60 percent of the land under cultivation. Vegetables, potatoes, sugar beets and other crops account for nearly 40 percent. Under this allocation of crops, agricultural production has developed smoothly, developed in a manner consistent with the conditions and capabilities of Hungary.

With regard to livestock production, Hungary, on the basis of specific environmental conditions and feed sources, has attached importance to developing the production of five main species of livestock and poultry in the following order of priority: hogs, cattle, chickens-ducks, sheep and horses.

Within each agricultural enterprise, the structure of production is always being changed to suit the specific conditions during each period and being modernized in line with socialist business practices.

Mechanization, the application of chemistry and the building of irrigation projects in agriculture, the rapid application of scientific and technical advances, the improvement of crop varieties and livestock breeds and so forth have also been important factors contributing to the achievements recorded within Hungary's agriculture. Prior to 1945, the entire country of Hungary had only a few steam driven tractors and foot-powered wheat threshing machines. By January, 1976, it had nearly 50,000 tractors with a total of 3,515,000 horsepower. By 1980, the number of tractors had risen to 56,000 with 4,760,000 horsepower. Other manual jobs in crop and livestock production have also been rapidly mechanized. Today, the production of all cereal grains and many other types of crops has been completely mechanized.

Fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides have been in widespread use in Hungary for more than 20 years. In 1960, Hungary used on 170,000 tons of chemical fertilizers in agriculture. In recent years, it has been using roughly 1.5 million tons annually, an average of 230 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare.

In Hungary's fields, modern irrigation and drainage methods, such as underground pipe networks and above-ground sluice networks, have been closely coordinated with traditional irrigation measures, thereby providing effective irrigation and drainage for the majority of the land under cultivation. Hungary's geneticists have developed many high quality varieties of crops and breeds of livestock. Together with importing a number of varieties of wheat (from the Soviet Union), corn (from the GDR) and so forth, Hungary has been making constant efforts to develop an increasingly improved allocation of varieties.

Under the impact of scientific and technical measures, Hungary's agriculture has achieved increasingly high yields. Hungary's wheat yields were roughly 10 quintals per hectare during the 1940's and 20 quintals per hectare in the mid-1960's. Today, the average yield on all cropland is 40 quintals per hectare, as high as 70 to 80 quintals per hectare at some places. The corn yield has risen from 15 quintals per hectare in 1938 to 55 quintals per hectare in 1984.

Compared to 40 years ago, the number of hogs being raised has only increased by 50 percent but pork output has increased 3.7 times as a result of replacing the old breed of hogs with white hogs and raising hogs by industrial methods. The number of cattle being raised is virtually the same but beef and milk output has nearly doubled.

In 1938 (the year during which the highest output prior to liberation was produced), cereal grain output reached 7,189,000 tons and 621,000 tons of meat were produced. In 1984, 15,700,000 tons of cereal grains and 2,400,000 tons of meat were produced even though the country's farmland had decreased by 10 percent and its agricultural workforce by 60 percent compared to 1938. This proves that agricultural labor productivity in Hungary has risen rather rapidly. Today, the average Hungarian agricultural worker supplies enough grain and food to feed 28 to 30 persons.

While applying many different types of factors to make an impact upon agricultural production, Hungary considers the decisive factor to be the quality of man's activities. At present, more than 80 percent of the workers in Hungary's agriculture are specialized and skilled workers. They are highly specialized by individual sector and trade: equipment repair, milking, hog production, crop protection, tractor operation, etc. They are no longer peasants but have become agricultural workers. More than 12 percent of Hungary's scientific and technical cadres, 50,000 of whom have an academy, college or post-graduate education, are working in agricultural production. Skilled and intelligent agricultural workers together with scientific methods of organizing production and a rational division of labor are the principal factors that have brought enormous achievements, brought a sense of pride to Hungary's agriculture.

The experiences that Hungary's agriculture has gained during the past 40 years are being studied and applied by many fraternal countries, including Vietnam.

The Vietnamese derive great inspiration from the achievements that the fraternal people of Hungary have recorded in agricultural production as well as the other fields of socialist construction. On this, the 40th anniversary of the total liberation of Hungary, we sincerely wish the Hungarian people continued and even larger victories under the leadership of the Hungarian socialist workers party, headed by Janos Kadar, in the building of developed socialist society, thereby making increasingly positive contributions to the growth and strength of the socialist community.

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COVER PAGES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 4, Apr 85 outside front cover, inside front cover, inside back cover, outside back cover

[Text] Outside Front Cover

Celebrating the 10th anniversary of the victory over the U.S. imperialists and the reunification of the fatherland, April, 1975-April, 1985.

[These words appear as the caption below a montage depicting a drawn portrait of President Ho Chi Minh set against the background of the petals of an open flower. Below this portrait, in the foreground of the montage, are drawn portraits of four individuals. From left to right, they are a bespectacled young woman; a young, male worker wearing gloves and a hard hat carrying a cable over his left shoulder and an unidentifiable tool over his right shoulder; a young woman wearing a hairnet and holding a sheath of rice in her arms; and a young soldier in uniform carrying an infantry rifle over his right shoulder. The upper left hand corner of the montage depicts a train travelling from left to right, in the foreground of which are farm fields, a power tower and a dam discharging water through its gates. In the upper right hand corner is a drawing of the former Presidential Palace of the Republic of South Vietnam. In the foreground of the palace is a tank, atop of which are four soldiers, one of whom is accepting an unidentifiable item from a civilian.]

Inside Front Cover

"The sacred task of all our people at this point in time is to display a high spirit of determination to fight and win, determination to liberate the South, defend the North and eventually achieve the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

As long as one aggressor remains in our country, we must continue to fight and drive him off.

(...)


Having experienced nearly 100 years of colonialist enslavement and more than 20 years of resisting the war of aggression of the imperialists, our people,

more than anyone else, are very desirous of achieving peace in order to build the country, but it must be a peace in true independence and freedom."

Ho Chi Minh
(1968)

Inside Back Cover

(1) GIÁ TRỊ TỔNG SẢN LƯỢNG CÔNG NGHIỆP
(Tính theo giá cố định năm 1970)



1. The value of total industrial output (at fixed 1970 prices)
2. Index of growth.
3. Total
4. Group A
5. Group B

Some industrial products:

Electric power (billions of kilowatt hours):

1976: 3.0
1980: 3.7
1984: 4.8

Cement (thousands of tons):

1976: 738
1980: 641
1984: 1,297

Cloth (millions of meters):

1976: 240
1980: 175
1984: 364

Civilian Chinaware (millions of pieces):

1976: 100
1980: 102
1984: 141

Outside Back Cover

Against the threat of nuclear war [These words appear as the caption below a drawing depicting four arms extending from the left and right margins, two from each direction, their hands set one atop the other and clenching a flagpole. The arms and hands are four different colors (top to bottom): white, yellow, black and red. A white dove rests on each arm. Atop the flagpole, flying from right to left, is a red flag emblazoned with a white dove in flight. Beneath the flagpole, pointing toward the right, is a black warhead with a tail-fin assembly. All of the above is set against the background of a drawing of the earth set to the left of the center of the drawing.]

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END

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